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ABSTRACT 
Three-paper dissertation: 
Origins and Use of Presidential Polling in Mexico 
Presidential Approval in Mexico 
Government Spending and Public Opinion in Mexico 
 
Oscar Torres-Reyna 
This three-paper dissertation aims to contribute to the study of the Mexican presidency, in 
particular, to the understanding of the origins and use of presidential polling, its role in the policy 
activity of the president, and the dynamics of presidential approval between 1989 and 2011. The 
dissertation draws upon the presidential polling, opinion-policy and approval research done in 
the United States. The first paper explores a topic that has not received much attention in Mexico, 
the origins and use of the presidential polling unit (PPU). The second paper focuses on 
presidential approval in Mexico, and the third analyzes, yet another understudied topic, the 
relationship between government spending (used as proxy for policy) and public opinion 
(collected by the PPU).
1
 Substantive findings are summarized below. 
In the interest of full disclosure, the author of this dissertation worked at the Presidential 
Polling unit from 1990 to early 1996. I started as a part time analyst and left as a Director for 
Economic and Special Studies. This experience gave me a second career in public opinion and 
provided a front row seat to presidential politics, but most importantly, it provided a first look at 
the use of data analysis and polling for policymaking in Mexico. 
                                                 
1
 The Mexican journal Politica y Gobierno (Politics and Government, published by the Centro de Estudios y 
Docencia Económica, A.C.-CIDE-, http://www.politicaygobierno.cide.edu/) publishes articles similar to those in 
major political science journals in the United States. A quick look at the titles of all the papers published in the 
“articles” section (since the first issue in 1994 and until March 19, 2013) shows a strong focus on voting behavior 
and elections in Mexico (31%). Articles on the Mexican presidency or presidents 1.3%, on public policy in Mexico 
10%, and on democracy in Mexico 8.5%. 
Polling data for the years 1989-2006 come from the PPU and is freely available at the 
Banco de Información para la Investigación Aplicada en Ciencias Sociales (BIIACS at CIDE).
2
 
For the years 2007-2011, data collected by the PPU is still not available.
3
 To complement the 






The PPU collected data from face-to-face and phone. The socioeconomic makeup of 
these two samples is different. According to Census data, the percentage of Mexican households 
with a landline was 36% in 2000 and 43% in 2010. In this sense, phone polls only reached about 
a third of households in the 1990s and about 40% in the 2000s. In general, the population from 
phone samples tends to have higher levels of income and education (data was post-stratified by 
age and gender). I will use this to explore the influence of socioeconomic differences between 
opinion and spending.  
To measure the policy activity of the presidents I used government expenditures. The 
data comes from the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geografía (INEGI).
6
 The 
macroeconomic data included in the models come from different sources. GDP percapita (as an 
indicator of economic growth) and inflation come from the World Development Indicators.
7
 
Unemployment data for the years 1989-2010 come from the Centro de Economia Internacional 
(CEI)
8
, and the year 2011 from INEGI. 
In terms of methodology, the first paper relies on crosstabulations, text analysis, 
wordclouds and cluster analysis. Additionally, to offer an insider’s view, I conducted a series of 
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 http://www.biiacs.cide.edu/. Most of this data is also available at the Roper Center, 
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/. For the dissertation, the source of the data was BIIACS. 
3











interviews to seven presidential staffers during the administrations of Presidents Carlos Salinas 
de Gortari (Dec/1988-Nov/1994), Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León (Dec/1994-Nov/2000), and 
Vicente Fox Quezada (Dec/2000-Nov/2006). The second and third papers made use of vector 
autoregression models to account for feedback effects among the spending and opinion variables, 
controlling, at the same time, for a possible ‘backwards’ process in the opinion variables.9 The 
main assumption is that the variables are connected: all variables depend and/or explain each 
other. The paper on approval uses presidential approval from field and phone polls as the 
contemporaneous outcome variable. The paper on the relationship between spending and opinion 
uses spending as the contemporaneous outcome variable. 
The first paper entitled “Origins and Use of Presidential Polling in Mexico” addresses the 
questions of what caused the creation of a government office dedicated to gauge public opinion, 
what poll information the presidents collected, and how it was used. I will argue that the 
institutionalization of public opinion within the presidency responded to the dynamics of the 
political system, in particular, to the changes in the electoral system and the outcome of the 
presidential election of 1988. The election of 1988 changed Mexico’s electoral map and 
reconfigured the party loyalties against the ruling party PRI. Aware of this new political context, 
President Salinas used polling not only to study the political behavior of the Mexican voters but 
also as an alternative to verify electoral results. In fact, the first mandate of the presidential 
polling unit was to track political preferences. Eventually the use of public opinion polls 
expanded to other issues and became part of the presidential policy toolkit. As Jacobs and 
Shapiro (1995) pointed out in the case of the Kennedy administration, the Mexican presidency 
                                                 
9
 This is, people may approve the job the president is doing because they may believe the country and their own 
personal situation is doing fine. However, it could also be the case that just because they do not like what the 
president is doing, they may believe the country and their own personal situation is getting worse. 
had now an office with “routinized procedures” to research and collect public opinion data. To 
identify the type of polling information collected by the presidents, in addition to interviews to 
presidential staffers, I applied text analysis on titles of all presidential polls conducted between 
1989 and 2006. While all presidents collected opinion data on their approval ratings and 
customized their polling operations according to their own policy agenda, there were some 
overall differences. President Salinas centered his field polling operations around policy, and his 
phone polls for elections and presidential image. President Zedillo used field polls mostly for 
electoral issues and phone polls for image and communications. President Fox focused the field 
polls for government evaluation and customer satisfaction, and his phone polls for image and 
evaluation of political figures. How public opinion information was used remains an open 
chapter. All presidential insiders mentioned that information from public opinion polls was not 
specifically used to design policy but rather to test it, and to see what worked and what did not 
work. Polling was used to find ways to convince the public of the benefits of the presidential 
policies and actions. From this analysis, the conclusion is similar to what Jacobs (1992) argued 
in his paper on recoil effect. The presidents did use polling to try to move public opinion to their 
side, but also polling was used to understand what was in the mind of the public. Eventually, 
these efforts, I believe, made a significant contribution to the development of political public 
opinion and, most importantly, to the development of democratic values among the political 
elites. 
The second paper entitled “Presidential Approval in Mexico” looks at the factors that 
influence presidential approval using as reference research done in the United States and Mexico. 
I am looking for evidence that presidential approval in Mexico depends on factors directly 
connected to policy outcomes (Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson 2002). The risk of manipulation 
is at the center of this connection. The president may create the illusion of meeting the public’s 
expectations (Kernel 1997) and/or opinion elites may misled the public against the president 
(MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson 1992). The argument here is that as long as presidential 
popularity is rooted in objective measures related to policy or economic outcomes, approval may 
actually be a reliable indicator of citizen’s response to government actions and, therefore, a 
reliable measure of the president’s political capital. Thus, the research question is whether 
approval depends on objective measures of the economy (and the overall situation of the country) 
or relies on the public’s perceptions about the current conditions of the country. Furthermore, are 
those perceptions retrospective or prospective? Do they rely on what has been done or what is 
expected to be done? The findings presented in this paper confirm the expectations that the 
popularity of the Mexican president depends mostly on how the economy is doing and how the 
president deals with current salient issues like public safety (Buendia 1996; Gómez-Vilchis 
2012). At the level of perceptions, prospective evaluations of personal well-being have a positive 
impact on approval but only among the richer segments of the population. It is important to 
notice that these perceptions are strongly influenced by the unemployment rates. The overall 
conclusion is that presidential approval in Mexico is rooted in macroeconomic, salient and 
subjective measures that are also connected to the dynamics of leading economic indicators. 
Presidential approval in Mexico depends, so far, on the president’s capacity to solve problems. 
The third paper entitled “Government spending and public opinion in Mexico” explores 
the relationship between policy and public opinion. While this paper draws upon the opinion-
policy research done in the United States, it departs from the policy preference approach to a 
perspective centered on policy outcomes. The main opinion variables included in the models 
refer to retrospective and prospective evaluations of personal well-being. These are generic and, 
in the question wording, do not refer to any issue in particular. One of the goals is to find 
whether these opinion variables are directly connected to trends in leading economic indicators 
(like growth of GDP percapita, unemployment, inflation). If such connection exists, then they 
may represent citizen’s responses to current state of affairs of which the president and the 
government in general are perceived as responsible. This is, the opinion variables can be taken as 
responding to policy outcomes. The main underlying logic follows the Mood and Thermostatic 
models suggested by Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson (2002) and Soroka and Welzien (2010) 
respectively. If people started to feel that things are getting worse, then I would expect the 
government to increase spending, for example to stimulate the economy. Conversely, if people 
feel things are getting better, then I would expect the president to scale back on spending. The 
models show feedback in the economic but not in the public safety models (this is, the reciprocal 
effect between opinion and spending). In the models where economic spending is the 
contemporaneous outcome variable, positive prospective evaluations of personal well-being and 
perceptions that the economy is the most important problem (MIP) facing the nation show 
significant effects on spending. In the case of spending on public safety, negative prospective 
evaluation of personal well-being and the perceptions that public safety is the most important 
problem in the country play a significant role (but there is no feedback). An important finding is 
that the public attentiveness to economic issues (MIP) does explain a significant portion of the 
variance in spending on the economy. Regarding the impact of opinions by socioeconomic status, 
there is not enough evidence to conclude that the President listens more to a particular segment 
of the population. The results, however, seem to indicate a marginal difference in favor of the 
public with lower income and education levels. Overall, the findings presented here show a 
connection between presidential spending activity and public opinion. This suggests some 
responsiveness towards public opinion. Regardless of their own personal agendas, presidents 
have worked to improve the conditions of the citizens and responded to their perceptions of the 
general situation of the country. The fact that most of the population is still poor combined with 
the fact that polling is here to stay (along with the new impact of social media), has forced 
politicians to be responsive to the needs and wants of the public. As long as the public remains 
connected to its economic reality and pay attention to their immediate environment, any attempt 
of manipulation will not last long. The Mexican public is wise and, repeatedly in electoral 
processes, it has demonstrated strong and reasonable political culture. Mexican politicians are 
catching up with the public and this is a good thing. However, as democracy consolidates in 
Mexico, it may be possible to see the nature of responsiveness changing as the influence of 
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Origins and use of presidential polling in Mexico 
 
Abstract 
Scholars in the United States have argued that the origins and use of the presidential polling 
apparatus lie in the dynamics of the political system. The conflicting relationship between the 
President and Congress, the incentives from the electoral system and imperfect information has 
motivated presidents to gauge public opinion. In Mexico, the story is different in the details but 
similar in the context. This paper is based on a series of interviews of presidential staffers and 
text analysis of the titles of all polls conducted by the presidential polling unit between 1989 and 
2006. The dynamics of the political system set the stage for the creation of the presidential 
polling unit. The transition to democracy that started during the late 1970s created the conditions 
for the electoral realignment in the presidential election of 1988, which was product of the power 
struggle within the ruling party. While the election of President Salinas was highly contested, his 
administration represented the continuation of the transition from a state-oriented to a market-
oriented economy, a modernization process that eventually expanded to the public sector. Given 
the political context at the beginning of his administration, Salinas faced the need to understand 
the new electoral reality and polling provided not only a way to study the political behavior of 
the Mexican voters but also an alternative to verify electoral results. The first mandate of the 
presidential polling unit was, in fact, to track political preferences. Eventually the use of public 
opinion polls expanded to other issues and became part of the presidential policy toolkit. Text 
analysis on titles of presidential polls shows that President Salinas centered his field polling 
operations around policy, and his phone polls for elections and presidential image. President 
Zedillo used field polls mostly for electoral issues and phone polls for image and 





satisfaction, and his phone polls for image and evaluation of political figures. All presidential 
insiders mentioned that information from public opinion polls was not used to design policy. 
While Mexico is still a developing country, the efforts of the presidents to understand what was 
in the mind of the public made a significant contribution to the development of political public 
opinion and, most importantly, the development of democratic values among the political elites. 
It is clear now that nobody can claim to be the ‘voice of the people’. Nowadays, public opinion 
studies are everywhere. Political events, speeches, trips or policy announcements cannot escape 
polling; with the advent of social media, these are scrutinized even more and almost instantly. In 
the Mexican case, public opinion has been an important addition to the presidential toolkit. 
Presidents have a direct source of information on the public sentiment. They have now a better 
sense of how far they could go in their policy agendas. While it is not clear that presidents have 
followed public opinion verbatim, it is clear that public opinion has had some influence on their 
policy actions and decisions. Nowadays, in Mexico, presidential responsiveness to public 
opinion has to be considered in the big scheme of the policymaking process constrained by the 
political system. The President is no longer the originator and executor of policies. He is now 
part of the policymaking equation. To get what they want, political elites have to balance the 
institutional arrangements that constrained them, along with the reality of a more active public 
opinion, and most importantly, a more mature and complex society whose sentiments are still 






 “Win the crowd and you will win your freedom” 




There is an old story, now part of the political folklore in Mexico, about a political 
candidate who, while campaigning, promised to build a bridge. The confused voters asked him 
why, the city did not have a river. The candidate replied that he would dig a river so he could 
build the bridge. This story pretty much summarizes the old ways of doing politics in Mexico. 
Political candidates would say and promise anything, the election was just a procedure to 
legitimize their jobs. Once in office, they would do whatever they wanted. Their political future 
was not tied to serving the public’s needs but rather serving their own interests, and those of the 
party and the political elite. 
The morale of the story is the incongruence between what the politicians want and what 
the public needs. All the way through the 1980s and, to a lesser extent, the 1990s, public opinion 
was channeled and controlled through different social organizations, most of which were 
affiliated with the ruling party PRI. The leaders of those organizations claimed to speak for all 
the people –to be vox populi. The media were also part of that complex political network loyal to 
the regime. 
Given the political context in Mexico towards the end of the 1980s, why would the 





established a polling unit within the presidency?
10
 Why did the president of an authoritarian 
regime decide to track public opinion? What kind of polling information did the presidents 
collect and use? Who had access to that information? This paper will address those questions in 
the context of a country transitioning to a democratic rule. I argue that the political system, 
intended or unintended, created the necessary conditions to put Mexico closer to what Bryce 
called the fourth stage of democracy (cited in Gallup and Rae 1940)
11
. 
This paper explores the origins of presidential polling in Mexico and the use of public 
opinion polls during three administrations: Carlos Salinas de Gortari (Dec/1988-Nov/1994), 
Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León (Dec/1994-Nov/2000), and Vicente Fox Quezada (Dec/2000-
Nov/2006). Presidents Salinas and Zedillo are members of the center-left Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional (PRI/Institutional Revolutionary Party), the hegemonic party that ruled Mexico for 
over 70 years. President Fox is a member of the right-wing Partido de Acción Nacional 
(PAN/National Action Party). 
In an unprecedented move, right after taking office on December 1988, President Carlos 
Salinas de Gortari created a polling unit within the Office of the Presidency. Under the name of 
Technical Advisor Office of the Presidency, it was headed by a Presidential Advisor and 
coordinated by the President’s Chief of Staff. It was an institutional feature closely monitored by 
the president and for the president’s eyes only.  
                                                 
10
 Mario Vargas Llosa made this comment during a televise debate among intellectuals called Siglo XX: la 
experiencia de la libertad (20
th
 century: the experience of freedom), Mexico, August 30, 1990. 
11
 Quoting Bryce, Gallup and Rae (1940:125) wrote: “’A fourth stage would be reached….if the will of the majority 
of citizens were to become ascertainable at all times’” (italics in the original). Gallup, George and Saul Forbes Rae. 





Research in the United States suggests several reasons as to why, since the Kennedy 
administration, presidents started to collect, consistently and systematically, public opinion 
information: 1) the dynamics in institutional arrangements have prompted presidents to gauge 
public opinion to calibrate their appeals to the public in an effort to confront other political elites 
(Congress in particular); 2) the decline of the influence of political parties and the rise of 
independent voting blocs have forced presidents to gather polling information to secure electoral 
coalitions to get re-elected and to advance their policy agenda; 3) given that most government 
decisions, procedures and implementations are part of the normal day-to-day operations of the 
bureaucratic machine, presidents somehow need to stand out to promote their image above it all. 
Polling provides the necessary information to design strategies to appeal to the voters and the 
general public (Jacobs and Shapiro 1995; Eisinger 2003; Jacobs and Burns 2004; Heith, 1998, 
2004)
 12
. In sum, presidential polling in the United States seems to be the consequence of both, 
the need to know and the conflict between political elites (mostly between the President and 
Congress). Such conflict is the product of the ‘rules of the game’ set by the political system and, 
in particular, by the incentives created by the electoral process. This produces the basic 
theoretical framework used in this paper: 
 
 
Presidential polling apparatus = f(dynamics of institutional arrangements, 
                                                                     electoral process,  
                                                        imperfect information)    
 
                                                 
12
 Jacobs,Lawrence R., Melanie Burns. 2004. “The Second Face of the Public Presidency: Presidential Polling and 
the Shift from Policy to Personality Polling”, Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 3, The Public Presidency 






By 1988, Mexico was still considered a non-democratic regime and in the middle of what 
scholars have called a “dual transition” process in which the country was moving from a state-





 summarizes the complex historical context that started during the 
1970s with a major game changer in the 1982 economic crisis (which set the institutional 
framework in which the presidential polling unit was created): 
“… the hegemonic PRI regime in Mexico tried to buy off and incorporate mass 
dissent through the economic populism of the 1970s to avoid having to give up the sole 
exercise of de jure and de facto power it enjoyed by virtue of its hegemonic rule. 
Economic populism led to recurrent end-of-sexenio crises, and one of the costs of 
retaining hegemony was that, in 1982, the Mexican state went bankrupt. The ranks of the 
opposition filled with disaffected businessmen and the urban middle classes, who decided 
to push their de facto power through the PAN. The surge of opposition from the right 
forced the PRI to give political concessions (that is, recognize electoral victories) that 
strengthened the PAN's de jure power. The imposition of Salinas as PRI presidential 
candidate in 1987 and, with it, of the neoliberal agenda to restructure the Mexican 
economy led to the split of the hegemonic PRI and the rise of a broad left under 
Cárdenas.” 
 
In the book La Herencia (translated as The Inheritance, 1999), Jorge Castañeda described 
in detail the moments that led to the nomination of Salinas as the PRI candidate in 1987; and the 
political drama during the night of his election in 1988. The nomination of Salinas was part of 
the political ritual that every six years a president had to undergo in naming his successor. What 
set Salinas’ nomination apart are two things, according to Castañeda: on one hand it broke with 
                                                 
13
 For a game theory/rational choice approach to dual transitions see Przeworski, Adam. 1991. Democracy and the 
market: political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America, Cambridge University Press, xii, 210 
p. For an institutional approach see Haggard, Stephan, and Robert R. Kaufman. 1995. The Political economy of 
democratic transitions, Princeton University Press, xiv, 391 p. 
14
 González, Francisco E. 2008. Dual Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Institutionalized Regimes in Chile and 






the non-written rule of not skipping one generation (which eventually led to the confrontation 
between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ guard within the PRI), and on the other, Salinas represented the 
continuation, and possible consolidation, of the transformation from state-led to market-oriented 
economy that started in 1982 (as we will see below, by the end of the 1980s the Mexican state 
had sold about two thirds of the companies it owned). During the election night, Castañeda 
described a candidate eager for news and waiting for the electoral authority to come out with 
information regarding his victory. Salinas’ need for a prompt announcement and the pressure 
from the party leaders to give a victory speech created a situation in which, by the time he 
decided to come out, his speech lacked the political support it needed from his party; he had lost 
the political momentum he needed to start his administration. 
Given the fracture among the political elite and the need to continue with the painful 
economic reforms, the Salinas administration needed to build political and popular support to 
advance his policy agenda. To navigate the complex political context polling became the new 
tool needed to fine-tune policies and actions, to calibrate the presidential appeals to a more 
demanding public opinion and to re-build electoral support
15
. In the case of Mexico, however, 
there has been little attention on the overall centrifugal/centripetal impact of the presidential 
polling apparatus (as suggested by Jacobs and Burns 2004).
16
 Most of the research, since the 
                                                 
15
 See Moreno (1996) for the case of the mid-term elections of 1991 and the use of polling by political elites. 
16
 The journal Politica y Gobierno (Politics and Government, published by the Centro de Estudios y Docencia 
Económica, A.C.-CIDE-, http://www.politicaygobierno.cide.edu/) publishes articles similar to those in major 
journals in the United States. A quick look at the titles of all the papers published in the “articles” section (since the 
first issue in 1994) shows a strong focus on voting behavior and elections (31%). Articles on the presidency or 
presidents are about 1.3%, on public policy 10%, and on democracy in Mexico 8.5% (these percentages refer to 





nineties, has focused on the overall impact of public opinion without paying much attention to 
the presidential polling unit itself.
17
  
This paper tries to fill that gap by following the research done in the United States and by 
assuming that the conditions set by the dynamics of Mexican political system generated enough 
incentives for the creation of the “public president” as defined by Jacobs and Burns (2004:537):  
“What makes the ‘public presidency’ public, however, is not only its outward oriented 
activities but also its systematic monitoring of the attitudes of the mass public. The public 
presidency is two-sided: Presidents take themselves and their policies to the public and they bring 
the public's opinions and perceptions into the inner sanctum of the presidency. Recent research 
has unearthed the second face of the "public presidency"? ---its sophisticated and routinized 
"public opinion apparatus" for conveying the public's sentiments to the president and his senior 
aides..."  
Starting with President Salinas, the presidential polling unit has linked consistently and 
systematically these two faces: the talking and traveling president and the president that listens. 
This link has had a major impact on how the President has not only adjusted his policy agenda 
but also marketed himself given that, in Mexico, presidents do place ads in the media.  
The overall argument is that the dynamics of the political system set in motion the 
institutional context that generated enough incentives for the creation of the Mexican presidential 
polling apparatus. I believe three processes drove those incentives:  
1) Changes in the electoral rules that started during the second half of the 1970s, 
which eventually opened the electoral competition to other, albeit smaller, 
political parties that eventually allowed political elites to play a major role in 
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the 1988 presidential election (see Peschard 2010)
18
. As Gonzalez (2008) 
argued, the regime had two choices: to repress the social unrest during the 
1970s, or to open a small window through the electoral system to channel it. 
The regime chose the second option, which did not necessarily represented 
commitment to democracy but rather a survival strategy.  
2) The crisis in 1982 challenged the prevailing notion of the role of the state in the 
economy. The modernization process that started in the 1980s was 
characterized by, first, a wave of privatizations and deregulations (which 
caused the state to sell about 63% of its companies by the end of the 1980s) 
and, second, by the end of the 1980s, the modernization of the public 
administration (see Alberro 2010)
19
. 
3) The election of 1988. As a consequence of the two previous process, there was 
a struggle between the “old” and “new” guard within the ruling party in which 
the new rules of the democratic game started to take effect (in particular, for 
the first time the PRI loosing majority control in Congress, see Loaeza and 
Prud’homme 2010:13)20. In this context, based on these trends and on what 
González (2008) suggested, we could see that the election of Salinas 
represented the election of a man eager to continue implementing a bold 
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modernization policy and in great need of legitimacy. This played a significant 
role in the creation of the presidential polling unit. Salinas needed an extra 
source of information to navigate not only the complex political context but 
also to find source of political support. 
The analysis presented here will depart from the common perceptions about the Mexican 
Presidents in the sense that it offers a sort of a general backstage view of how they operated. On 
the front lines, we saw presidents as trying to seize power or to transform the bureaucratic 
machine into an efficient provider of public goods. The behind the scenes view offers a different 
perspective especially when combined with the historical and institutional context in which the 
three presidents reviewed here acted. Intended or not, their actions, their calculations and their 
efforts contributed to the advancement of the democratic process as they all considered the 
public’s sentiment into their policy activity.  
This paper is divided into two sections. The first will look into the origins and use of the 
presidential polling unit from an insider’s point of view by relying on interviews to presidential 
staffers under Presidents Salinas, Zedillo and Fox. This follows the work done by Jacobs and 
Shapiro (1995), Eisinger (2003) and Heith (2004) on presidential polling for the case of the 
United States. Here I will argue that the Mexican case follows a slightly different path given the 
institutional differences between both countries
21
 but similar not only in the influence of the 
political system, but also  active involvement by the presidents interested in knowing what was 
in the public’s mind.  
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Based on the interviews, we will see that the information coming from public opinion 
polls was used primarily to advance the president’s policy agenda and to test the limits of how 
far the president could go. In addition, polling information was seen, in general, as an additional 
input in the decision-making process and as an “issue monitor” to keep the president informed 
regarding issues salient to the public. All former presidential officials mentioned that information 
from public opinion polls was not and should be not used to design policy. Section 2 will provide 
a comparative review of polling in non-democratic countries. Section 3 will provide an overview 
of the Presidential polling apparatus in the United States; section 4 will provide an overview 
summarizing some of the findings from the interviews to former presidential officials within the 
general context of the political and economic situation of Mexico. Section 5 will discuss the 
interviews. 
The second part explores the type of polling information the presidents collected. This 
part relies on text analysis applied to the titles of all private polls conducted by the presidential 
polling unit under the directive of each president. Heith suggested that the United States 
presidents collected information on policy, popularity and demographics. Druckman and Jacobs 
(2006) suggested that presidents collect public opinion data selectively based on issue saliency.  
In the Mexican case, Alejandro Moreno (1997) suggests that presidents collected the 
necessary information to build popular consensus. Findings presented in this paper confirm those 
of the aforementioned research with some small differences. All presidents collected information 
about their image and popularity but with different intensity across administrations (President 
Zedillo was the most active on this). They all collected public opinion information to advance 





them. Polling was used to find ways to present their policies to the public and to maximize the 
chances of being accepted.  
To be clear, the presidents polled on issues salient to the public mostly to monitor 
people’s concerns but not necessarily to address them directly. In most cases, what was relevant 
to the president was also relevant to the public. For example, to the public the economy was 
important while to President Salinas getting NAFTA done was a step in addressing those 
concerns. To President Zedillo educating the public on what the government was doing to fix the 
economy was important to address those concerns. To President Fox having an efficient and 
responsive federal government was a way to help the economy growth. In some of these cases, 
the intended or unintended consequence was popular support for the president and for the 
president’s political party. 
Section 6 will present the results from the text analysis along with dendograms and 
wordclouds. Section 7 will focus on directed text analysis on issues common to all three 
presidents, section 8 will conclude. 
 
2) Polling in non-democratic countries 
 
The Mexican case seems unique because public opinion polling has been, since 1989, an 
institutional feature of the Mexican presidency by providing a consistent and constant flow of 
information about the public’s sentiment (for a similar argument in the case of the United States 





non-democratic countries had used public opinion. I will argue, however, that Mexico is the first 
or probably one of the first in which presidential polling contributed to set the foundations for a 
stable democracy.  
Irving Crespi (1989:45) presents the case of China in which public opinion was used 
mainly as a source of information: “As the Chinese economy was modified to allow more room 
for individual initiative, successful governing became more dependent on the political leadership 
being informed about public response to those modifications, and polls were adopted as an 
effective mean for becoming informed. That is to say, the purpose of polling in China is to 
enable the still totalitarian government to pursue its goals more effectively. We should not 
conclude that the use of polls presages a conversion of the People’s Republic of China into a 
Western-style democracy.”  
Crespi also presents the case of the former Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev who, 
in cooperation with United States news organizations, commissioned polls to gather information 
for the leaders and to market the Soviet public favorably. When the polls did not show what 
Gorbachev wanted to hear he denounced them as “unscientific and misleading” (quoted in Crespi 
1989:45). Elena Bashkirova (1995:278) also explored the role of public opinion in the Soviet 
Union. Before Gorbachev, Soviet leaders used public opinion to justify the “socialist way of life” 
while keeping secrete anything that threatened the status quo.  
Cale Horne (2012), in a study covering 1992-2006, found a surprising result for the 
Russian Federation: higher levels of consistency between public opinion and policy, 65% as 
compared to 63% for the United States (reported by Monroe 1979). Horne concludes: “Based on 
available data, opinion–policy consistency in Russia from 1992 to 2006 is relatively strong, even 





is not clearly different from responsiveness in the United States and other Western democracies, 
even if the nature of the data (i.e., differences in specific questions as well as emphases in 
different policy domains cross-nationally) makes direct comparisons unadvisable” (p. 233). 
According to Horne, Putin capitalized the public sentiment favoring order over democracy to 
concentrate power, and to provide a general sense of security. Still Horne cautiouned about 
making any conclusions regarding Russia’s democratic process. 
Catherine M. Conaghan (1995) shows that in the case of Peru, polls were used mainly to 
justify the government’s coup in 1992 led by President Alberto Fujimori: “ON THE EVENING 
OF APRIL 5, 1992, TANKS ROLLED through the streets of Lima as President Alberto Fujimori 
announced his decision to disband the national Congress, dismiss the judiciary, and suspend the 
Constitution…” (Conaghan 1995:227; caps in the original). Surprisingly enough, this action 
received, according to Conaghan, between 70% and 80% of public support: “Because of the polls 
relayed genuine popular frustrations about the malfunctioning of Peruvian democracy, they 
provided Fujimori with a rationale for breaking with the Constitution. With evidence of public 
support for his actions in hand, Fujimori was able to present his breach of the Constitution as a 
democratic exercise. Fujimori used polls to legitimate his assault on institutions and to steamroll 
ahead with political reforms that accelerated the disorganization of the party system, weakened 
the legislature, and concentrated even more power in an already near-imperial presidency” 
(p.230). Conaghan argues that while the Peruvian people supported Fujimori’s coup, public 
opinion polls also revealed the strong commitment to democratic values. The Peruvian case 
provides an extreme case of presidential responsiveness as well as an example on the danger of 





public’s disenchantment with the current political system to legitimize a ‘change’ to the status 
quo in a way he interpreted should be done: the autocratic way.  
The cases of China, Soviet Union and Peru show how the political elites used polling to 
justify either authoritarian behavior or the existence of autocratic institutions. In none of these 
contexts, public opinion was seen as either setting the boundaries to politicians as in the case of 
the United States (see for example Steven Casey –2001- account of FDR and WWII), or political 
elites using historical events to change public attitudes without disrupting democratic institutions 
(see James Sparrow’s account –2011- of the impact of WWII on public acceptance of ‘big 
government’; another case along the same lines are the implications of the ‘Patriot Act’ after 
9/11). 
The Mexican case is peculiar because, according to presidential staffers (see section 5 
below) some of the presidential political actions were either constrained or modified by the 
expected negative response from the public. Such adjustments were made within the boundaries 
set by the political system.  
 
3) Presidential polling in the United States: an overview 
In the case of the United States, the article “The Rise of Presidential Polling: The Nixon 
White House in Historical Perspective” by Jacobs and Shapiro (1995) and two books center their 
attention on documenting the origins and use of polls by the presidents. One is The Evolution of 
Presidential Polling by Robert Eisinger (2003) and the other one Polling to Govern: Public 
Opinion and Presidential Leadership by Diane Heith (2004). Two more center the attention on 





by Brandice Canes-Wrone (2006); or for manipulation as in Politicians Don’t Pander: Political 
Manipulation and the Loss of Democratic Responsiveness by Jacobs and Shapiro (2000). 
The paper by Jacobs and Shapiro set the stage for the study of presidential polling. The 
authors argued that the origins of the polling apparatus started during the Kennedy’s presidential 
campaign in 1960. Compared to the previous administrations, that collected public opinion data 
in an “ad hoc” and “personalistic” way. The Kennedy the polling operations changed the 
relationship between the President and public opinion: “…it no longer simply mirrored the 
personal inclinations of the sitting president. Public opinion analysis was conducted not by ad 
hoc and personalistic arrangements but by a "public opinion apparatus"-an operation that was 
centralized in the White House and organized around routinized procedures for assembling 
public opinion data and conducting public relations activities” (p. 164).  
By 1973, the polling operation was fully organized within the White House with higher 
control of the number and frequency of polling, better funding and, most importantly, 
professional staff dedicated to the analysis of opinion polls. Polling, however, was not (and it is 
still not today) part of the bureaucratic structure of the presidency, so the President has to rely on 
sources of funding other than taxpayers’ money. Still this was not an obstacle for the presidents 
to have access and conduct their own polling, in particular during the Nixon administration.  
According to Jacobs and Shapiro, between 1958 and 1963 Kennedy conducted 93 polls, 
Johnson 130 (1963-68) and Nixon 233 (1969-62; p. 167) and argued that the active involvement 
of the presidents in polling responded to the modernization and institutional expansion of the 
presidency itself. Furthermore, they conclude that such evolution responds to a more complex 





party system were two of the more important ones. In particular, the waning influence of 
ideologically distinctive or ''responsible" parties on the electorate and the rise in "independent" 
voting meant that the individuals who wanted to run successfully for president were more likely 
to attach importance to tracking the mid-point of public opinion (Downs 1957; Page 1978). The 
weakening hold of political parties, then, favored candidates who recognized the political 
importance of polling and public opinion analysis.” (p. 192-3).  
John Geer (1996) explored the informational value of public opinion polls and looked 
into whether policymakers’ behavior changes with polling information. He points out that 
“[p]olls have not only increased the quality of information available to politicians but have also 
reshaped how we think about the term itself. Because of these changes it becomes useful to think 
of politicians over the last 150 year a falling into two eras: well-informed and poorly informed” 
(p.68-9) 
The books by Eisinger and Heith deal with how presidents use information from opinion 
polls to their advantage to either push their policy agendas, to improve their image or getting re-
elected. These authors made it clear that this is no longer a game of uncertainty but rather one 
with perfect information where the challenge is to understand and navigate the complexity of 
public opinion and its links to the political process.  
To Eisinger, presidential polling is born out of the conflicting relationship between the 
president and other political elites: “… the emergence and proliferation of presidential polling 
stem from the tenuous relationships between the presidency and other institutions –specifically 
Congress, political parties, and the media – that formally served as conduits of public opinion. 





them as links to the American people” (Eisinger 2003:1). Overall, the case studies presented by 
Eisinger, starting with President Hoover, showed men obsessed with getting accurate 
information about his performance and about where the public stands on issues, information that 
helps him deal with an adverse political context. In a sense, presidents have always been 
interested on knowing what the public thinks and use that knowledge to design strategies to 
promote their own policy agendas in their battle with other political elites.  
Presidents are politicians and using information to their advantage is certainly part of 
their job description. A central question is whether this attitude improves governance, 
responsiveness and democracy (Page and Shapiro 1992; Jacobs and Shapiro 2000). 
Heith studies the presidencies from Nixon to Clinton. She argues that presidents do not 
use polling to simply track their approval ratings “…the poll apparatus provided the White 
House with more than mere evaluations of performance; the White House queried the public 
across agendas and issues, and not only popularity. The poll apparatus influence message design 
via phrasing and speeches, and aided event evaluation. These six White Houses used poll data to 
shape constituency relations. They used the information to identify, track, and employ the 
president’s electoral coalition, leaving the bureaucratic phases of the policy cycle alone. The 
polling apparatus was predominantly present with agenda building and mapping though the 
legislative battles with Congress” (p.135). She furthers concludes, “…the poll apparatus does 
provide some semblance of the public’s voice for an institution distanced from its audience. The 
combination of the polling apparatus and election imperatives moderates fears of direction and 
followership and produces a modicum of responsiveness for the public” (p.145). In this sense, 





in promoting their policy agenda or to be aware of the most important issues in the public’s mind. 
According to Heith, polling set boundaries on presidential action. 
One more book by Michael Towle called Out of Touch: The Presidency and Public 
Opinion focus the attention on how presidents interpret rather than how presidents use polls. 
While the topic of the book is less relevant for this paper the usage of the concepts like 
“congratulation-rationalization” effect, “cognitive dissonance” and “selective perception” is 
particularly relevant to understand presidential behavior and poll trends. The “congratulation-
rationalization” effect happens when the president sees favorable poll trends and assumes that 
people approve his efforts and feel successful. But when poll trends go south, it triggers a 
rationale based on a cognitive dissonance-selective perception process that lead them to conclude 
that it was somebody else’s fault or the public just “did not get it” (hence presidents get out of 
touch with the public). The presence of cognitive dissonance/selective perception may hinder 
presidential responsiveness to the public by preventing the president to focus on problem solving 
as Kernell (1986) warned, or artificially heightening the need for more “crafted talk” as Jacobs 
and Shapiro (2000) suggested.  
In their book Politicians Don’t Pander: Political Manipulation and the Loss of 
Democratic Responsiveness, Jacobs and Shapiro argue that public opinion offers some guidance 
and policy instructions to politicians to design policy but they also argue that politicians “… use 
research on public opinion to pinpoint the most alluring words, symbols, and arguments in an 
attempt to move public opinion to support their desired policies... politicians use polls and focus 
groups not to move their positions closer to the public’s but just the opposite: to find the most 





original). These efforts to move public opinion are complemented by managing media coverage 
and through ‘priming’ (see chapter 2:47). The authors also point out that party polarization and 
the growing importance of special interest groups are making the public less confident in 
government and government less responsive to the public. 
Brandice Canes-Wrone (2006) offers a different view in her book Who Leads Whom?: 
Presidents, Policy, and the Public. She argues that presidents monitor public opinion to identify 
policies that they believe will improve society’s well-being and have better chance to pass 
Congress. According to Canes-Wrone, an interaction effect between popularity and election 
times influence responsiveness, so that the question is more about the conditions leading to a 
possible response, not the response itself. In her view, highly popular or highly unpopular 
presidents in off-electoral season will not respond to public demands unless the president likes 
the policy. Marginally popular presidents during the electoral season will respond to public 
demands regardless of their benefit to society. In this way, there is no need for manipulation 
since presidents will make public appeals to make big issues even bigger (in the eyes of the 
public). Policies, then, will be sold as to benefit society since the president will move policy 
towards what the public want: 
 “The existing literature contains two recurring themes regarding the policy impact of 
presidents’ involvement of the mass public. The first comports with the concerns voiced 
by the authors of the Federalist: namely, that the involvement encourages the enactment 
of policy that caters to transitory, ill-reasoned opinion at the expense of societal welfare. 
A separate, contrasting theme is that the involvement does not necessarily shift policy in 
the direction of existing opinion. This idea emerges in work that argues presidents use 
polls and public appeals to try to manipulate public opinion, in research that suggests 
congressional members do not alter their behavior in response to presidents’ appeals, in 
studies that indicate the appeals are simply grandstanding, and in analyses that find 





She further argues, “…presidents’ involvement of the mass public does shift policy 
toward majority opinion. However, I also find that under most conditions a president will not 
endorse a popular policy he believes is contrary to the interest of society. In other words, under 
most conditions, the popular policies that the president takes to the airwaves are ones that he 
believes will improve societal welfare. Thus presidents’ arousing and monitoring of public 
opinion increase the influence of the populace but not in a way that entails pervasive 
demagoguery.” (p. 5). 
In sum, institutional arrangements, incentives from the electoral process, and the need to 
know seem to be the main drivers in presidential polling in the United States. The question is 
whether we observe a similar pattern in the Mexican case. 
 
4) Presidential polling in Mexico: the context 
By the end of the 1980s, Mexico was certainly not a dictatorship but it was certainly true 
that one political party had dominated the political system since 1929: Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional (PRI, Institutional Revolutionary Party).
22
 Since the 1976’s electoral reform, 
Mexico started a democratization process characterized by two major political events: the 
election of 1988 and the electoral victory by an opposition party in the presidential elections of 
2000 (Ochoa-Reza 2004; see also figure 1). Figure 2 graphs the Polity scores showing that 
between 1976 and 2000 Mexico was indeed in a transition period (“anocracy”).23  
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Some signs of this transition can be seen in the fact that the PRI not only lost the majority 
control in Congress during the federal election o 1988, but also that that President Salinas won 
with 50.7% of the total vote (something unheard of before) and his main rival candidate was a 
prominent member of his own party
24
. The presidential election of 1988 is critical in two ways: 1) 
it marks the beginning of a new political context in which the hegemonic party, with the 
exception of the mid-term election of 1991, will no longer win a federal election with more than 
50% of the vote and; 2) also shows the realignment of electoral preferences and political 
loyalties as a product of the conflict among the political elites within the ruling party (Molinar 
and Weldon 1990). This set the stage for the creation of a unified leftist political party that along 
with the conservative party (PAN) got control of Congress by the mid-term election of 1997.   
Dominguez and McCann (1996) disagreed that the election of 1988 shows realignment as 
those seen in the United States; they argue that “…The principal shift in the 1988 election was a 
change in the menu of parties offered to the electorate” (p.115). In a way this is correct, the only 
two old national parties were the PRI and PAN, and the 1988 election did not shift preferences 
and loyalties between this two, but it gave birth to a third option, later on called PRD. The split 
in preferences and loyalties (not only at the group level but also by geography) was, however, 
between PRI and the newly formed PRD and, as we will see, part of the efforts of President 
Salinas was to recover sectors of the population whose party loyalty was shaken by the split 
between the old-PRI and the new-PRI. This new electoral reality was ‘inaugurated’ by the then 
PRI’s candidate Salinas in the now famous victory speech in which he claimed that while the 
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PRI was still the dominant party, “the epoch of practically a one-party system has ended” 
(Washington Post, July 7,1988).
25
 Since 1988, there was no guarantee that candidates from the 
president’s party would win elections, and to recover some of the PRI’s traditional voting blocs 
the president had to ‘go public’ and was forced to negotiate with other political parties (mainly 
PAN) rather than with the traditional political elites within PRI. 
Kernell (1986), and Druckman and Jacobs (2009) talk about the change from 
‘bargaining’ type of leadership (ala Neustadt) to the ‘going public’ approach (Kernell). 
According to Kernell during the ‘institutionalized pluralism’, the public remained at the margins 
of the political process and policymaking was done among political elites through negotiation 
and bargaining. During ‘individual pluralism’, there are not clear hierarchies, the number of 
decision-making players multiplies and the political future of elected officials started to be more 
dependent on their local clienteles than on the party structure per se. This makes it costly for the 
president to reach out to the new smaller powerhouses and even more difficult to balance the 
plurality of interests. Given this scenario, it makes sense for the president to appeal to the public 
to try to convince the political elite to follow his lead. In turn, this need to appeal to the public 
creates the need to understand it and the common practice to do that is by tracking public opinion 
through opinion polls. In the Mexican case, given the political pressure coming from the right 
and from the increasing presence of the leftist party PRD, the political scenario after 1988 
showed a mix of ‘bargaining’ style leadership and ‘going public’ actions.  
The Mexican president was, until the end of 1980s (and partly during 1990s) the head of 
the state, the head of the government and the head of the hegemonic party (PRI). According to 
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Weldon, this political context created what was known as the presidencialismo, which led 
Vargas Llosa to argue that Mexico was the “perfect dictatorship”: 
“…the president of Mexico exercises an extraordinary range of powers. He can reform the 
constitution by proposing amendments, which are frequently accepted by Congress with only 
cosmetic changes. He initiates virtually all legislation, which often is passed by Congress with 
dispatch. The president designates his own successor to the presidency and also nominates most 
of the congressional candidates of his party. He also often names the candidates of the official 
party for governor. He can have governors, mayors, and members of Congress removed from 
their posts. He designates members of his cabinet and can fire them at his leisure. The federal 
judicial branch is filled with his appointees, which leads to a compliant judicially…” (Weldon 
1997:225) 
 
By the end of the 1980s the political context started to change as a consequence of: a) the 
electoral reforms in 1976 which opened the political competition to other parties; b) elite 
disputes within the hegemonic party; and; c) because a new and highly educated class of 
politicians known as technocrats started to seize power, to reject the old ways of doing politics in 
Mexico and started to implemented policies to move from a State-oriented to a market-oriented 
economy.  
Presidential polling started in earnest with President Salinas when he created an office 
especially dedicated to conduct public opinion polls. The original mandate from the president 
was to focus on electoral preferences, in part because Salinas’ legitimacy was brought into 
question because of a widespread perception of an alleged fraud in his election. Still, he was the 
first president from the hegemonic party to win with 48.8% of the total vote (including void 
votes and non-registered) and, officially with 50.7% (see figure 1). His closest competitor 





Nacional (National Democratic Front), got 31.1% of the effective vote (29.9% of the total vote)
26
, 
the highest percentage for an opposition party in a federal election.  
Once in office, President Salinas wanted to use polls to have a direct, credible and 
reliable source of information regarding electoral preferences and voting behavior. As in the case 
of the presidents in the United States, polling provided Salinas with a direct line of 
communication with the public and a flow of information free from political interference. 
[FIGURE 1 Federal election results (1970-2012) HERE] 
During the Salinas administration, polling played a relevant role in preparing the stage for 
the creation of the Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE, Federal Electoral Institute) on October 11, 
1990
27
. Polls were used to verify the voter registration lists and to track coverage. This in turn 
facilitated the creation of the national voter identification card, which was validated by the 
Senate on July 9, 1992 as an official identification document for purposes other than voting. 
Nowadays the IFE Voter ID card is nationally recognized and required for any administrative 
procedure (opening bank accounts, getting passports, applying for jobs, etc.). Mr. Juan Rebolledo, 
President Salinas’ speechwriter, argued that the voter id card was the instrument that truly 
democratized Mexico by giving an identity and a way to connect to the economy to millions of 
people. 
                                                 
26
 Cuauthémoc Cárdenas Solózano is the son of the President of Mexico Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940) and a 
member of the Partido de la Revolución Mexicana (PRM, Mexican Revolutionary Party, formerly known as Partido 
Nacional Revolucionario -PNR, National Revolutionary Party) which is the predecessor of the PRI. President 
Cárdenas nationalized the Mexican oil companies and created the state owned PEMEX (Petróleos Mexicanos or 
Mexican Petroleum), he also started a major appropriation of land and gave it to local communities or group of 
farmers, these sections of land were called ‘ejidos’ and were regulated by the state but worked by peasants/farmers. 
Cuauthémoc Cárdenas was a prominent member of the PRI but because of political differences he split up and ran, 
in 1988, as the candidate of the Frente Democrático Nacional (National Democratic Front) which grouped a 
number of small left-wing parties. The PRD was officially formed the following year by many disenchanted 
members of the PRI. 
27





The democratization efforts and the modernization of the public administration, during 
the Salinas and Zedillo administrations, is captured by the polity score which changed from 0 to 
4 during Salinas and from 4 to 8 during the Zedillo administration (see figure 2). When Fox 
arrived at Los Pinos (the Mexican White House), by the standards of the polity score, Mexico 
was considered a fully institutionalized democracy
28
. 
FIGURE 2 HERE (Polity score Mexico/United States) 
While the Salinas administration used public opinion polls to gauge electoral preferences, 
polling was also used to adjust and to advance his policy agenda. His foreign policy goal was to 
insert Mexico into the global economy and the starting point was NAFTA (the trade agreement 
among Mexico, United States and Canada). Dr. Ulises Beltrán, President Salinas’ pollster, 
pointed out that by making the electoral system more reliable, transparent and clean, Mexico was 
in a better position at the negotiation table. Eventually, all three governments approved NAFTA 
and was put into effect during the last year of the Salinas administration in 1994. 
President Salinas also used polling to advance his economic and social policy agenda. His 
social policy centered on the program called Solidaridad (Solidarity) that included a set of 
policies to address poverty ‘with a twist’. The main idea was to help improve the local conditions 
of poor communities and neighborhoods by developing a partnership between government and 
individuals. The government would contribute with money and resources and the local 
communities would contribute with whatever they could, mostly labor. Salinas was responding 
not only to calls to address poverty, a major problem in Mexico, but also promoting the idea that 
it was not only the government’s responsibility but also the responsibility of the local 
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communities and the individuals to improve their living conditions. Here Salinas was trying to 
change the perception of federal government as the sole provider for ‘everything’. The intended 
or unintended consequence of his social agenda was that the program targeted a section of the 
population that traditionally formed the hard-core voting bloc within the PRI: the poor. This may 
have contributed to his party’s victory during the 1991 mid-term election (see figure 1)29. There 
was an extensive use of polling on Solidaridad not only to follow the public’s reaction to it but 
also to find out missing pieces or key players left out by the original design.  
On the economic front, Salinas continued with a program from the previous 
administration called Pacto de Estabilidad y Crecimiento Económico (PECE, Pact for Stability 
and Economic Growth). This was also a response to address the leftover effects of the 1980s 
economic crisis. In the same way as Solidaridad, PECE intended to keep economic stability and 
growth by establishing a partnership among the key interest groups: business leaders, union 
leaders, agricultural leaders and the federal government, The main goal was also that all would 
agree that harsh economic measures were needed for the economic recovery. In this sense, PECE 
was the concertation mechanism, which the Salinas administration used to guarantee the political 
support from the affected parties needed for the liberalization (for more on concertation see 
Encarnación 1996). In the case of PECE, polling also was used to track the impact of the policy 
among the public and to calibrate it by finding key pieces not considered in the original design. 
Polling also played a role in political communication. President Salinas, and later on 
President Zedillo, used polling and focus groups to craft their messages to the masses (similar to 
what Jacobs and Shapiro 2000 argue for the United States). The apparent goal was to move 
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opinion to the president’s policy preference by convincing the public of the benefits of their 
policies and to educate (or re-educate) the public on what the federal government does. 
Presidents Salinas and Zedillo not only wanted the public to support their policies but also, and 
most importantly, they wanted the public to understand them (see next section).  
Jose Luis Barros, President Zedillos’ speechwriter, mentioned that unlike the previous 
administrations, now the President was trying to communicate with the masses not with the 
political elites and public opinion polls (and focus groups) were essential tools to this end (an 
key component of Kernell’s ‘individual pluralism’ phase in which the public is no longer at the 
margins of the policy making process). An important aspect of this not seen in the United States 
is that Mexican Presidents do market themselves by placing advertisements on TV, radio, 
newspaper, and magazines to promote their work, image and policies. Juan Rebolledo, President 
Salinas’ speechwriter, mentioned that “to the political need to explain something to the public 
was added the political necessity to be accepted” and, once again, polls and focus groups were 
the tools used in trying to find that balance. Benjamin Salmón, President Fox’s pollster, added 
the need to educate the public on how the government worked; he showed some frustration when 
he kept finding out that the public still thought that Congress reported to the President or that 
fighting retail drug dealing was the responsibility of the federal government (which he 
mentioned was the responsibility of the local authorities). In sum, the political communication 
targeted the masses not the elites on three different levels: to gain support by making the 
message clear and in layman terms, by trying to convince the public of the benefits of the 





It is important to notice that none of the presidential staffers argued that public opinion 
polls were used for policy design; on the contrary, polls were used to advance as much as 
possible the presidential agenda. They all also recognized that they were not always successful 
but they did not back down in trying to market their policies, and at the center of these efforts 
was the flow of information from the polls and focus groups.  
While all three presidents used polling to measure their approval ratings, image and job 
performance, there were some overall significant differences: 
 
 President Salinas used polling mainly to advance his policy agenda. 
  President Zedillo focused less on policy and more on political communication and 
continued to improve the electoral system  
 President Fox used polling mostly to evaluate government performance and to gauge his 
political capital to deal with Congress. 
 
One important aspect of the Fox administration was that, it was the first Mexican 
president to ‘go public’ ala Kernell by promoting his policies in full competition with a Congress 
fully controlled by members of the opposition parties. Fox was the first president facing a 
divided government context during his entire administration. In this case, as Kernell pointed out, 
the changing institutional context changed the incentives for the Mexican president. According 
to his pollsters, presidential approval became central to Fox since he considered it as a barometer 





how much political capital he could burn. To Fox, the higher the approval the more risks he 
could take to advance his policy agenda (see the interview section). 
It is probably relevant to stress that a major difference between the political systems of 
the United States and Mexico is that the Mexican presidents cannot seek reelection. This 
removes a need to establish an electoral coalition or to be in a possible ‘permanent campaign’ 
mode unless the president wants his party to win the next presidential or mid-term election. The 
no-reelection also removes the need to minimize possible electoral costs. Judging by the electoral 
trends in figure 1, it is not clear president cared to much about the electoral future of their parties. 
With the exception of the mid-term election during the Salinas administration, all others have 
either lowered their voting share and/or lost the election
30
. Mexican Presidential behavior 
resembles that of a second term president in the United States where legacy may be the main 
motivation to cater to the public.  
In sum: 
 The use of public opinion polls comes down to leadership and institutional context.  
 Polls are not used for policy design but rather to fine-tune it. 
 Polls are tools that provide a direct flow of information of what are the public’s 
perception and opinions.  
 Polls provide feedback on the president’s policies, messages and performance. 
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 Polls are used to craft the message to sell it to the public to gain support.  
The following section presents in more detail the interviews with former presidential 
staffers. The goal was to have an insider’s look at how presidents used public opinion polls and 
their relevance to their administrations. 
 
5) The interviews 
 
This section presents a series of interviews to presidential insiders. The goal is to provide 
insights on how presidents used polling for their political communications, messages, ad 
campaigns, and decision-making.  
 
a) Dr. Ulises Beltrán and Leticia Juárez (Salinas and Zedillo)31 
 
Soon after President Carlos Salinas de Gortari took office on December of 1988, José 
Córdova Montoya, his chief of staff, appointed Dr. Ulises Beltrán Ugarte, a Ph.D from the 
University of Chicago, to be in charge of the first ever-institutionalized presidential polling 
apparatus in Mexico
32
. Mr. Montoya considered the work of the office under Dr. Beltrán to be 
sensitive so the office kept a low profile by holding on to the office’s previous name: Technical 
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Advisor’s Office of the Presidency of Mexico. 33 Eisinger (2004) observed the same in the case of 
the Presidents of the United States, where in most cases poll data was kept secret and/or limited 
to few staff members.
34
 In the Mexican case, Dr. Beltrán was set to report directly to President 
Salinas and to his chief of staff José Córdova, all polls were for their eyes only. The fieldwork 
was contracted out to a private polling company Opinión Professional S.A. de C.V. 
Leticia Juárez, Dr. Beltrán’s right hand in charge of overseeing the day-to-day workflow 
and operations of the polling unit, recalled that the first year or so was difficult not only because 
of the lack of resources and equipment but also because of the learning curve for everyone 
involved. At the beginning, there were no public opinion experts. Up to that point the expertise 
came from the experience gained during the 1988 presidential campaign (similar to the Kennedy 
experience; see Jacobs and Shapiro 1995). Statistical support for sampling design came from 
experts from Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Información (INEGI).
35
 One of those 
experts was Roy Campos, now President & CEO of Consulta-Mitofsky. The learning curve was 
mostly at the theoretical level, on instrument design, and some aspects involving the processing 
and analysis of the data
36
. Eventually the learning curve was soon overcome and the polling unit 
proved to be highly professional and accurate in its analysis and forecasts. 
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 Dr. Beltrán stayed in his position for twelve years as pollster to Presidents Salinas and Zedillo and the name of the 
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would not look good if you ask about yourself”. 
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 National Statistics, Geography and Information Institute, it runs the census and collection efforts of other socio-
demographic and economic survey data indicators. 
36
 Dr. Beltrán recalls an anecdote where Mr. Córdova told him about a US reporter asking him about ‘likely voters’ 
and that Mr. Córdova had no idea what it was or what to say; obviously this lack of knowledge did not last long 





The accuracy of the electoral forecasts gave credibility to the polls conducted by the 
polling unit. As Gallup (1938:11) wrote: “….I do see the value of elections in determining the 
accuracy of methods used in measuring public opinion; for if the methods are not accurate in 
forecasting an election, they will probably prove equally inaccurate in measuring public opinion 
on national issues….”  
 According to Dr. Beltrán, to understand why President Salinas wanted to have a polling 
unit in the presidency it is important to look at his experience as a graduate student in the United 
States. President Salinas has a PhD from Harvard’s School of Government, and that experience 
exposed him to the literature on the link between polling, elections and government, in fact, his 
dissertation was based on a poll done in Mexico.
37
  
Given his graduate studies in the United States combined with his modernization strategy 
and the public’s perception about his own election, President Salinas wanted to have an 
independent and direct source of information not only to track and measure electoral preferences 
using pre-electoral polls but also on the outcome of the elections using exit polls and quick 
counts. Dr. Beltrán mentioned that President Salinas was convinced that the use of exit polls 
would contribute to the credibility of the electoral process in Mexico. The president did not seem 
to trust his own party, interest groups or the local authorities in charge of organizing elections. 
For these reasons, and according to his account, the initial presidential mandate for Dr. Beltrán 
was to focus the polling efforts on measuring electoral preferences and the performance of local 
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. For this task, President Salinas asked him to seek advice from William Schneider, 
Gallup International and Warren Mitofsky, the father of exit polls in the United States who 
eventually became also the father of exit polls in Mexico.  
The Technical Advisor’s Office conducted the first exit poll in Mexico in the state 
election of Baja California in 1989 (July 2). By midnight the night of the election, before anyone 
else, the President knew who was going to be the next governor of that state and knew that the 
results of the polls did not favor the candidate of the PRI. In an unprecedented move by Mexican 
standards, and even before the official count of the votes even started, two days later Luis 
Donaldo Colosio, president of PRI at that time, conceded that the numbers did not favor them. 
On July 5 The New York Times reported: “In a dramatic broadcast on national television Tuesday 
night, the president of the PRI said returns from the election in the state of Baja California Norte 
indicated that Ernesto Ruffo Appel of the right-wing National Action Party, or PAN, had won a 
decisive victory. That concession was echoed shortly afterward by the PRI's candidate for 
governor, Senator Margarita Ortega Villa” (“Mexico's Ruling Party Concedes First Defeat in a 
Governor's Race”, Section A; page 1). When all the votes were finally counted, the PRI had 
officially lost the election.
39
 This was also the first time that a candidate from the opposition 
party had won a state election and marked the beginning of a trend where the opposition started 
to win state and local elections. This also shows the beginning of a trend in which the president 
was always well informed of both, electoral preferences and outcomes on relevant elections. 
According to Dr. Beltrán, having a direct flow of information might have put the president in a 
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better position to deal with any kind of pressure coming from local authorities, interests groups, 
candidates or party leaders.  
The relationship with the media was a bit different. Up to that point, most of the media 
outlets were loyal to the government and, in particular to the President. Television was the most 
pro-government media outlet at that time.
40
 Still, and based on the interviews, the president 
wanted private companies and the media to take over the polling business by financing exit polls, 
quick counts and pre-electoral polls. President Salinas believed that having independent, reliable 
information about the electoral process would minimize the traditional post-electoral conflicts, 
and it would help to improve the credibility of the election results. Furthermore, according to Dr. 
Beltrán, the goal was to motivate the development of an industry of public opinion that could 
police itself and served as an extra check on the electoral process.  The first attempts however 
were difficult and in most cases unsuccessful. Leticia Juárez mentioned that the private polling 
companies that existed at that time did not wanted to get involved in politics and, in particular, in 
measuring electoral preferences since there was this fear of “messing up” (and this was also the 
case with the giant media Televisa). At the end, according to Ms. Juárez, “nobody wanted to get 
in trouble with the government”. This confirmed a similar argument by Camp (1996)41: 
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“…[independent pollsters] wished to establish themselves as autonomous from the state, 
in other words, they did not want to be employed specifically by the president, the PRI, 
or individual politicians, a pattern common to many intellectuals in the past. These 
pollsters were willing to accept government contracts if they were permitted to publish 
the results. A level of economic competition also ensued among the independent pollsters, 
some of whom were criticized professionally by their peers. These criticisms, which may 
or may not have been methodologically sound, had the potential for damaging reputations 
domestically and internationally, thus cutting off or substantially reducing income 
sources. The purely economic motivation for such competition took a back seat, however, 
to the ideological and political sensibilities of the pollsters, encompassed specifically in 
their attitude toward working for or independently of the state.” (p.5) 
 
Eventually Televisa paid for an exit poll for the 1991 mid-term elections, and even then 
there was some hesitation in releasing the results, which, for that particular election, were highly 
favorable to the President’s party. Later on, Ms. Juárez recalls that in the printed media, the 
newspaper Reforma was the first to systematically started publishing poll results from its own 
polling unit. 
The need for quick, independent, and direct information expanded to other areas of 
government, in particular, for public policy. On this particular issue, public opinion, according to 
Dr. Beltrán, was used to fine-tune policies, identify key players, see the limits on how far can 
they go and, most importantly, to inform the public about the content and benefits of the 
president’s policies. Dr. Beltrán emphasized the fact that public opinion was not used to design 
policy or to direct any government action. He also mentioned that one of the risks of relying 
exclusively on public opinion was its possible relation with ‘published opinion’ (political 
columnists, political commentators, and opinion leaders) that could influence ‘public opinion’ 
and therefore getting into a situation in which interest groups may be actually influencing 





then he should “open a taco restaurant instead of leading the country” (for similar comments 
from presidential pollsters in the United States see Heith 1998).
42
 
On the public policy front, using polls to measure political preferences was a necessary 
step to advance his policy agenda. Part of his modernization strategy was to initiate a trade 
agreement with the United States and it was very important, according to Dr. Beltrán, to clean up 
the electoral mess and to present Mexico as a democratic country with a transparent and credible 
electoral system. Whether or not this was a major factor in getting NAFTA approved by the 
United States Congress is not clear, but it certainly removed one possible reason not to do so. 
Another challenge regarding public policy was to convince the public of the benefits of 
his policies. Polling was instrumental in presenting them to the public and allowed him to sort of 
‘test the waters’ on controversial issues and to see how far he could go. Dr. Beltrán mentioned 
that polls allowed the president to identify crucial political actors and issues that where not 
originally considered in the initial policy design and that made and/or improved the chances of 
the policy being accepted by the public and the affected parties in particular. This was the case 
with privatization efforts of ‘ejidos’43 and services like electricity, telephone both of which were 
provided by the government; the normalization of the relations between the Federal government 
and the Catholic Church; and the trade agreement with the United States. All these and other 
policies were part of the modernization efforts intended to re-evaluate the role of the State in 
society and to develop a market-oriented economy did challenge deep-rooted beliefs… 
“…a 20 years old Mexican in 1974 had learned that the economic well-being of the 
country depended on keeping it isolated from the world and, in particular, from the 
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United States. He has been told that his personal well-being, and his national pride, 
depended on a economically strong and highly interventionist State. 
To this ideal Mexican, prices did not depend on market forces but rather on the regulatory 
action of the government. Although the evidence said otherwise, he has been taught that 
the Revolution had created a rural paradise based on the collective property of the land. 
He had learned that religious tolerance did not conflict with prohibiting the public display 
of religious beliefs, on which she participated anyway, and with the churches’ lack of 
legal rights. Elections were to her, at the end, a bureaucratic process to ratify the PRI in 
government. In a way, the stability of the country rested on the continuity of the PRI in 
power and in the legal and ‘extralegal’ strength of the president. 
In 1994 that same Mexican, now 40 years old lived, in a total different reality. In 20 years 
the paradigms that legitimated the government had changed and even some regarding the 
national identity were different. 
In the process, there was a different institutional order product of multi-party and a more 
competitive electoral system” (translation to English is mine. Original source in Spanish: 
Beltrán, 1996:146-47). 
 
Given the strong political culture rooted in more than seventy years of history and since 
the initial resistance to his policies was the product of all those deep-rooted beliefs, not only 
among the public but also among those interest groups who had greatly benefited from them. It 
was important to President Salinas to understand the dynamic and sensitivities of the public in 
order to transform it. In this sense, public opinion polls were instrumental in: 
1. The design of communication strategies: a) to inform the public the benefits of the 
proposed changes (in the case of NAFTA polls played a relevant role in crafting a 
discourse that allowed the public to understand what was at stake); b) to better respond to 
unexpected events (like the indigenous uprising in the state of Chiapas).  
2. Minimizing the possible social unrest that controversial policies may cause. In this case, 
polls were used also to identify strategic actors not originally considered in the original 





uncovered the fact that the policy would have better chances of being accepted by 
including the local community councils. NAFTA was also another example along the 
same line. 
 
In general President Salinas used polls to advance his policy agenda. According to Dr. 
Beltrán, the role of presidential polls can be summarized in four main aspects listed in order of 
importance: 
 
1. To measure electoral preferences and evaluation of local authorities. 
2. To calibrate long-term policy strategy 
3. To provide a source of independent, reliable, timely and accurate information that helped 
deal with interest groups, party leaders, candidates, state and local authorities  
4. To provide “discourse craft recommendations”.44 
 
During the Salinas administration all four items played a crucial role at one point or 
another. According to Dr. Beltrán, during the Zedillo administration points 3 and 4 were the most 
relevant. President Zedillo continued with the modernization efforts and further contributed to 
the political landscape by giving real veto player status to the Supreme Court and the IFE, finally 
achieving full independence from the federal government. In the 1997 mid-term election the 
PRI’s long time stronghold in Congress ended and a period of continuous divided government 
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 Given the divided nature of the political context, it became relevant to keep open 
communication with the public. During his administration, President Zedillo received weekly 
reports from the polling unit with three major components: 
1. The public’s reaction to the most important events of the week,  
2. Presidential approval and the public’s reaction towards the president’s messages or 
events. 
3. “Discourse craft recommendations”. This played an important role during the 
government bailout of the banking system in 1995 that prevented the banks from going 
bankrupt and therefore collapsing the Mexican economy. A now famous member of the 
opposition, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, was a strong advocate against such 
government actions
46
. In this case, polling was used to counter-attack the opposition’s 
critiques and to try to inform the public of the needed measures. 
 
Ms. Juárez mentioned that the presidential polling unit set the example for other levels of 
government and recalls that the governor of the state of Sonora approached them for advice 
about polling. Nowadays, every single level of government and government agencies either hire 
polling companies to measure public opinion for their own area of interest or pay close attention 
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to public polling data. In fact, in 1999 Congress opened its own public opinion office to supply 




b) Juan Rebolledo (Salinas)48 
 
To Juan Rebolledo, Salinas’ speechwriter, the polling apparatus was the result of the 
modernization and professionalization of the presidency. President Salinas was trying to move 
away from the old ‘learning on the job’ practices to a government with more professional and 
specialized officials. To Mr. Rebolledo polling was an important component to see how far they 
could go with certain policies, to identify key issues, key political players, and to know what 
worked and what did not and why. In his view, the only way to balance the need to explain 
something to the public and the need to be accepted was through polling and focus groups. The 
goal was to find the right angle for the policy, speech, message or action in order to have better 
chances of being accepted by the public. If the idea was not popular, they would try to find a way 
to do so by presenting it in a way the masses would understand. He acknowledges that there were 
instances where they were not successful no matter how many times they tested the message or 
the intended policy, but most of the times they were able to find the balance between the 
intended goals and what the public wanted.  
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c) Fernando Lerdo de Tejada (Zedillo)49 
 
Fernando Lerdo de Tejada, General Director of Social Communication and Spokesman 
for President Zedillo (appointed September 5, 1997), pointed out that public opinion polls were 
used mostly as testing devices for presidential spots and to find the best way to connect with the 
public. He agreed with Dr. Beltrán’s argument that polls should not be used as instruments to 
design policies, and provided an example of what could go wrong when a policy is designed by 
following the public. The case goes back to 1988 when the ‘regente’ of Mexico City at that time 
(In 1988 Mexico City was considered an ‘office’ of the federal government and its head was 
appointed by the President of Mexico) decided to make permanent a temporary measure to deal 
with air pollution. The policy was called “Hoy No Circula” or “No Driving Today” where people 
could not drive their vehicles certain days of the week. The reason to make it permanent was 
based on the “popularity” of the measure. According to Mr. Lerdo de Tejada, Manuel Camacho 
Solis (the ‘regente’ at that time) commissioned the public opinion study to Mr. Lerdo de Tejada’s 
wife and the results showed that Mexico City residents were very happy with it and this set the 
stage to make it permanent. The unintended consequence of such decision came later when the 
number of vehicles circulating doubled because people, instead of carpooling or using public 
transportation, bought a second car that they could use the days they could not use the other one. 
Eventually this caused not only more traffic congestion but created even more pollution. 
One of the mandates of Mr. Lerdo de Tejada’s office was to make sure the public ‘got it’ 
and that the presidential messages were clearly understood by the public. He argued that his 
office did a lot of testing and re-testing to find the format that not only had a better chance of 
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being accepted by the public or of being understood, but also that improved the president’s 
public support. He also attributed the origins of the presidential polling apparatus to the fact that 
President Salinas and his team were not only highly educated, highly influenced by their 
experiences in the United States and had a strategy to modernize Mexico, but also to the fact that 
by the end of the 1980s Mexican society was more complex and mature and they needed new 
and more modern means to be better understood. He believed that polling was one of the new 
instruments that allowed the president of Mexico to better deal with a more complex and 
demanding citizenry. 
In the same way as Dr. Beltrán, Mr. Lerdo de Tejada suggested a careful reading of 
‘public opinion’ and ‘published opinion’ (either from the newspapers columnists, political 
commentators, congressmen, etc.). In his job as the President’s Spokesman, he had to be careful 
in interpreting public opinion, as there was always the risk that “published opinion” could filter 
through the polls. 
 
d) Jose Luis Barros (Zedillo)50 
 
According to Jose Luis Barros, President Zedillo’s long time speechwriter, the president 
was an avid reader of public opinion polls. Every Friday, Dr. Beltrán would sent him a weekly 
report with a summary of the main findings from the weekly polls. Mr. Barros would meet with 
the president on Saturday mornings to review the findings and meet again with a broader group 
on Sunday afternoons to set the agenda for the coming week. To Mr. Barros opinion polls prove 
useful because they provided information on the people’s expectations of the president: 1) what 
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issues they expected the president to address; 2) their reaction to what the president recently said 
or did; 3) what they thought was the nation most important problem
51
; 4) what their electoral 
preferences and for whom were they were more likely to vote in the upcoming election.
52
  
Mr. Barros further noted that to craft the president’s discourse they made as much use of 
public opinion polls as they did of focus groups (which were also done by Dr. Beltrán’s office). 
President Zedillo wanted his messages to reach the mass public, but he never let polling dictate 
what he wanted to say. To President Zedillo polling provided a frame of reference that he could 
use to make his messages as clear as possible to a broader audience.
53
 Mr. Barros also 
commented that President Zedillo used the same tactic regarding the way he designed his public 
policies. Polling provided the missing pieces to make policies appealing to the public and/or 
provided strategic information that could improve the chances for the policy to be accepted or 
understood by the public. There were some instances in which polling was not considered at all 
in both policy design and speech writing. For example, this occurred when deciding to continue 
with the electoral reform, which in the public’s mind of the public was at the bottom of the 
priority list. In the case of messages, polling was not used whenever the president wanted to 
position himself in response to a special or unexpected event or whenever the issue became 
personal. 
Mr. Barros made an interesting point in observing that Presidents now tried to 
communicate and to connect with the mass public, whereas before presidents communicated 
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 President Zedillo started tracking public opinion since his presidential campaign. He had his own pollster and it 
was unclear as to whether President Salinas shared information gathered by the presidential polling unit. 
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mostly with the political elites. Data-driven presidents are making every effort to understand 
what the public needs, think and wants, and while they are not pandering, but rather  are trying to 
navigate the public’s perceptions to reach a point where they are hoping people will understand 
what they are trying to convey. 
 
e) Rolando Ocampo and Benjamín Salmon (Fox)54 
 
When Vicente Fox took office it was the first time that a candidate from the opposition 
had won the presidential election, it was a big change in the political history of Mexico. It was 
also a big change for the presidential polling unit. During the Salinas and Zedillo administrations, 
a Presidential Advisor headed the polling unit. Under Fox a Director of Department headed the 
unit, and the office was under the umbrella of a general coordination called Coordinación 
General de Opinión Pública e Imagen (General Coordination for Public Opinion and Image). 
During the Fox administration, the public opinion department had two directors, Rolando 
Ocampo and Benjamín Salmón, both of which were interviewed for this paper. Mr. Ocampo, the 
first pollster, pointed out that the word ‘image’ in the title of the coordination referred not to the 
image of the president but to the image of the federal government. President Fox wanted to know 
how the public perceived the work of the federal government as a whole and also how the public 
perceived his job as president. President Fox would use the public’s feedback to position himself 
and to improve the image of the federal government. This, according to Mr. Ocampo, was 
indicative of another noticeable change: the polling office would no longer conduct electoral 
polls; the main goal was now the evaluation of government performance. 
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According to both pollsters, the new mandate for the polling unit was to evaluate the 
quality of the services provided by the federal government, to evaluate the performance of 
cabinet members and their offices, and to track the impact of public policy on public opinion. 
This approach could be explained because of his background as a businessperson. President Fox 
was born and raised in the state of Guanajuato and comes from a family of farmers. Fox has a 
BA in business administration. He climbed the corporate ladder from route supervisor all the 
way to President of Coca-Cola Mexico where he was in charge of overseeing the operations in 
both Mexico and Latino America. After Coca-Cola he went back to administer the family 
business and by the end of the 1980s got into politics, was elected congressmen in the federal 
elections of 1988 and later governor of his home state in 1995.  
Under president Fox the dynamics of the polling apparatus changed; it became more like 
a production line and the workflow was systematized. Every three months the unit would 
conduct a poll to gauge people’s perception towards public policies, people’s evaluation of the 
quality of services provided by the federal government (like education, health, public safety), 
attitudes towards foreign policy (in particular relations Mexico-United States), presidential 
approval, perceptions regarding the economic situation of the country and then personal situation 
and their subjective opinions concerning the overall situation of the country. Mr. Salmón pointed 
out that these quarterly surveys were also used to measure specific indicators regarding public 
safety, public health, and education. They would include questions such as whether the 
individual was a victim of a crime, and if so, what kind of crime, whether it was reported, how 
the local authorities treated him or her, and what the response was to the claim. On health 





good, and whether any medication prescription was fully filled.
55
 On education, there were 
questions on whether books were promptly distributed and what the public’s attitudes were 
toward teachers. 
Mr. Salmón further noticed that the results of those quarterly surveys were analyzed and 
compared against indicators reported by each government agency. Polls were used as a ‘second 
opinion’ on whether the different branches of the federal government were doing their job as 
they say they were in their reports to the president. In Mr. Salmón’s view, “if the perception did 
not match, then something was wrong”. For example, if the director of the IMSS56 said that 
prescriptions had been 100% filled but in the survey from those using those services only a third 
of the respondents say that their prescriptions had been filled, then it was a cause for concern. 
Survey results were distributed to each government agency according to its specific area as a 
way to know how their “customers” were rating them. According to Mr. Ocampo, full survey 
results were never made available to all agencies. 
In addition to the quarterly surveys, they also ran ‘event polls’ to address the public’s 
reaction to any unexpected event or special presidential event or message. Finally, to 
complement the set of studies, the polling unit ran a yearly poll on ‘metas presidenciales’ or 
‘presidential goals’, which was part of a yearly appraisal or review of whether the branches of 
the federal government were meeting the goals set the previous year. According to Mr. Ocampo, 
every January/February the president used the results of the yearly polls to assess which 
government offices were meeting the goals and which ones were not. During that time President 
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Fox would ask each agency to define a new set of goals for the coming year. The survey 
evaluated agencies in three main aspects: government innovation, results obtained and client 
satisfaction.  
In the same way as performance indicators were matched with perceptions, public policy 
was matched to people’s awareness. For example, the attention to indigenous groups has been a 
sensitive issue for a long time and Mr. Salmón pointed out that government spending on 
improving the areas where those groups live had increased 400% during the Fox administration. 
However, the public’s perception on how the president was helping those groups had remained 
low. According to Mr. Salmón, this was considered a ‘breach of communication’ and the 
feedback from the polls was used to adjust accordingly the presidential agenda and his messages. 
Based on that feedback they use ‘framing’ as a way to try to explain public policy, in layman 
terms, the actions of the federal government. Polling was also used to try to identify issues that 
needed to be clarified to the public regarding the ‘levels of responsibility’, and he cited the 
example of how fighting retail drug dealing was usually thought to be the responsibility of the 
president when in reality it was the responsibility of the local authorities.  
Mr. Salmón said that another use of public opinion polls was to figure out the political 
capital that the president had. Derived mostly from the presidential approval question and 
adjusted by different issues, president Fox wanted to know how far he could go on particular 
topics, specially, those related to his fights with Congress. To President Fox, presidential 
approval meant bargaining power to push his presidential agenda. Unlike Presidents Salinas and 
Zedillo, he faced a divided government where Congress reclaimed his functions as lawmaker and 





Mr. Ocampo made one final comment regarding the criticisms towards President Fox in 
the sense that his was a poll-driven presidency. Mr. Ocampo argued that President Fox pursued, 
for example, some fiscal policies that where quite unpopular. 
 
Considering the cases of non-democratic countries presented in the previous section in 
which polling was used by political elites to justify their authoritarian behavior or their autocratic 
political system, Mexico presents a case in which the political elites used polling to advance the 
transition to democracy. In this sense, the creation of the presidential polling unit within the 
presidency is part of that process but is also part of the modernization of the public 
administration. This required the calibration of government decisions and actions without 
breaking the current institutional (and social) order, public opinion polls (and focus groups) 
provided an additional source of information to do just that. Mexican Presidents used polling 
information to advance their own agenda, to craft their messages, speeches, and to evaluate their 
image and performance but also kept an eye on what was in the public’s mind. By looking at the 
poll data, the Presidents were able to figure out how far could they go and whether the issues 
they care about were in tuned with the issues the public cared about as well.  
In looking at the origins of the presidential polling apparatus there is another component 
that relates more to presidents’ personal traits. The creation of the polling unit was the personal 
decision of President Salinas and its continuation has been the decision of the Presidents after 
him. At any point any president after Salinas could have shut down the operation but they did not. 
This shows the importance for the Presidents to have a tool that connects them directly to what 





political elites that claimed to be la voz del pueblo (the voice of the people). Having this new tool 
allowed the Presidents to fine-tune their policies, messages, speeches, trips and actions.  
The interviews and the context from this and the previous section provided a frame of 
reference suggesting the type of polling information the presidents collected. While they all kept 
and intensively used the polling unit, it is clear that all three presidents were interested on getting 
different types of information. Each had different policy goals. President Salinas was interested 
on public opinion data on electoral and policy issues; President Zedillo on image and message; 
and President Fox on government performance and customer satisfaction. The following section 
will look into what type of information each president collected by analyzing the titles of all the 
polls they conducted. I expect the results to match those from the interviews.  
 
6) Information Collected: Text mining 
 
This section presents the results of a text mining analysis applied to the titles of all polls 
conducted by the presidential polling unit during the Salinas, Zedillo and Fox administrations. 
The research question that guides this analysis refers to the type of polling information the 
presidents collected. The goal was to develop a polling profile for each president and to find 
patterns that may reveal presidential priorities in their polling activity (an exercise similar to 
Heith’s).  
The analysis is divided between face-to-face (field) and phone polls mainly because of 
the difference in demographics. Samples from phone polls tend to have higher socioeconomic 





with a fixed telephone line was 36% in 2000 and 43% in 2010 (see table 1). In this sense, phone 
polls only reached about a third of households in the 1990s and about 40% in the 2000s. Between 





Table 1. Availability of fixed telephone service in Mexico 
 
  2000 2010 Change 
Yes 36% 43% 7% 
No 63% 56% -7% 
                                                             Source: INEGI: http://www.inegi.org.mx/est/contenidos/Proyectos/ccpv/ 
 
Table 2 below shows the number of polls conducted by each president. Between 1989 
and 2006, the three Presidents conducted a total of 4,625 polls of which 3,867 (84%) were phone 
polls and 758 (16%) face-to-face polls.
58
 Of those 4,625, 11% were conducted during the 
administration of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (Dec/1988-Nov/1994), 66% were conducted by 
President Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León (Dec/1994-Nov/2000), and 23% by Vicente Fox 
Quezada (Dec/2000-Nov/2006). The ratio between phone and face-to-face polls was 2:1 during 
the Salinas administration, 9:1 during the Zedillo administration and 3:1 during the Fox 
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 Source for family income: INEGI, 2001, Indicadores Sociodemográficos de México (1930-2000), p. 124, 
http://www.inegi.org.mx/prod_serv/contenidos/espanol/bvinegi/productos/integracion/sociodemografico/indisociode
m/2001/indi2001.pdf. Source for exchange rate: Fox, Vicente. 2006. Sexto Informe de Gobierno, p. 368, 
http://sexto.informe.fox.presidencia.gob.mx/docs/anexo/pdf/P368.pdf. A report presented by AMAI show this level 
of income puts the average household in the sociodemographic category ‘D’ in which 36% of the families in this 
group have phone service and 93% have an education level equivalent to middle-school or lower. López Romo, 
Heriberto, Avances “AMAI: Distribución de Niveles Socio-económicos en el México Urbano”, AMAI, 
http://www.amai.org/pdfs/revista-amai/revista-amai-articulo-20060320_113356.pdf. The Asociación Mexicana de 
Agencias de Investigación de Mercado y Opinión Pública (AMAI) was funded in 1992 by a group of companies 
dedicated to market research and public opinion. Its main goal is to set the standards for professionalism and ethical 
behavior in the industry and among its members. 
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administration. This contrast with the number of private polls ordered by the Kennedy (93), 
Johnson (130) and Nixon (233) administrations (Jacobs and Shapiro 1995:167).
59
 
From table 2 we can see that face-to-face show a steady increased from 177 polls during 
the Salinas administration, 288 during President Zedillo’s and 293 during Fox’s. Phone polls 
show an irregular pattern with 342 during Salinas, 2,746 during Zedillo’s and 779 during Fox’s. 
Lets remember that each presidential term in Mexico has six years. Phone surveys, in particular 
during the Zedillo administration, were short quick surveys used mostly for the weekly reports 
for the president. 
Table 2. Presidential polls per administration and type 
  
Type of survey 
 President 
 
Field Phone Total 
     
CSG 
Frequency 177 342 519 
Row % 34 66 100 
Column % 23 9 11 
     
EZP 
Frequency 288 2746 3034 
Row % 9 91 100 
Column % 38 71 66 
     
VFQ 
Frequency 293 779 1072 
Row % 27 73 100 
Column % 39 20 23 
     
Total 
Frequency 758 3867 4625 
Row % 16 84 100 
Column % 100 100 100 
 
Source: Own estimation using data from BIIACS, CIDE. 
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The analysis presented here is data-driven using text mining to find patterns that would 
provide some indication of what kind of polling information the presidents collected
60
. To 
develop a polling profile for each president, and type of poll, I will rely on frequency of words, 
correlations, dendograms (cluster analysis) and ‘wordcloud’ plots (showing which words stand 
out given their frequency).  
Based on the interviews, the main hypotheses are be that President Salinas used polling to 
advance his policy agenda, President Zedillo focused more on image and communications and 
President Fox focused on customer satisfaction. 
The dataset is composed by the titles of all presidential polls deposited and freely 
available at the Banco de Información para la Investigación Aplicada en Ciencias Sociales 
(BIIACS), CIDE, http://www.biiacs.cide.edu/.  From this list, I created six datafiles or corpora 
divided into two groups: field and phone polls for each president.  
The first step in text mining is to pre-process the data by removing all punctuation, 
converting to lowercase, removing numbers, removing extremely common words called “stop 
words”61 and, in the special case of Spanish, and to minimize the effect of typos, I converted 
accented vowels to regular vowels (for example á = a, é = e, etc.).
62
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“Dimensional Reduction of Word-Frequency Data as a Substitute for Inter subjective Content Analysis”, Political 
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No. 1 (Jan., 2010), pp. 229-247 
61
 The package tm in R has functions to remove punctuations, numbers and to convert to lowercase. It also has the 
function --stopwords()-- for several languages including Spanish. For a list of stop words in Spanish see here 
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The following sub-sections present the results of the text analysis per president/per type 
of poll by analyzing the top then most frequent words. Tables 3 and 4 show the ten most frequent 
words on both face-to-face and phone polls per administration. 
TABLE 3 HERE [Top ten most frequent words (face-to-face)] 
TABLE 4 HERE [Top ten most frequent words (phone)] 
 
 




During his administration, President Salinas conducted 177 face-to-face polls. In the top 
ten most frequent words there is a set related to policy items (see table 3): 
 ‘Solidaridad’ or ‘solidarity’ repeated 27 times. This refers to his social policy program to 
address extreme poverty by creating partnerships between the federal government and 
local communities to improve the conditions of their neighborhoods.
63
  
 ‘Pacto’ or ‘pact’ repeated 15 times. The word ‘pece’ repeats 10 times (an acronym for 
Pacto de Estabilidad y Crecimiento Económico/Pact for Stability and Economic Growth). 
The ‘Pact’, as it was known, was a carryover from the previous administration to 
implement harsh economic policies by negotiating with representatives from the private 
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 ‘Tratado’ or ‘treaty’ repeated 12 times.  With the same number of repeats the words 
‘libre’ (‘free’) and ‘comercio’ (‘trade’). Together those words form ‘Tratado de Libre 
Comercio’ or as in its English acronym, NAFTA. This continues the policy change 
started in the previous administration of opening the economy to the global trade.
65
  
The dendogram in figure 3 shows the following word links: 
 One group is formed by the words ‘económico’, ‘pacto’, ‘pece’, ‘crecimiento’ and 
‘estabilidad’ (‘economic’, ‘pact’, ‘pece’, ‘growth’ and ‘stability’ respectively) all related 
to Salinas’ economic policy knows as the ‘Pact’. 
 A second group refers to the Spanish words for NAFTA: “tratado”, “libre” and 
“comercio”.  
 The word ‘solidaridad’ (or ‘solidarity’) is joined by the words ‘evaluación’ (‘evaluation’) 
and ‘nacional’ (‘national’).  
 
FIGURE 3 HERE [DENDOGRAM: Salinas (face-to-face polls)] 
 
Face-to-face polls were also used to assess the Salinas administration, in particular his 
State of the Union addresses which are represented in the word ‘informe’ (with 26 repeats) and is 
linked to the word ‘gobierno’ (or ‘government’) which repeats 13 times and both form a group in 
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Salina’s face-to-face polls’ dendogram (and have a correlation of 1, see table 14). This group 
joins another one formed by the words ‘gira’ (‘trip’, with 22 repeats) and ‘unidos’ (‘united’ with 
10 repeats). This second group refers to presidential trips to the United States. This cluster shows 
how President Salinas used face-to-face polls to measure the public’s reaction to his speeches 
and to his visits to the United States (probably related to the trips regarding NAFTA 
negotiations). 
Face-to-face polls were also used for elections. The word ‘electoral’ repeats 22 times66. 
The word ‘encuesta’ or ‘poll’ is repeated 16 times and is linked to ‘electoral’ in the dendogram, 
forming a cluster. Together they form the title ‘encuesta electoral’ or ‘electoral poll’ which 
tracked electoral preferences in different state and national elections. 
The last two clusters track two conflicts one local and one foreign: 
 The local conflict refers to the guerilla in Chiapas, the word ‘Chiapas’ repeats 12 times 
and is linked in the dendogram with the word ‘conflicto’ or ‘conflict’, which repeats 22 
times (with 13 referring to Chiapas’ uprising).  
 The foreign refers to the Gulf War in 1990, although the words ‘Golfo’ or ‘Gulf’ and 
‘Pérsico’ do not make the top ten lists they form a cluster in the dendogram and both 
words repeat 9 times, along with 9 repeats of the word ‘conflicto’.  
 
In sum, President Salinas used face-to-face polls mostly to track public opinion towards 
his policy agenda and presidential activities (14% of all repeated words used in polls’ titles and 
58% of all the face-to-face polls during his administration –see table 5). The wordcloud plot in 
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figure 4 summarizes the main contents of the face-to-face polls during the Salinas administration 
where the words ‘solidaridad’, ‘informe’, ‘electoral’, ‘gira’, ‘pacto’ and ‘tratado’ dominate the 
contents of the polls (big fonts show higher frequency).     
            
Table 5. Salinas face-to-face polls – summary 
 
Item Repeats % words % polls 
Policy 54 7% 31% 
State of the Union Address 26 4% 15% 
Presidential trips 22 3% 12% 
Electoral 22 3% 12% 
Local affairs (Chiapas) 12 2% 7% 
Foreign affairs 9 1% 5% 
        
Total # repeated words 722    
Total # polls 177    
 
% words – % of the repeated item in terms of the total number of repeated words. 
% polls – % of polls in which the item is present. 
 
 








President Salinas conducted 344 phone polls during his administration. In the top ten 
most frequent words there is the following set (see table4): 
 The word ‘presidente’ or ‘president’ repeats 102 times. However not all refers to Salinas. 
The word ‘president’ refers to the actual president only 34 times.  In the dendogram 
(figure 5) the word ‘presidente’ is linked to the word ‘gira’ or ‘trip’, which repeats 24 
times (with a correlation of 0.42, see table 15). Another word that links is ‘mensaje’ or 
‘message’, which repeats 9 times and refers to special presidential announcements to the 
nation (with a correlation of 0.25).  
 Table 15 shows the word ‘presidente’ having a strong correlation (0.76) with the word 
‘candidato’ or ‘candidate’, which repeats 68 times and refers to the main candidates for 
the presidential elections in 1994
67
: 
o 37 refer to words that form the name Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Solórzano 
o 24 refer to words that form the name Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León 
 The word ‘nacional’ or ‘national’ repeats 91 times along with the world ‘encuesta’ which 
repeats 83 times and both form a cluster in the dendogam in figure 5. Combined form the 
title ‘Encuesta nacional’ or ‘national poll’ which Salinas conducted 82 of these polls to 
track the public’s electoral preferences towards the presidential candidates along with 
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general opinions regarding economic situation of the country, personal situation of 
individuals and presidential approval
68
. 
 The word ‘campaña’ or ‘campaign repeats 44 times and form a cluster in the dendogram 
(figure 15) with the word ‘medios’ or ‘media’ which repeats 27 times. Both form ‘media 
campaign’ referring to polls used to measure the impact of presidential TV spots 
promoting several government initiatives and/or policies.  
 
FIGURE 5 HERE [DENDOGRAM: Salinas (phone polls)] 
 
In the top ten are also words related to specific events (see table 4): 
 The words forming the name “Frente del Movimiento Zapatista” repeat 30 times and 
refer to the guerrilla movement in Chiapas. 
 The assassination of the presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio whose name repeats 
19 times (only 15 of these are connected to the assassination). The word ‘asesinato’ or 
‘assassination’ repeats 24 times69. 
In sum, President Salinas used phone polls mostly to track voting behavior and electoral 
preferences toward the presidential candidates during the 1994 presidential election (24% of all 
polls to track voting intentions and 20% to track political preferences towards candidates). He 
also used 30% of all phone polls to track different aspects of his presidency like his trips, 
messages (mainly his State of the Union addresses) and the impact of his presidential media 
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spots. The wordcloud plot in figure 6 also summarizes this, where the words ‘presidente’, 
‘national’, ‘encuesta’, ‘candidato’ and ‘campaña’ show high frequency. 
Table 6. Salinas phone polls - summary  
 
 Item Repeats % words % polls 
Presidential election 151 12% 44% 
Presidential spots 44 3% 13% 
Local affairs (assassinations) 24 2% 7% 
Presidential trips 24 2% 7% 
Presidential messages 9 1% 3% 
        
Total # repeated words 1266   
 
Total # polls 344   
 
 
% words – % of the repeated item in terms of the total number of repeated words. 
% polls – % of polls in which the item is present. 
 
 
FIGURE 6 HERE [WORDCLOUD: Salinas (phone polls)] 
 
Comparing the usage of face-to-face and phone polls, the Salinas administration use of 
face-to-face polls mostly for the President’s policy agenda and to craft and evaluate his 
Presidential addresses while phone polls were mostly used toward tracking voting intentions and 










President Zedillo conducted 288 face-to-face polls. Among the top ten words for 
President Zedillo there is the following set (see table 3): 
 The word ‘previa’ or ‘previous’ repeats 196 times and the word ‘electoral’ repeats 193 
times. These two words form a cluster in the dendogram in figure 7, and together refer to 
182 pre-electoral polls conducted during his administration for all the states and four 
previous to the presidential election of 2000 for a total of 186 pre-electoral polls. Table 
14 show a strong correlation of 0.94 between words ‘previa’ and ‘electoral’. 
 President Zedillo focused the attention of pre-electoral polls at ‘Distrito Federal’ or 
Mexico City. The word ‘distrito’ or ‘district’ repeats 35 times and the word ‘federal’ 
repeats 38 times. A deeper look into the polls reveal that there were 20 pre-electoral polls 
in Mexico City’s pre-electoral polls while the rest of those 35 polls focused on 
miscellaneous issues like public safety, overall situation and the public’s perception of 
local authorities. The other frequently polled states were Baja California (13 times, both 
North -7- and South -6), Chihuahua, Jalisco, Sinaloa and Tamaulipas all with 8 repeats. 
The relevance of polling in Mexico City and Baja California is shown in the dendogram 
in figure 7, where both states form their own clusters. 
 The next set of most frequent words are ‘evaluación’ or ‘evaluation’ with 24 repeats, 





(figure 7), the first cluster to form is the combination ‘evaluación’ and ‘gobierno’, which 
refers mostly to President Zedillo (3 polls) and Mexico City’s local government (7 polls).   
 The words ‘presidente’ or ‘president’ (18 times), the word ‘imagen’ or ‘image’ (8 times) 
and the word ‘Zedillo’ (11 times) form another cluster. There is a strong correlation 
between the word ‘presidente’ and the words ‘Zedilllo’ (0.77) and ‘imagen’ (0.65), see 
table 14. 
FIGURE 7 HERE [DENDOGRAM: Zedillo (face-to-face polls)] 
 
In sum, President Zedillo used face-to-face polls mostly to track electoral preferences at 
both state level and for the presidential election of 2000 (see figure 8, wordcloud). 
 
Table 7. Zedillo face-to-face polls – summary 
 
 Item Repeats % words % polls 
Electoral 182 17% 63% 
Federal/local government 10 1% 3% 
Presidential image 8 1% 3% 
        
Total # repeated words 1099   
 
Total # polls 288   
 
 
% words – % of the repeated item in terms of the total number of repeated words. 
% polls – % of polls in which the item is present. 
 









President Zedillo conducted 2,746 phone polls during his administration. In the top ten 
list we find (see table 4): 
 A cluster is formed with the words ‘presidente’ or ‘president’ (612 times) and the word 
‘Zedillo’ (611 times). The total number of polls with ‘Presidente Zedillo’ in the title is 
443. The words strongly associated with the word ‘presidente’ refers to Zedillo’s persona, 
see table 15: ‘Zedillo’ (0.87), ‘imagen’ or ‘image’ (0.56), ‘gira’ or ‘trip’ (0.36), 
‘mensaje’ or ‘message’ (0.33). These associations are reflected in a number of clusters in 
the dendogram in figure 9. 
 A cluster related to Presidential special announcements is formed with the words 
‘Ernesto’ (175 times), ‘Ponce’ (172 times), ‘León’ (177 times)70 and ‘mensaje’ or 
‘message’ (122 times). The frequency of this cluster is defined by the word ‘mensaje’ 
which refers exclusively to gauge public opinion towards presidential messages (in 122 
polls). 
 The word ‘image’ repeats 226 times along with ‘corto’ (129 times), which refers to the 
short versions of the polls on Presidential image.  
 The word ‘campaña’ (or media spots) promoting his programs or events repeats 117 
times and refers to presidential spots promoting various programs or government 
initiatives. 
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 The word ‘evaluación’ referring to the public’s perceptions of the national situation 
repeats 142 times). The words ‘evaluación’ and ‘Zedillo’ are together in 73 titles, while 
the combo ‘evaluación’ and ‘spot’ are in 26 titles.  
 Word ‘gira’ referring to Presidential trips repeats 148 times. 
A second usage focused on scanning the event of the day or the public’s perception on 
the overall situation of the country: 
 Words ‘día’ or ‘day’ (438 repeats), ‘noticia’ or ‘news’ (420 repeats) and ‘importante’ or 
‘important’ (419 repeats). Together they form a cluster that refers to the ‘noticia 
importante del día’ or ‘important news of the day’ which is the title of 419 polls (see 
table 4).  
 Word ‘nacional’ referring to the national context repeat 170 times and refers to a 
miscellaneous set of topics: 42 are related to the Chiapas guerrilla (with a correlation of 
0.52), 39 related to the National University (UNAM, with a correlation 0.45).
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 Word ‘situación’ or ‘situation’ repeats 122 times and focuses mostly on getting subjective 
perceptions on the overall economic situation (together in 85 titles). This word show 
strong correlation with the following word ‘economica’ or ‘economic’ (0.75), and 
moderate correlation with: ‘enojo’ or ‘upset’ (0.36), ‘actual’ (0.36), ‘percepcion’ or 
‘perception’ (0.34) and ‘pais’ or ‘country’ (0.32). 
A third usage focused on elections. The word ‘electoral’ repeats 325 times, the word ‘pre’ 
243 times and the word ‘post’ 93 times. Of this, in the titles, pre-electoral phone poll total 229 
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and post-electoral phone polls total 55. This is shown in the dendogram (figure 9) where ‘pre’ 
and ‘electoral’ form a cluster.  
FIGURE 9 HERE [DENDOGRAM: Zedillo (phone polls)] 
In sum, 43% of all the phone polls (10% of all repeated words) were dedicated to some 
aspect of his presidency (image, media campaign, trips) and 15% of the phone polls were 
dedicate explicitly to track public awareness of special events and 12% for electoral purposes.  
The wordcloud in figure 10 below summarizes the main usage of phone polls: ‘presidente’, 
‘Zedillo’, ‘noticia’, ‘importante’, ‘día’, ‘electoral’, ‘imagen’ (bigger font higher frequency). 
Table 8. Zedillo phone polls – summary 
 
 Item Repeats % words % polls 
President Zedillo 551 4% 20% 
News of the day 419 3% 15% 
Electoral 325 3% 12% 
Overall context 292 2% 11% 
Presidential image 226 2% 8% 
Presidential trips 148 1% 5% 
Presidential media spots 143 1% 5% 
Presidential messages 122 1% 4% 
        
Total # repeated word 12386   
 
Total # polls 2746   
 
% words – % of the repeated item in terms of the total number of repeated words. 
% polls – % of polls in which the item is present. 
 
FIGURE 10 HERE [WORDCLOUD: Zedillo (phone polls)] 
As a conclusion, President Zedillo used face-to-face polls mainly for electoral purposes 
while the phone polls were mostly used to evaluate his administration, how he was perceived by 











President Fox ordered 293 face-to-face polls and the word that repeats the most is 
‘evaluación’ or ‘evaluation’ with 291 repeats (see table 3). The world ‘sistema’ or ‘system’ 
repeats 85 times (with a correlation of 0.66, see table 14). Along with ‘evaluación’, form a 
cluster regarding customer satisfaction, all repeating 79 times and with a strong correlation of 
0.70 (see dendogram in figure 11 and table 14): ‘cliente’ or ‘client’, ‘compensación’ or 
‘compensation’, ‘metas’ or ‘goals’, ‘negociadas’ or ‘negotiated’, ‘resultados’ or ‘results’ and 
‘satisfacción’ or ‘satisfaction’.   
This was the first time presidential polls were used to measure the level of satisfaction 
with the services delivered by the federal government. Out of 79 polls, 18 (23%) were dedicated 
to education, 10 (13%) to the national lottery and sports betting, and 9 (11%) to health services 
(see table 9 below). 
Table 9. Government services mention in polls’ titles  
 
Education 18 23% 
Lottery/sports betting 10 13% 
Health 9 11% 
Government programs 7 9% 
Foreign 7 9% 
PEMEX 6 8% 
Repatriation 5 6% 
Social 5 6% 






A second set of words relates to political figures and political issues. The word ‘políticos’ 
or ‘politicians/politics’ repeats 165 times forming a cluster with (see dendogram in figure 11): 
 The word ‘diversos’ or ‘several’ repeats 74 times (a correlation of 0.92) and the word 
‘actores’ or ‘actors’ repeats 73 times (0.93). Together spell ‘diversos actores políticos’ or 
‘several political actors’, which corresponds to 70 polls.  
 The word ‘asuntos’ or ‘issues’ repeats 83 times and has a strong association of 0.91. 
Together they form ‘asuntos politicos’ or ‘political issues’ for a total of 83 polls. 
A third set of words corresponds to the Fox administration. The word ‘presidente’ or 
‘president’ repeats 122 times, the word ‘gobierno’ or ‘government’ repeats 94 times, the word 
‘Fox’ 97 times and the word ‘gestión’ or ‘administration’ 71 times. 
Comparing the main topics in the top ten list and the dendogram in figure 11 below, the 
only cluster that is clearly defined, and common to both, is the set related to the customer 
satisfaction polls. The other words are mixed into the rest of the clusters in the dendogram, and 
this could be because President Fox tended to combine different topics into one poll. From the 
cluster analysis, another group that stands out is the one referring to national issues like 
education (‘educación’, 37 times), law enforcement (‘impartición’ 17 times, ‘justicia’ 17 times), 
crime (‘crímen’, 19 times), corruption (‘corrupción’, 22 times) and social programs (‘programas’, 
22 times, ‘sociales’, 25 times ). These are all linked to the word ‘national’ (‘nacional’, 46 times).  
There were 16 polls with all the words in the same title (“Encuesta nacional de indicadores 






The other two groups refer to political issues: tracking public opinion on several political 
figures, national political issues, voting behavior and political preferences. The only common set 
in the top ten list of most frequent words are those related to political actors.  
 
FIGURE 11 HERE [DENDOGRAM: Fox (face-to-face polls)] 
 
In sum, President Fox used face-to-face polls to evaluate the performance of his 
administration (27% of all polls), his image (25%) and opinions toward political figures/issues 
(28%).  
 
Table 11. Fox face-to-face polls – summary 
 
 Item Repeats % words % polls 
Customer satisfaction 79 2% 27% 
President Fox 74 2% 25% 
Political figures/issues* 83 2% 28% 
National issues 16 0% 5% 
        
Total # repeated word 3645   
 
Total # polls 293   
 
*Used the maximum number of both since most of the time both topics were combined into one poll 
% words – % of the repeated item in terms of the total number of repeated words. 
% polls – % of polls in which the item is present. 
 
The wordcloud in figure 12 summarizes the main usage of the face-to-face polls which, a 
the center, shows the words ‘evaluación’ or ‘evaluation’, ‘presidente’ or ‘president’, ‘políticos’ 
or ‘politicians’, ‘satisfacción’ or ‘satisfaction’, ‘metas’ or ‘goals’, ‘resultados’ or ‘results’, 
‘compensación’ or ‘compensation’, ‘actores’ or ‘actors’ (big font higher frequency).  












The Fox administration conducted 779 phone polls. In the top ten most frequent words 
(in the titles) of the phone polls the top three refer to his administration (see table 4).  
The word ‘Fox’ repeats 472 times, the word ‘presidente’ or ‘president’ 468 times, the 
word ‘gestión’ or ‘management’ 356 times, and the word ‘evaluación’ or ‘evaluation’ 438 times. 
Together they form the phrase “Evaluación del Presidente Fox y de su gestión…” (“Evaluation 
of President Fox and his administration…”), which is the title of 347 polls. The dendogram in 
figure 13 captures this in the first cluster.  
FIGURE 13 HERE [DENDOGRAM: Fox (phone polls)] 
 
The second most mentioned set corresponds to political issues. The word ‘políticos’ or 
‘politics/politicians’ repeats 396 times, the word ‘asuntos’ or ‘issues’ repeats 223 times, the word 
‘actores’ or ‘agents’ and ‘diversos’ or ‘several’ both repeat 159 times.  The phrase ‘asuntos 
políticos’ or ‘political issues’ is part of 218 titles, which is shared 153 times with the combo 
‘diversos actores’ or ‘several agents’. This groups is also represented in a cluster in the 
dendogram in figure 13 
Three more sets refer to the guerilla in Chiapas, the Mexico’s City major and the 
relationship with the United States, also represented in the dendogram. There were 57 titles 





(EZLN)’ and 59 titles for United States. In the dendogram addional clusters are identified for 
government reforms, presidential trips and image, electoral conflict. 
In sum, with the phone polls President Fox focused more on his image and persona (45% 
of all polls) and kept track of political figures/issues (28%).  
Table 12. Fox phone polls – summary 
 
 Item Repeats % words % polls 
Presidente Fox 347 5% 45% 
Political issues/figures 218 3% 28% 
Local affairs (EZLN/AMLO) 99 1% 13% 
United States 59 1% 8% 
        
Total # repeated words 7518   
 
Total # polls 779   
 
% words – % of the repeated item in terms of the total number of repeated words. 
% polls – % of polls in which the item is present. 
 
The wordcloud plot in figure 14 summarizes the usage of phone polls by the Fox 
administration. The words that stand out are: ‘Fox’, ‘presidente’ or ‘president’, ‘evaluación’ or 
‘evaluation’, ‘políticos’ or ‘politics/politicians’, ‘gestión’ or ‘administration (bigger the font 
higher the frequency). 
 
FIGURE 14 HERE [WORDCLOUD: Fox (phone polls)] 
 
The following section will present and additional text analysis exercise comparing all 






7) Directed text analysis (grouping specific terms) 
 
This section presents the results of a “directed” text analysis. Here I aggregated words 
related to common topics across all three administrations. Once aggregated, I crosstabulate the 
topics by administration and single out the significant relationships. The goal is to find out which 
topics were surveyed the most by each president and whether it was significantly higher (or 
lower) as compared to the total number of polls (in either face-to-face or phone).
72
 Table 13 
shows the results of this exercise along with the significant levels (percentages are row percent). 
TABLE 13 HERE [Comparative of common topics (with significant levels)] 
 
Comparing all three administrations the topics that show some significant difference in 
terms of the frequency are: electoral, public safety, evaluation, media campaign, government, 
foreign policy and pre electoral polls.  
In addition, the surnames ‘Zedillo’ and ‘Fox’ stand out during their respective 
presidencies. During the Zedillo administration, 21% of the phone polls have his name in the title. 
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 Data was prep by setting all text to lower caps, converting all accented vocals to non-accented. Significant levels 
were estimated using a z-score test for proportions: 
Z=  
Where  
pi = row percent for president i 
pt = row percent for the total number of poll for all three presidents 
ni and nt are the sample size for president i and for the aggregate for all three presidents respectively 
phat =  ((pi* ni) + (pt*nt)/(ni+nt)   
qhat = 1 – phat 
A z-score >±1.96 is considered significant and reject the null hypothesis that both proportions are equal. A p-value 





In the case of the Fox administration, the difference is significant on both types of polls. The 
surname ‘Fox’ appears in 25% of the field polls and 49% of the phone polls. 
It is important to notice that the only policy items that show some significant difference, 
albeit low, are the public safety and foreign policy ones. Economic and education issues, while 
polled across all presidencies, do not stand out in any of them. Clearly the table shows that 
electoral issues were relevant to the Salinas and Zedillo administration while the governmental 
evaluation was highly relevant during the Fox administration. I will focus on these two topics 
since they were the most frequent and significant across all presidencies. 
Electoral polls dominated most of the polling during the administrations of President 
Salinas and President Zedillo. In the case of President Salinas, 53% of the phone polls had some 
word related to elections
73. The words ‘electoral’ and ‘elecciones’ or ‘elections’ were the most 
common ones across all three administrations (they repeat on average 91 times in the face-to-
face and 144 in the phone polls, see tables 16 and 17). As part of the text analysis I ran 
correlations to figure out in which context these words are used and to see if there is a pattern 
that shed some light on what President Salinas had in mind when conducting them (see table 15). 
The word ‘electoral’, has a correlation of 1 with the words ‘instituto’ (or ‘institute) and ‘federal’ 
which refer to ‘Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE)’ which is in charge of organizing federal 
elections in Mexico. It also has a correlation of 0.63 with the words ‘listas’ and ‘nominales’, 
which refer to the lists of registered voters. The word ‘elecciones’ show a strong correlation of 
0.95 with the word ‘percepcion’ or ‘perception’ and a moderate correlation (0.30) with the word 
‘agosto’ or ‘august’ (referring to the month after the presidential election). In the case of face-to-
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 Electoral polls are those with the words: ‘electoral’, ‘elecciones’ or ‘elections’, ‘vota/voto’ or ‘vote’, ‘partido’ or 
‘party’, ‘candidato’ or ‘candidate’, ‘pre – debate’, ‘post – debate’. Of these, ‘electoral’ and ‘elecciones’ are the most 





face polls, President Salinas only dedicated 16% of them to electoral issues. In the face-to-face 
polls, the words ‘electoral’ and ‘elecciones’ have strong correlations to words related to IFE, the 
credibility of the presidential electoral process and the presidential candidates (see table 14).  
In the case of President Zedillo 68% of face-to-face polls were dedicated to electoral 
issues. The word ‘electoral’ show a correlation of 1 with the word ‘previa’, which shows that 
most of the polls were pre-electoral. The word ‘elecciones’ shows a correlation of 1 with the 
word ‘conteo’ and ‘rapido’ or quick count (see table 14). In the case of phone polls, President 
Zedillo only dedicated 17% to electoral issues (see table 15). 
President Fox dedicated 26% of face-to-face polls and 17% of phone polls to electoral 
issues. In the case of face-to-face polls the word ‘elecciones’ has a correlation of 0.86 with 
‘diputados’ or ‘congressmen’, ‘expectativas’ or ‘expectations’ and ‘federales’ or ‘federal’ which 
seems to indicate that President Fox focused on congressional elections in the face-to-face polls. 
On the other hand, the word ‘electoral’ shows more moderate correlations and seems to be more 
related to state and local elections. The same pattern appears in the phone polls. 
Unlike his predecessors, President Fox’s polling was all about evaluation, 61% of his 
face-to-face polls and 52% of the phone polls have the word ‘evaluacion’ or ‘evaluation’ in the 
title (see table 13).  In the case of the face-to-face polls ‘evaluacion’ shows a correlation of 0.70 
with the words related to customer service (‘cliente’ or ‘client’, ‘compensacion’ or 
‘compensation’, ‘metas’ or ‘goals’, ‘negociadas’ or ‘negotiated’, ‘resultados’ or ‘results’ and 
‘satisfaccion’ or ‘satisfaction’). In the case of phone polls ‘evaluacion’ shows strong correlation 





moderate correlation with ‘actores’ or ‘actors’ (0.40), ‘diversos’ or ‘several’ (0.40) and 
‘politicos’ or ‘politicians/politics’ (0.36). 
The overall conclusion here is that a major difference on how polls were used is that 
Zedillo and Fox focused on their image and their administrations, Salinas and Zedillo focus on 
electoral preferences/issues and Fox focus on government evaluation and customer satisfaction. 
On policy items common across all presidencies there are no major differences.  
 
TABLE 14 HERE [Associations (face-to-face)] 
TABLE 15 HERE [Associations (phone)] 
TABLE 16 HERE [Common terms (face-to-face)] 








Presidential polling started in earnest with the administration of President Carlos Salinas 
de Gortari. Since then, three other presidents have tracked the opinions of the Mexican people on 
a variety of issues relevant to the presidents and to their agendas. During the Salinas and Zedillo 
administrations, the polls were for the president’s eyes only, and the polling unit was under the 
direction of a Presidential Advisor and coordinated by the President’s Chief of Staff. During the 
administration of President Fox, the polling unit was placed out of the president’s inner circle 
and under the umbrella of a general coordination dedicated to ‘public opinion and image’; it had 
17 directors, one of them in charge of public opinion
74
. Still most of the poll analysis was first 
sent to the president and selective results were distributed to specific areas of the federal 
government.  
In this paper, I argued that the presidential polling unit was the result of the 
modernization of the presidency and the dynamics of the political system, characterized by the 
transition from authoritarian to democratic rule and from a state-oriented to a market-oriented 
economy. Part of this process was the electoral realignment of 1988 not only product of the 
democratic transition, but also the power struggle within the ruling party (PRI). The 1988 
presidential election was highly controversial, as a result, the election of President Salinas was 
highly contested and under a heavy cloud of suspicion. Salinas started his administration as a 
‘troubled president’.  
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The democratic transition opened the door to the political participation of dissident 
members of the hegemonic party during the 1988 presidential election. It was the old-PRI versus 
the new-PRI. Molinar and Weldon (1990) argued that the 1988 election shows realignment in the 
electoral preferences that changed the PRI’s traditional voting bloc while the PAN (the 
conservative party and oldest opposing political party) remained unchanged. Domínguez and 
McCann (1997) disagreed with this conclusion arguing that the election of 1988 only created 
another party but did not change party ids or loyalties. While this is true, the election 1988 did 
set the stage for a unified left-wing party, which eventually, changed allegiances across groups 
that traditionally were loyal to the PRI and modified the geographic strongholds and party ids 
between PRI and PRD.  
The changes in the hard-core voting base of the PRI that benefited the newly formed 
PRD (Partido de la Revolución Democrática/Party of Democratic Revolution) revealed the 
fracture in the electoral preferences and political behavior of the voters. For the first time, social 
groups and geographic areas that were PRI supporters changed their allegiances in favor of an 
opposing party, the PRD (Molinar and Weldon 1990; Loaeza and Prud’homme 2010). In this 
sense, the rupture that started with the political elite eventually was transferred to the electorate 
complicating the electoral map for the hegemonic party.  
Salinas won the presidential election amid a series of controversies, the most notable 
called la caida del sistema (system breakdown) made famous by Diego Fernandez de Cevallos 
(from the PAN). This referred to the alleged failure (both technical and by intentional delays) of 
the then electoral commission to release the vote count the day of the election
75
. In this context, 
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Salinas started his administration amid strong suspicious of fraud that forced him to pledge a 
change of attitude regarding future electoral processes. This troubled start, combined with his 
intentions to continue the modernization of the country, the public administration, and his 
experience as a graduate student in the United States, prompted him to find a way to understand 
the significant changes in the electoral preferences and political behavior of the Mexican voters. 
As in the United States, polling was the best way to achieve this and this may explain why the 
first mandate of the presidential polling unit was to monitor and study the electorate. 
Eisinger argued that presidential polling in the United States was the product of the 
institutional conflict between the president and other political elites (mainly Congress), the 
electoral process and the ‘need to know’. In the Mexican case, is probably fair to say that the 
presidential polling unit was the product of the democratization process and the electoral 
realignment of the 1988 presidential election that prompted the need to understand the changes in 
electoral preferences and political behavior of the Mexican voters. Eventually, this need to 
understand the electoral map was transferred to the need to understand public opinion as a whole. 
This opened a new range of possibilities for the presidents to see the public right into ‘their eyes’ 
rather than through the eyes of other political elites. As the presidential insiders pointed out, the 
president would now be talking directly to the masses rather than to the elites.  
After Salinas, three presidents kept and used the presidential polling unit to track public 
opinion on a variety of issues. Heith argued that, in the case of the United States, presidents have 
used polling for policy, popularity and demographic issues and that eventually the priority was to 
focus on policy issues.  In the Mexican case, President Salinas oriented his polling operations 





government evaluation and customer satisfaction. Presidents made of two types of polls: face-to-
face and phone, which were also used for different purposes. Face-to-face polls centered on 
policy by the Salinas administration; on elections by the Zedillo administration; and on customer 
satisfaction by the Fox administration. There is, however, a common usage in the case of phone 
polls, which were used to evaluate the image of the presidency and the presidents. 
 
Table 18. Presidential Polling Usage – summary 
 
  Face-to-face Phone 
Salinas Policy (Social, Economy, NAFTA) Presidential elections/Presidency 
Zedillo Electoral (state, local, presidential) Presidency/message/image/events 
Fox Government performance/political figures Presidency/political figures 
 
Text analysis reveals some additional differences. Common words had different 
connotations or were used in different contexts. We can see, for example, that the word 
‘evaluation’ was used in the Salinas administration in a policy-related context like ‘programs’, 
‘development’ or ‘agriculture’. To Zedillo it meant ‘government’ evaluation and Fox used it in 
the context of customer satisfaction (see summary table A1 below).  
  The word ‘president’ was also used in different contexts. In the case of Salinas, it was 
associated with words related to presidential election. In the case of Zedillo and Fox the word 
‘president’ is highly associated with their own names. The correlations with the word ‘Zedillo’ 
are 0.77/0.87 (field/phone respectively) and with the word ‘Fox’ 0.72/0.74 during the Fox 
administration (field/phone respectively). In the case of Fox, one additional association is with 





In the electoral area, there were two common, ‘electoral’ and ‘elections’, that were used 
in different contexts. The word ‘electoral’ referred, in the case of President Salinas, to the 
Electoral Federal Institute that organized the national federal elections on both field (0.53) and 
phone (1.00) surveys. In the case of Zedillo referred to pre-electoral polls (0.94 in field and 0.77 
in phone). In the case of Fox for state elections (field, 0.32) and post-electorals (phone, 0.63).  
The word ‘elections’, under Salinas, focused on the designation of PRI candidates (0.53, 
field) and the people’s perception about elections (0.95, phone). Zedillo used field polls mostly 
for ‘quick counts’ and phone polls for the internal selection of candidates (0.47). Fox seemed to 
focus on the people’s expectations about legislative elections on both field (0.86) and phone 
(0.93) polls. This last one seemed to be related to his struggle with a divided Congress. 
The word ‘national’ was also used in a different context. To Salinas meant national 
elections in both field (0.45) and phone (0.92) polls. During the Zedillo and Fox administrations, 
there is an interesting divide between field and phone polls. To Zedillo the word ‘national’ shows 
a moderate correlation of 0.40 with the word ‘poll’(face-to-face), which at first seems to mean 
something generic. However, by looking at table 14, we can see that other words are correlated 
with ‘national’ like those related to the National University and the student’s strike in 1999-2000. 
Also in the field polls, the word ‘national’ shows, during the Fox administration, a high 
correlation with crime and provision of justice (0.61). In the phone polls, for both Zedillo and 
Fox, there is a high correlation, 0.52/0.75 respectively, with the guerrilla group EZLN (Ejército 
Zapatista de Liberación Nacional/Zapatista Army for National Liberation). In the big picture, 
Salinas kept his focus on the electoral process, while Zedillo and Fox focus on political events, 





Finally, the word ‘government’ also meant different things in the field polls but all used it 
in the same context in the phone polls. In the latter, the word ‘government’ shows different levels 
of correlation in the same context: the State of the Union Address, which for Salinas was 0.83, 
Zedillo 0.63 and Fox 0.43. In the field polls, Salinas also used it for the State of the Union 
Address (1.00) but Zedillo and Fox for different topics. In the case of Zedillo, it was for 
evaluation purposes (0.50) although table 14 suggests that it may have been also used  to 
evaluate the State of the Union Address. In the case of the Fox administration, it is related to 
trust/confidence, his own persona and with reference to the republic as a whole (0.50). During 
the Salinas and Zedillo administration, and probably less during the Fox presidency, there was a 
major interest in measuring both, the expectations and the impact of the State of the Union 
Address. The main goals were to see to see the people’s reaction towards it, whether the message 





Summary A1. Associations (Pearson correlations).   
Common word to all Presidencies Highest correlated word (face-to-face) 
Highest correlated word (phone) 
‘Evaluacion’ (evaluation) 
 Salinas: 0.38 with the words 
‘campo’ (rural areas), ‘desarrollo’ 
(development, ‘programas’ 
(programs).  
 Zedillo: 0.55 with ‘gobierno’ 
(government). 
 Fox: 0.70 with ‘cliente’ (client), 
‘compensacion’ (compensation), 
‘metas’ (goals), ‘negociadas’ 




 Salinas: 1.00 with ‘informe’ or 
State of the Union Address. 
 Zedillo: 0.50 with ‘evaluacion’ 
(evaluation) 
 Fox: 0.50 with the words 
‘confianza’ (trust/confidence), 
‘Fox’, ‘indice’ (index), ‘republica’ 
(republic) 
‘Informe’ (State of the Union Address), 
with the following correlations: 
 
 Salinas: 0.83 
 Zedillo: 0.63. 
 Fox: 0.43 
‘Electoral’ 
 Salinas: 0.55 with ‘instituto’ 
(institute) 
 Zedillo: 0.94 with ‘previa’ 
(previous) 
 Fox: 0.32 with the following state 
names: Durango, Queretaro, 
Veracruz, and Yucatan. 
 Salinas: 1.00 with ‘federal’ 
(federal) and ‘instituto’ (institute). 
 Zedillo: 0.77 with ‘pre’ (previous) 
 Fox: 0.63 with ‘post’ (after) 
 
‘Elecciones’ (elections) 
 Salinas: 0.53 with the words 
‘candidato’ (candidate), 
‘designacion’ (designation), ‘pri’ 
(PRI party) and ‘proximas’ 
(next/future). 
 Zedillo: 1.00 with ‘conteo’ (count), 
‘rapido’ (quick). 
 Fox: 0.86 with ‘diputados’ 
(legislators), ‘expectativas’ 
(expectations) and ‘federales’ 
(federal). 
 Salinas: 0.95 with ‘percepcion’ 
(perception). 
 Zedillo: 0.47 with ‘internas’ 
(primaries), and ‘noviembre’ 
(November). 




 Salinas: 0.63 with ‘aspirantes’ 
(candidates), ‘debate’ (debate) and 
‘negociaciones’ (negotiations). 
 Zedillo: 0.77 with ‘Zedillo’. 
 Fox: 0.72 with ‘Fox’ 
 Salinas: 0.76 with ‘candidato’ 
(candidate) 
 Zedillo: 0.87 with ‘Zedillo’ 




 Salinas: 0.45 with ‘preelectoral’ 
(pre-electoral) 
 Zedillo: 0.40 with ‘encuesta’ (poll) 
 Fox: 0.61 with ‘crimen’ (crime), 
‘imparticion’ (delivery/provision), 
‘indicadores’ (indicators), and 
‘justicia’ (justice). 
 Salinas: 0.92 with ‘encuesta’ (poll). 
 Zedillo: 0.52 with ‘ezln’ (guerrilla 
group EZLN) 
 Fox: 0.75 with  ‘ezln’ (guerrilla 
group EZLN) 
 





What are the implications for Mexican democracy? I believe it is too early to tell. The 
polling apparatus was created during the time when Mexico, while in transition, was still 
considered an authoritarian regime. What sets Mexico apart from other non-democratic regimes 
was that the use of polling stayed within the boundaries of the political system. If the information 
coming from the polls did not match the expectations, then there was an attempt to change those 
expectations but, if failed, then it was back to the drawing board. Trying to convince the public 
that their policies were meant to benefit society is part of the democratic process. Same as when 
a company tries to convince the public that their product is the best in the market. The Mexican 
president markets his policies in the hopes that the majority of society will accept them.  
The question is then, when marketing becomes manipulation. An answer may involve 
institutional arrangements in particular and the political system in general: Is there anything in 
the system that may validate the claims made by the marketing efforts? The media and published 
opinion are the usual ‘fact checking’ filters of society. Nowadays, social media and Google have 
joined to serve that purpose. As the editorial of the journal Place Branding and Public 
Diplomacy points out “….In today’s world, where the globalisation of communications has 
resulted in an environment where no single message can survive unchallenged, propaganda has 
become virtually impossible….” (p. 4)76. Still, we find cases in which Presidents make symbolic 
claims to advance their policies and actually succeeding in convincing the public to go along. 
Why did the system failed in those instances?  
In the case of Mexico, Salinas sold the idea of a prosperous country and a big player in 
the global market. Polling was used to sell his policies and the ideas underlying them to the 
public. Was he wrong? It is not clear, but right after his administration ended, the country went 
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through one of its worst economic crisis in history. Zedillo spend most of this administration 
trying to fix the inherited problems. Castañeda (1999) pointed out that Salinas broke an 
unwritten rule during the last year of his administration: pay whatever dues necessary at the end. 
Normally, towards the end of each administration, there was always a crisis. By tradition, the 
exiting president had to deal with it, and take responsibility for it so the new president started 
with a clean slate. According to Castañeda, Salinas refused to make the necessary adjustments to 
prevent an imminent recession. Making those adjustments would have implied that the Salinas 
policies failed to stabilize the country. Furthermore, his popularity was high, 74% approval 
rating during the first half of 1994 (see figure 1). If he knew that something was wrong, he must 
have felt pressure not to do anything to jeopardize his popularity. Ironically, he ended up being 
one of the most hated presidents in the history of Mexico and had to leave the country right after 
his tenure. 
 The opposite case is the Fox administration. At the end, he also fell to deliver on his 
promises of change, a corruption-free government and a safe country. He also made an intensive 
use of polling but not significant advances on the democratic front (see figure 2). Zedillo sits 
somewhere between Salinas and Fox. He did make significant advances in strengthening the 
democratic institutions and brought the country out of one its worst economic crises.  
What can we conclude from all this? While there are not doubts that Mexico is now a 
democratic country, it is still a poor one. Mexico is still a developing country. Yet, the efforts, of 
all the presidents considered in this study, to understand what was in the mind of the public made 
a significant contribution to the development of political public opinion and, most importantly, 







. It is clear now that nobody can claim to be the ‘voice of the people’. Nowadays, polling 
is everywhere and no single political event, speech, trip or policy escapes it. In the same way, 
there is no public official interested on having a grip on what the public thinks. Furthermore, 
with the advent of social media, political messages and/or policy activities are scrutinized even 
more and almost instantly.  
In the Mexican case, public opinion has been an important addition to the presidential 
toolkit. Presidents have a direct source of information on the public sentiment. They have now a 
better sense of how far they could go in their policy agendas. While it is not clear that presidents 
have verbatim followed public opinion, it is clear that their policy actions and decisions have 
been weighted by the inflow of public opinion information.  
Nowadays, in Mexico, presidential responsiveness to public opinion has to be considered 
in the big scheme of the policymaking process constrained by the political system. The President 
is no longer the originator and executor of policies. He is now part of the policymaking process. 
To get what they want, political elites have to balance the institutional arrangements that 
constrained them, along with the reality of a more active public opinion industry, and most 
importantly, a more mature and complex society whose sentiments are still deeply rooted in their 
economic reality. 
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 Jacobs, Lawrence R. 1992. "The Recoil Effect: Public Opinion and Policymaking in the U.S. and Britain", 
Comparative Politics, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Jan., 1992), pp. 199-217. Jacobs describe the ‘recoil effect’ as a process 
during which “….In striving to have an outward effect on public opinion, the creation of this [polling] apparatus had 
an inward effect: it educated government officials to be aware of and sensitive to public opinion. Thus, while the 
apparatus originated as an attempt to manipulate popular preferences through public relations campaigns, its 
development over time increased senior government officials' interest in tracking and responding to popular 
preferences. This new outlook among politicians and civil servants involved a shift from a preoccupation with 

























Figure 1. Federal Election Results (1970-2012) 
 
Notes:  
 The grey vertical lines show presidential elections, others are mid-term elections 
 In 2006, PAN (33.4%), PRI (28.2), PRD (29.0) 
 2012 are the oficial presidential results, see: 
http://computos2012.ife.org.mx/reportes/presidente/distritalPresidenteEF.html (http://www.ife.org.mx/ ) 
 Field/Phone refer to the average presidential approval per type of poll during the first half of each year. 
Sources: BIIACS, BGC and Consulta-Mitosfky. 
 Presidential approval from phone polls in 1991 are estimated. 
Sources: 
 1970-1982 Reynaldo Yunuen Ortega Ortiz, “De la Hegemonía al Pluralismo: Eleccioens Presidenciales y 
Comportamiento Electoral 1976-2006”, Los grandes problemas de México: Instituciones y Procesos 
Políticos XIV, El Colegio de México, 2010, p. 413-416.  
 1988-2006: Jean-François Prud’homme, “Sistema de Partidos”, Los grandes problemas de México: 








 Polity score: Polity IV: Regime Authority Characteristics and Transitions Datasets/ Polity IV Annual Time-
Series 1800-2010, http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm 
 Corruption Perception Index (CPI): Transparency International, 1995-2011, The index goes from 0 “highly 






Figure 3. Dendogram 
 
 
Fro From left to right:  
From left to right:  
1) Economic, pact, pece, growth, stability. 
2) Treaty, commerce, free. 
3) Electoral, poll, solidarity, evaluation, national 
4) Gulf, Persian, Chiapas (Mexican state), conflict 
5) Government, state of the union address, trip, United 
 
Clusters 1 and 2 show high correlation and refer to the economic pact (1) and NAFTA (2). Cluster 3 shows a link 
between the program Solidarity and electoral polls. Clusters 4 refer to the events related to the Iraq war and the 










Figure 4. Wordcloud: Salinas (face-to-face) 
 
Wordcloud graphs show the frequency of words, the higher the frequency the higher the font.  
The more fequent words are: solidaridad (solidarity), informe (state of the union address), 
nacional (national), gira (trip), electoral (electoral), evaluacion (evaluation), economico 
(economic), crecimiento (growth), estabilidad (stability), comercio (commerce), libre (free), 
tratado (treaty), Chiapas (Mexican state). 
Here we can see that the program Solidarity and presidential speechess (‘informe’) were more 





Figure 5. Dendogram 
 
From left to right:  
1) Poll, national. 
2) Candidate, Solorzano, Cardenas, Cuauthemoc. 
3) Trip, president. 
4) Zedillo, Ponce, Ernesto, Leon. 
5) Front, movement, Zapatista 
6) Campaign, media 
7) Assassination, Luis, Colosio, Donaldo 
Cluster  1 refer to national polls (mostly electoral). Cluster 2 is about the PRD presidential candidate in 1994 
Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas. Cluster 3 refers to president’s trip. Cluster 4 to the candidate Zedillo. Cluster 5 to the 
Chiapas guerrilla. Cluster 6 to the evaluation of the presidential media campaigns and Cluster 7 to the assassination 












Figure 6. Wordcloud: Salinas (phone) 
 
Wordcloud graphs show the frequency of words, the higher the frequency the higher the font.  
The more fequent words are: presidente (president), encuesta (poll), nacional (national), 
candidato (candidate), campaña (campaign). 






Figure 7. Dendogram 
 
From left to right:  
1) Electoral, pre. 
2) District, Federal, Baja, California. 
3) Zedillo, image, president. 
4) Situation, Jalisco, Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Tamaulipas (Mexican states). 
5) National, evaluation, government. 
 
Cluster 1 refers to pre-electoral polls. Cluster 2 to the elections in Mexico City and Baja California. Cluster 3 refer 
to the image of President Zedillo. Cluster 4 seem refer to the situation in the states of Jalisco, Chihuahua, Sinaloa 
and Tamaulipas (in an electoral context). Cluster 5 refers to the goverrnment’s evaluation. 
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Figure 8. Wordcloud: Zedillo (face-to-face) 
 
Wordcloud graphs show the frequency of words, the higher the frequency the higher the font.  
The more fequent words are: previa (pre), electoral (electoral). 





Figure 9. Dendogram 
 
From left to right:  
1) Day, news, important, more. 
2) Electoral, pre. 
3) President, Zedillo. 
4) Message, Leon, Ernesto, Ponce. 
5) Situation, campaign, short, image, evaluation, trip. 
 
Cluster 1 refers to the most important news of the day. Cluster 2 to pre-electoral polls. Cluster 3 to President Zedillo. 










Figure 10. Wordcloud: Zedillo (phone) 
 
Wordcloud graphs show the frequency of words, the higher the frequency the higher the font.  
The more fequent words are: president e (president), Zedillo, noticia (news), mas (more), importante (important), dia 
(day). 
The wordcloud suggest that phone polls were used to monitor President Zedillo’s image and to track what the people 





Figure 11. Dendogram 
 
From left to right:  
1) Evaluation, system, satisfaction, results, negotiated, goals, client, compensation. 
2) Education, topics, justice, indicators, crime, provision, corruption, programs, social. 
3) Politics/politicians, opinion, issues, agents, diverse. 
4) Government, Fox, management, image, president . 
5) Country, political, situation, id, party, intention, vote, change, direction, consume, media, perception, 
confidence, index, priorities, ministry. 
6) National, electoral, poll. 
Cluster 1 refers to the evaluation of customer satisfaction and goals. Cluster 2 refers to  programs and indicators on 
social issues (education, crime, justice, corruption). Cluster 3 refers to issues and political elites. Cluster 4 referst to 
the evaluation of Fox’s image and managemnet style. Cluster 5 refer to a miscellaneous toics regarding voting 










Figure 12. Wordcloud: Fox (face-to-face) 
 
Wordcloud graphs show the frequency of words, the higher the frequency the higher the font.  
The more fequent words are: evaluacion (evaluation), politicos (politics/politicians), presidente (president), cliente 
(client), satisfaccion (satisfaction), asuntos (issues), opinion (opinion), gobierno (government). 
Wordcloud suggest that face-to-face polls were used for evaluation purposes like customer satisfaction, goals, image, 





Figure 13. Dendogram 
 
From left to right:  
1) Evaluation, Fox, management, president. 
2) Opinion, agents, diverse, issues, politics/politicians. 
3) National, Zapatista, army, EZLN, liberation. 
4) Lopez, Obrador, Andres, Manuel (Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador). 
5) United, Mexico, relationship, Federal, conflict, electoral, program, trip, image, government, reform. 
Cluster 1 refers to the evaluation of Fox’s management. Cluster 2 refer to opinion toward political elites and political 
issues. Cluster 3 refers to the guerrilla in Chiapas. Cluster 4 refers to the then Mexico City’s major Andrés Manuel 
López Obrador. Cluster 5 referst to miscellaneus topics about the US-Mexico relation, presidential travels, image, 
electoral conflic and reforms.
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Figure 14. Wordcloud: Fox (phone) 
 
Wordcloud graphs show the frequency of words, the higher the frequency the higher the font.  
The more fequent words are: presidente (president), Fox, evaluacion (evaluation), politicos (politics/politicians), 
gestion (management). 
Wordcloud suggest phone polls were used primarily to evaluate President’s Fox performance and management style. 







Figure 15.  
 





















Table 3. Top ten most frequent words (face-to-face polls) 
 
Rank Face-to-face - Salinas Face-to-face - Zedillo Face-to-face - Fox 
1 Solidaridad (solidarity) 27 
Previa (previous). 
electoral (electoral, 193) 
196 Evaluacion (evaluation) 294 
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22 Evaluacion (evaluation) 24 President (president) 122 
4 Evaluacion (evaluation) 19 Gobierno (government) 22 Fox  97 
5 Pacto (pact) 15 
Nacional (national). 
President (president) 













12 Zedillo  11 Asuntos (issues) 83 



























Puebla (state).  
Aumento (increase). 








Salinas - word 'encuesta' (16) removed  
Zedillo -word 'México' (20) removed 
 






Table 4. Top ten most frequent words (phone polls) 
 
Rank Phone - Salinas Phone - Zedillo Phone - Fox 












611 Evaluacion (evaluation). 438 
3 Campaña (campaign) 44 
Dia (day). 
Noticia (news, 420). 
Importante (important, 
419) 










Pre (previous, 243) 





Zapatista (30)  
31 
Imagen (image). 
Corto (short, 129) 
226 Opinion (opinion) 173 







Ernesto Zedillo Ponce 
Leon 
24 Evaluacion (evaluation) 142 Gobierno (government) 127 
8 Luis Donaldo Colosio 19 Situacion (situation). 128 Unidos (United) 73 















Salinas – removed: word 'encuesta' (83), 'partido' (23), 'nacional' (91) 
Zedillo – removed: word 'nacional' (170), 'Mexico' (127) 
Fox – removed: 'federal' (80), 'Mexico' (69), 'nacional' (69) 






Table 13. Comparative of common topics across all administrations. Comparison is between row 
percent and total percent.  
 Topics Presidents All Face-to-face Phone 
electoral 
CSG 40% *** 16% ** 53% *** 
EZP 22%   68% *** 17%   
VFQ 19%   26% ** 17%   
Total 23%   39%   20%   
economy 
CSG 4%   9%   1%   
EZP 6%   4%   6%   
VFQ 5%   6%   4%   
Total 5%   6%   5%   
education 
CSG 2%   2%   1%   
EZP 1%   0%   1%   
VFQ 4%   13%   1%   
Total 2%   6%   1%   
public safety 
CSG 0%   0%   0%   
EZP 3%   3%   3%   
VFQ 10% * 10%   9% * 
Total 4%   5%   4%   
evaluation 
CSG 4%   11% * 0%   
EZP 6% *** 9% ** 5% *** 
VFQ 54% *** 61% *** 52% *** 
Total 17%   29%   14%   
Zedillo 
CSG 5%   1%   7%   
EZP 21% *** 4%   22% ** 
VFQ 1%   2%   1%   
Total 14%   2%   17%   
Fox 
CSG 0%   0%   0%   
EZP 0%   0%   1%   
VFQ 42% *** 25% ** 49% *** 
Total 10%   10%   10%   
campaign 
CSG 9%   3%   13% * 
EZP 4%   0%   4%   
VFQ 5%   2%   6%   
Total 5%   1%   5%   
government 
CSG 4%   7%   3%   
EZP 3%   7%   3%   
VFQ 18% *** 28% ** 14% *** 
Total 7%   15%   5%   
foreign 
CSG 9%   13%   7%   
EZP 6%   0%   6%   
VFQ 10%   1%   13% * 
Total 7%   4%   8%   
previous 
CSG 0%   0%   1%   
EZP 15% ** 68% *** 9%   
VFQ 0%   0%   0%   
Total 10%   26%   6%   
Significance:  * : 10% / ** : 5% / *** : 1% 
 
The table shows, for example, that during the Salinas administration (CSG), 40% of all titles have the word 
‘electoral’. If we consider all surveys for all administrations, 23% had the word ‘electoral. The table is comparing 













evaluacion 1.00 evaluacion 1.00 evaluacion 1.00 
campo 0.38 gobierno 0.55 cliente 0.70 
desarrollo 0.38 ciudad 0.44 compensacion 0.70 
programas 0.38 gestion 0.39 metas 0.70 
nacional 0.36 situacion 0.31 negociadas 0.70 
medios 0.32 nacional 0.23 resultados 0.70 
reformas 0.27 zedillo 0.20 satisfaccion 0.70 
articulo 0.24     sistema 0.66 
pais 0.24     base 0.33 
comunicacion 0.22     proyecto 0.29 
impresos 0.22     semestre 0.27 
radio 0.22     sep 0.23 
television 0.22     superior 0.23 
        secretaria 0.22 
        gabinete 0.20 
            
electoral 1.00 electoral 1.00 electoral 1.00 
instituto 0.55 previa 0.94 durango 0.32 
encuesta 0.49     queretaro 0.32 
federal 0.44     veracruz 0.32 
credibilidad 0.39     yucatan 0.32 
elabora 0.39     ciudadania 0.29 
padron 0.39     conflicto 0.29 
procedimiento 0.39     consejeros 0.29 
agosto 0.26     designacion 0.29 
michoacan 0.26     electorales 0.29 
morelos 0.26     judicial 0.29 
proceso 0.26     local 0.29 
proximas 0.26     miembros 0.29 
        tribunal 0.29 
        drogas 0.26 
        leon 0.26 
        trafico 0.26 
        conocimiento 0.23 
        tabasco 0.23 
        encuesta 0.22 
        gobierno 0.22 
        nuevo 0.22 
        gabinete 0.21 
 
The table shows the association between the first word in the list and the rest. For example, ‘evaluation’, in the 





Table 14 (cont.). Face-to-face associations (Pearson correlations).  







elecciones 1.00 conteo 1.00 elecciones 1.00 
candidato 0.53 elecciones 1.00 diputados 0.86 
designacion 0.53 rapido 1.00 expectativas 0.86 
pri 0.53 chiapas 0.37 federales 0.86 
proximas 0.53   
 
sonora 0.40 
ernesto 0.37   
 
queretaro 0.22 
zedillo 0.37       
             
presidente 1.00 presidente 1.00 presidente 1.00 
aspirantes 0.63 zedillo 0.77 fox 0.72 
debate 0.63 imagen 0.65 gestion 0.69 
negociaciones 0.63 informe 0.52 imagen 0.66 
bush 0.44 gobierno 0.39 asuntos 0.62 
conclusion 0.44 gestion 0.34 politicos 0.61 
george 0.44 cuarto 0.32 actores 0.56 
firma 0.43 tercer 0.32 diversos 0.56 
mensaje 0.38 año 0.23 opinion 0.52 
comercio 0.23 captura 0.23 situacion 0.47 
libre 0.23 ernesto 0.23 pais 0.45 
tratado 0.23 ezln 0.23 politica 0.45 
mexico 0.20 orden 0.23 confianza 0.41 
    quinto 0.23 indice 0.41 
        gobierno 0.38 
        percepcion 0.29 
        vicente 0.27 
        cambio 0.26 
        rumbo 0.26 
        economica 0.25 
        entrevistado 0.25 
        intencion 0.23 
        voto 0.23 
        campaña 0.21 
        prioridades 0.21 
        promesas 0.21 
 
The table shows the association between the first word in the list and the rest. For example, ‘elecciones’, in the 





Table 14 (cont.). Face-to-face associations (Pearson correlations).  







gobierno 1.00 gobierno 1.00 gobierno 1.00 
informe 1.00 evaluacion 0.55 confianza 0.50 
previo 0.50 zedillo 0.53 fox 0.50 
posterior 0.47 informe 0.52 indice 0.50 
quinto 0.47 ciudad 0.44 republica 0.50 
sexto 0.47 acusaciones 0.41 prioridades 0.47 
primer 0.38 oscar 0.41 anuncios 0.41 
segundo 0.38 presidente 0.39 gestion 0.41 
tercer 0.38 gestion 0.29 publicitarios 0.41 
cuarto 0.27 cuarto 0.28 asuntos 0.39 
    cuauhtemoc 0.28 estatal 0.39 
    espinoza 0.28 presidente 0.38 
    solorzano 0.28 politico 0.37 
    tercer 0.28 politicos 0.37 
    cardenas 0.22 federal 0.33 
    mexico 0.21 situacion 0.32 
        actores 0.30 
        diversos 0.29 
        jefe 0.28 
        opinion 0.27 
        distrito 0.26 
        politica 0.25 
        percepcion 0.24 
        imagen 0.23 
        electoral 0.22 
        entrevistado 0.22 
        pais 0.22 
        economica 0.21 
 
The table shows the association between the first word in the list and the rest. For example, ‘gobierno’, in the 





Table 14 (cont.). Face-to-face associations (Pearson correlations).  







nacional 1.00 nacional 1.00 nacional 1.00 
preelectoral 0.45 encuesta 0.40 crimen 0.61 
tematica 0.39 autonoma 0.32 imparticion 0.61 
evaluacion 0.36 debate 0.32 indicadores 0.61 
    universidad 0.32 justicia 0.61 
    primer 0.26 temas 0.60 
    año 0.23 programas 0.55 
    cnte 0.23 educacion 0.51 
    coordinadora 0.23 sociales 0.51 
    economia 0.23 encuesta 0.50 
    educacion 0.23 corrupcion 0.49 
    etapa 0.23 publicas 0.38 
    evaluacion 0.23 dependencias 0.34 
    huelga 0.23 loteria 0.34 
    instalaciones 0.23 consejo 0.27 
    medios 0.23 inea 0.27 
    nueva 0.23 adultos 0.24 
    poterior 0.23     
    pri 0.23     
 
The table shows the association between the first word in the list and the rest. For example, ‘nacional’, in the Salinas 












presidente 1.00 presidente 1.00 presidente 1.00 
candidato 0.76 zedillo 0.87 gestion 0.81 
cardenas 0.53 imagen 0.56 fox 0.74 
cuauhtemoc 0.53 corto 0.41 evaluacion 0.65 
solorzano 0.53 gira 0.36 actores 0.49 
gira 0.42 emision 0.34 diversos 0.49 
ernesto 0.37 mensaje 0.33 opinion 0.46 
leon 0.37 platicas 0.32 politicos 0.43 
ponce 0.37 leon 0.29 giras 0.40 
zedillo 0.37 ernesto 0.28 asuntos 0.35 
europa 0.27 ponce 0.28 america 0.28 
mensaje 0.25     declaraciones 0.26 
        imagen 0.24 
        mensajes 0.23 
            
electoral 1.00 electoral 1.00 electoral 1.00 
federal 1.00 pre 0.77 post 0.63 
instituto 1.00 post 0.26 ambiente 0.44 
listas 0.63 baja 0.25 conflicto 0.43 
nominales 0.63 california 0.25 estatal 0.38 
democratica 0.30 seguimiento 0.25 ife 0.34 
revolucion 0.30 federal 0.24 politico 0.31 
debate 0.27 sinaloa 0.23 federal 0.30 
medios 0.24 tamaulipas 0.20 encuesta 0.28 
        escenario 0.25 
        gobernabilidad 0.25 
        navideña 0.21 
        propone 0.21 
        tregua 0.21 
        yucatan 0.21 
 
The table shows the association between the first word in the list and the rest. For example, ‘presidente’, in the 












elecciones 1.00 elecciones 1.00 elecciones 1.00 
percepcion 0.95 internas 0.47 expectativas 0.93 
agosto 0.30 noviembre 0.47 federales 0.83 
carpizo 0.30 primarias 0.33 diputados 0.69 
declaraciones 0.30 julio 0.23 apoyar 0.29 
jorge 0.30     madrazo 0.29 
        roberto 0.29 
        incendios 0.21 
        obra 0.21 
        pareja 0.21 
        tiempos 0.21 
            
  Salinas   Zedillo   Fox 
nacional 1.00 nacional 1.00 nacional 1.00 
encuesta 0.92 ezln 0.52 ezln 0.75 
accion 0.22 zapatista 0.52 liberacion 0.73 
institucional 0.22 liberacion 0.47 ejercito 0.71 
revolucionario 0.22 autonoma 0.45 zapatista 0.71 
    unam 0.45 frente 0.52 
    universidad 0.45 marcos 0.52 
    ejercito 0.44 subcomandante 0.52 
    accion 0.32 movimiento 0.49 
    consulta 0.29 comision 0.34 
    mexico 0.23 cocopa 0.32 
    dialogo 0.22 concordia 0.32 
        pacificacion 0.32 
        loteria 0.30 
        pnd 0.28 
        registro 0.28 
        renave 0.28 
        plan 0.25 
        vehiculos 0.25 
        accion 0.22 
        pan 0.22 
The table shows the association between the first word in the list and the rest. For example, ‘elecciones’, in the 













gobierno 1.00 gobierno 1.00 gobierno 1.00 
informe 0.83 informe 0.63 informe 0.43 
acciones 0.44 previo 0.29 jefe 0.37 
cuarto 0.44     campaña 0.34 
quinto 0.44     informes 0.33 
previo 0.31     lopez 0.33 
posterior 0.30     obrador 0.33 
medios 0.27     critica 0.31 
campaña 0.24     cuarto 0.30 
obras 0.21     comparacion 0.29 
        medios 0.27 
        andres 0.25 
        manuel 0.25 
        federal 0.24 
        anuncios 0.23 
        publicitarios 0.23 
        distrito 0.21 
        estatal 0.21 
        fox 0.20 
 
 
The table shows the association between the first word in the list and the rest. For example, ‘gobierno’, in the 





Table 16. Common words use across all three presidencies (face-to-face).  
 
 
 Face-to-face Salinas Zedillo Fox Average 
evaluacion 19 24 294 112 
elecciones/electoral 29 194 50 91 
presidente 5 18 122 48 
gobierno 13 22 94 43 
nacional 26 18 46 30 
pais 3 1 67 24 
situacion 2 9 52 21 
Distrito Federal 1 35 16 17 
educacion 4 1 37 14 
economica(o) 14 3 15 11 
México 4 20 6 10 
conflicto 22 3 1 9 
medios 5 1 20 9 
Chiapas 14 8 3 8 
Zedillo 1 11 6 6 
Veracruz 1 5 6 4 
programa 8 1 2 4 
Michoacán 2 4 2 3 
Tabasco 1 4 3 3 
Yucatán 2 3 3 3 
 





Table 17. Common words (phone). Number of repeats. 
 
Phone Salinas Zedillo Fox Average 
presidente 102 612 468 394 
dia 2 438 1 147 
elecciones/electoral 16 334 82 144 
nacional 91 170 69 110 
gobierno 10 85 127 74 
ernesto/zedillo/ponce/leon 24 175 10 70 
mexico 1 127 69 66 
campaña 44 117 27 63 
gira 24 148 11 61 
federal 5 91 80 59 
economica(o) 3 116 23 47 
post/posterior 5 107 27 46 
zapatista 30 42 62 45 
programa 4 62 43 36 
estados/unidos 7 34 59 33 
reforma(s) 11 22 66 33 
pri 7 77 11 32 
informe 7 56 27 30 
medios 27 21 37 28 
declaraciones 1 55 24 27 
percepcion 10 43 18 24 
seguimiento 1 48 5 18 
asesinato 24 23 6 18 
frente 31 1 21 18 
cardenas 37 12 1 17 
salinas 1 45 4 17 
educacion 4 27 12 14 
prd 8 33 1 14 
seguridad 1 16 25 14 
comercio 9 23 9 14 
pan 7 25 7 13 
diputados 1 14 23 13 
salud 2 10 25 12 
luis 19 11 6 12 
apoyo 3 20 12 12 
aprobacion 1 15 17 11 
presidencia 2 16 15 11 
tratado/libre/comercio 9 16 8 11 
europa 10 9 12 10 
campo 4 8 18 10 
candidatos 2 17 11 10 





acciones 2 3 19 8 
mexicano 1 7 13 7 
nuevo 1 16 4 7 
partidos 1 9 11 7 
derechos 1 13 6 7 
desempleo 1 12 7 7 
libertad 2 15 1 6 
cardenal 9 1 4 5 
sector 1 8 5 5 
posadas 9 2 2 4 
explosion 5 4 1 3 
vivienda 1 6 3 3 
congreso 1 5 3 3 
mediana 4 1 2 2 
pequeña 4 1 2 2 
cambio 1 3 2 2 
negociaciones 1 4 1 2 
ejecucion 1 1 3 2 
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Presidential Approval in Mexico 
 
Abstract 
Research in the United States has offered a variety of answers to the question of what accounts 
for presidential approval. Most of the reasons are connected to economic factors and people’s 
perceptions about them. While there is no consensus, some of the evidence suggests that 
approval responds to expert interpretations about the future expectations of ‘real world’ data. 
Recent research has also suggested that approval could depend on the asymmetry of political 
preferences and, therefore, the political mood of the moment regardless of the dynamics of ‘real 
world’ data. The main goal of this paper is to find evidence that presidential approval in Mexico 
depends on factors directly connected to policy. The risk of manipulation is at the center of this 
connection. The president may create the illusion of meeting the public’s expectations and/or 
opinion elites may misled the public against the president. The argument is that as long as 
presidential popularity is rooted on objective measures related to policy or economic outcomes, 
approval may actually be a reliable indicator of citizen’s response to government actions and, 
therefore, a reliable measure of the president’s political capital. Thus, the research question is 
whether approval depends on objective measures of the economy (and the overall situation of the 
country) or relies on the public’s perceptions about the current conditions of the country. 
Furthermore, are those perceptions retrospective or prospective? Do they rely on what has been 
done or what is expected to be done? Taking into account feedback effects, three factors 
influence approval in Mexico: unemployment, anti-crime policies and prospective evaluations. 
Unemployment is considered one of the main economic indicators of how the economy is doing 





of approval. The effect of anti-crime policies is captured by the combined effect of approval 
from field and phone polls. Measured as spending on public safety, higher levels of approval 
from field polls seem to motivate higher levels of spending, which in turn, increase approval 
ratings among the well off. Spending on public safety issues is the only type of spending 
showing feedback effects with approval. The third factor, positive prospective evaluations, 
shows a significant relationship with approval, but only in phone polls. Optimistic expectations 
about the individual’s well being in the future cause higher levels of approval among those with 
higher levels of education and income. The overall conclusion is that presidential approval in 
Mexico is rooted in macroeconomic, salient and subjective measures that are also connected to 
the dynamics of leading economic indicators. Presidential approval in Mexico depends, so far, on 










Over the last twenty years, Mexican scholars have focused their efforts in explaining 
presidential approval in terms of leading economic indicators, perceptions about those indicators, 
perceptions about economic policies, and more recently, the public’s sentiment towards anti-
crime/corruption policies.
78
 This follows the experience of the United States in which, over the 
last forty years, research has focused on the impact of economic factors, retrospective and 
prospective evaluations and presidential activity and rhetoric.
79
  
While research on what accounts for presidential approval in both countries is still 
ongoing, a recurring conclusion is that high approval ratings do not necessarily help the president 
to get what he wants. It does, however, can help a president get re-elected as in the case of 
President Clinton in the United States. In the case of Mexico, high approval ratings may have 
helped Salinas’ party to win the midterm elections of 1991 (see Moreno 1996) or change the 
party in government as in the recent electoral defeat of PAN during the presidential election of 
2012. 
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This paper does not explicitly deal with the policy effectiveness or electoral impact of 
approval but rather takes a new and a different approach to explain its dynamics in Mexico. By 
looking at approval in terms of feedback effects, I expect to assess how ‘objective’ the measure 
of presidential approval is. By ‘objective’ I mean what Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson 
(2002:30) refer to as an indicator of “citizen response to government” rather than just a measure 
of “how well the incumbent is performing his or her job”.  
The case of Mexico may be different from the United States in two ways: 1) the Mexican 
public does explicitly expect the president to manage the economy and take care of social 
problems; and, 2) the authoritarian characteristics of the Mexican political system, probably at 
least until the Zedillo administration, made approval ratings irrelevant; in a way, the people were 
stuck with the political elite of the moment.
80
 In 1996, 41% of the public said that the 
government should decide how much to produce for the economy to function (Beltrán 
1996:152). In the same year, 52% mentioned that dealing with social problems should be the 
principal goal of the government (Meyenberg 1996:62). While the electoral victory of President 
Fox’s was perceived as a clear sign of democratic transition, the celebratory mood did not last 
long. Between 1997 and 2001 about two out of three polled thought that divided government was 
good for the country, but since 2002 this has changed to one out of two.
81
 While in April of 2007 
the public did not have a clear idea of whether it was good or bad that the president’s party did 
not control Congress, by April 2012, 53% said that it was not good for the country that this was 
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the case (38% thought otherwise).
82
 In spite of the democratic transition, Mexicans still expect 
the president to fix all the problems and presidential approval may well reflect that perception. 
This paper will explore the dynamics of approval during the administrations of Presidents 
Salinas, Zedillo, Fox and Calderón. Because of the strong expectations of the Mexican public 
towards the president, I expect to find a significant relation between macroeconomic indicators 
(taken as policy outcomes), public’s expectations (retrospective and prospective), policy activity 
(measured here as spending) and approval. 
Buendia (1996) studied the period 1988-1993 and suggested that after a long period of 
hardship, the Mexican public developed a pragmatic stand: If economic conditions improve then 
they will support the president, otherwise they will not. To Buendia, variations in economic 
indicators had a direct influence on approval. In his model, the richer segments of the population 
were particularly sensitive to variation in inflation rates. He found that public support for the 
president’s economic reforms was stronger among the affluent than among the poor. He also 
found that support for the president’s economic reforms tend to be higher at the beginning of the 
administration than at the end. 
Villareal (1999) focused on the Salinas administration (1988-1994) and argued that the 
impact of economic indicators provided only a partial explanation of presidential popularity. 
Unlike Buendia, he found that the middle class was more sensitive than the well off to changes in 
inflation rates. However, focusing on the Salinas administration, his main finding was that the 
long-term expectations created by Salinas’ “audacious policies” and “skillful public-relations 
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campaign promoting them” (p. 150) where the main factors that ultimately explained Salinas’ 
high levels of approval.  
Gómez-Vilchis (2012) analyzed the period 1994-2006 and argued that non-economic 
factors play a role in explaining presidential popularity, but the effectiveness of popularity in 
advancing the president’s policy agenda depends on the political context. Gómez-Vilchis focused 
on the effect of anti-crime and anti-corruption policies and found strong correlation between 
presidential approval and support for these types of policies. According to the author, Fox’s 
electoral victory created high expectations in terms of reducing government corruption and better 
public safety. At the end, President Fox’s popularity (especially among the affluent) was not 
enough to implement the reforms needed to reduce corruption and to fight crime. Gómez-Vilchis 
concludes that factors related to the political system (in particular the relationship between the 
Presidency and Congress) and the strength of the opposition parties (the PRI being one of them) 
prevented Fox from advancing his policy agenda.
83
 Given these findings, it is possible to see that 
the Mexican political system is starting to behave like in the United States in which divided 
government and the institutional arrangements among political elites have a negative effect on 
the policy effectiveness of a popular president.  
Recent research in the United States has looked into whether popularity, prestige and 
persuasion matter (Edwards 2009; for a review see Nichols 2011). The conclusion of this 
‘second look’ at the presidency is that it does not matter at all, as Nicohols put it: “….The office 
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was simultaneously seen as too big for any man and too powerful for the wrong 
man….presidents were no longer seen as the solution; they had become a big part of the 
problem” (514). This is a direct criticism of Neustadt’s (1990) famous line “the power of the 
presidency is the power to persuade” which characterizes the ‘first look’ at the presidency. Now 
the president is seen as a ‘photo-op’ president, waiting for the right moment to shine and, when 
possible, make things easier. 
While popularity does not seem to be relevant for policymaking, it does seem to be 
relevant for electoral purposes, which in turn could have an effect on policymaking. This creates 
two possible scenarios: 1) the opposition has all the incentives and motivations to make the 
president look bad which may create policy gridlocks; and, 2) winning re-election the president 
may pull the ‘legitimacy’ card to push for his preferred policies.  If staying in power is the 
ultimate goal of a highly popular president, can he afford to give the appearance of responding to 
the public? Or, must he justify every single percentage point increase in his approval rating? We 
are back to the initial question, what accounts for presidential approval? 
As we will see below, approval research in Mexico has closely followed that of the 
United States. Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson (2002: chapter 2) summarize the major findings 
when arguing that economic performance and events explain a good deal of the variance in 
approval ratings. I would like, however, to start where they conclude: “….We have assumed that 
the responses [to the approval question] meant exactly what the question asked. The subject was 
‘the president’ and no one else. The object of evaluation was ‘handling his job’ and nothing else. 





The next section will start by exploring the question that polling organizations have used 
to measure presidential approval and a brief review of the work done in the United States. 
Section 3 will introduce the model, section 4 will discuss the data, section 5 will present the 
results and section 6 will conclude. 
 
 
2) The approval question and an overview of the research 
 
Why has the question, “Do you approve or disapprove of the way [the incumbent] is 
handling his job as President?” received so much attention from both inside and outside 
academia? The question itself does not provide a clear direction or point of reference and it is not 
clear what respondents meant when they say either ‘approve’ or ‘disapprove’. As Neustadt 
(1990:81) said, “…Unlike a preelection poll, this inquiry does not relate to any concrete action 
by respondents. Unlike a query on specific issues, it does not relate to any concrete information. 
The question is unfocused; so is the response, which tells us anything or nothing about what 
respondents meant by what they said….” The meaning and implications of the responses to this 
question have puzzled researchers for over four decades. 
Given that the approval question does not provide any clear guidance in terms of what it 
refers to and Kernell warned us about the dangers of paying to much attention to the dynamics of 
presidential approval, the concern here is: When presidents track approval and actually pay 
attention to it, what is exactly are they paying attention to? A central question is whether 
presidential approval ratings respond directly to: 1) the dynamics of leading economic indicators; 





in the individual’s immediate environment (and/or to macroeconomic conditions); or, 4) to some 
random, and probably myopic factors (which may include perceptions about the president’s 
personal traits).  
To explore the above relationships I will estimate a series of vector-autoregressive 
models (VAR) under the assumption that the relationship between presidential approval other 
opinion and policy variables is strictly endogenous. The period of analysis extends from 1989 to 
2011 for a total of twenty-three years (the unit time is the year). Given that the time series is at 
the minimum end of the required span of time for these types of models, the lags will be set to 




The research in the United States has explored the impact on presidential approval of 
objective measures (i.e leading economic indicators), subjective measures (i.e retrospective and 
prospective perceptions), political factors (presidential speeches, trips, and campaigns), 
unexpected events (i.e wars, economic crises, political scandals), and ‘smart political marketing’ 
(i.e manipulation).
85
 Some scholars have also analyzed the influence of the mass media and have 
paid a closer look at, for example, partisanship. In this line of thought, the question is not 
whether approval responds to certain factors but rather whether the way individuals evaluate the 
job performance of a president depends on what they know or who we are. Do individuals 
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process the information and provide an assessment based on evidence and personal experiences? 
Or do they process the information using our partisan or socioeconomic lenses? Some have 
concluded that taken together such asymmetry does not matter; some people stay in one track 
and ride parallel to others (i.e ‘parallel publics’). Others have stressed that the asymmetry across 
groups does not cancel out in the aggregate, therefore suggesting that the intensity of such 
asymmetry may influence what individuals think as a collective entity.  
In response to the question: what makes the approval question valuable? Neustadt 
suggests two reasons: its dynamics over time and who is paying attention. Changing presidential 
approval over time, and its apparent correspondence with political events led Neustadt to 
consider presidential approval as an indicator of public standing regarding the president’s action 
and a factor explaining the ups-and-downs of the president’s prestige.86 Neustadt looked at the 
approval ratings for the Truman and Eisenhower administrations and concluded that the factors 
explaining the president’s public prestige were the public’s future expectations and its perception 
of current living conditions as viewed through the dynamics of approval ratings. Furthermore, 
Neustadt suggested that if the public’s perceptions could not be controlled, they would have a 
negative effect on the president’s prestige, because it would have a negative effect on his 
approval ratings:  
“Because he cannot control happenings, a President must do his best with hopes. His 
prestige is secure while men outside of Washington accept the hard conditions in their 
lives, or anyway do not blame him. If he can make them think the hardship necessary, 
and can make them want to hear it with good grace, his prestige may not suffer when they 
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feel it. Had Truman’s public thought interminable warfare-within-limits a necessity his 
prestige would have risen, not declined, in 1951. A President concerned for leeway inside 
government must try to shape the thoughts of men outside. If he would be effective as a 
guardian of public standing, he must be effective as teacher to the publics. Truman was 
an unsuccessful teacher in the midst of the Korean War…” (p. 84).  
This is consistent with the feedback cycle theory presented in the spending-opinion paper 
in which the public will hold politicians accountable if it does not perceive their actions 
justifiable or as serving the public interest. It is possible that the Truman administration failed to 
persuade the public about the benefits of his actions; this is, the flow of information from the 
president to the public was not clear enough. 
What also makes the presidential approval question valuable is that other politicians pay 
attention to it: “The Washingtonians who watch a President have more to think about than his 
professional reputation. They also have to think about his standing with the public outside 
Washington. They have to gauge his popular prestige. Because they think about it, public 
standing is a source of influence for him, another factor bearing on their willingness to give him 
what he wants.” (Neustadt 1990:73). Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson (2002) suggested that the 
approval question itself might also be an indicator of the perception of government in general; 
therefore, Congressional leaders should not dismiss its dynamics. Erikson and Tedin (2005: 109) 
pointed out, “…The president’s approval rating takes on importance because it is widely 
believed to measure the president’s degree of political support at the moment. Congress may be 
more likely to enact the policy proposals of a president who shows popular 
support….Presidential approval also provides a guide to reelection prospects”. Thus, approval 






A quick look into the literature on the relation between presidential approval and 
presidential success in Congress shows that scholars are divided. Some argued that higher 
approval ratings correlate with higher legislative success (Ostrom and Simon 1985; Rivers and 
Rose 1985; Brace and Hinckley 1992; Rohde and Simon 1985).
87
 Others disagree and argue that 
presidential approval does not guarantee legislative success (Collier and Sullivan 1995; Cohen, 
Bond, Fleisher, and Hamman 2000; Covington and Kinney 1999).
88
 Yet another line of research 
found that approval ratings help the president in some sections/groups of Congress but not in 
others (Edwards 1980, 1989; Bond and Fleisher 1990).
89
 One more line of research argues that it 
depends on issue saliency (Hutchings 1998; Kollman 1998; Schattschneider 1960; Carmines and 
Stimson 1980; Zaller and Feldman 1992).
90
 From this latter line of research, Canes-Wrone and 
Marchi (2002) showed that “…a president's popularity will afford him influence over the passage 
of a bill if and only if there exists this combination of public concern and public uncertainty 
about the bill” (493). The jury is still out on the effect of approval on presidential legislative 
success. The fact that research find so much variation indicates that approval matters, we are just 
not clear how much and under what circumstances. 
Neustadt concluded that public frustration, as reflected in low approval ratings, has a 
negative effect on presidential prestige. Such frustration arises from the public’s unmet 
expectations and its negative perceptions about the current situation. In a way, this suggests that, 
among the public, there is a minimum consensus on what a president ought to do.  
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Along the same lines, Kernell (1997) argued that the public expects the president to 
promote the “general welfare” (p. 242) and sees him as problem solver; hence, the president’s 
popularity will depend on how well he meets those expectations. Kernell warned that too much 
public exposure to enhance the presidential image could create more harm than good, as it could 
become the goal rather than the way to meet the public’s expectations.  
Enns, Kellstedt and McAvoy (2012) raised an interesting point: aggregated public’s 
expectations may not be one and only. Their research suggests that partisanship can bias 
presidential approval and the public’s economic outlook towards one political party or the 
other.
91
 In this sense, people’s preference for one party or the other will influence the minimum 
consensus about what the president ought to do. Thus, public expectations are not uniform, but 
are asymmetrical, based on political bias or socioeconomic status. If asymmetry is the case, then 
it all boils down to which group has the most influence on either elections or policymaking 
(possibly entering the realm of a new pluralistic view of politics). While there is not enough data 
to confirm it, the Mexican case provides a hint that this process may have had something to do 
with the electoral win of the conservative party (PAN) in 2000 and the return of PRI to the 
presidency in the recent presidential elections of 2012 (see figure 2).  
Setting the influence of asymmetric expectations aside, Neustadt provided the basic 
components to explore presidential approval: prospective evaluations, perceptions of current 
situation, accountability and presidential public relations (communication with the public). A 
major requirement for these components to work in the president’s favor is that, given the 
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political context, he must see them as endogenous variables rather than exogenous.  This is, the 
president must communicate with the public, persuade it, and defend his agenda and actions in 
terms of the ‘public interest’. Failure to do so will result in low levels of presidential approval, 
negative image and negative prestige.  
In a field essay reviewing the literature on presidential approval, Paul Gronke and Brian 
Newman (2003) trace the beginnings of the research on presidential approval to the work of John 
Mueller (1970, 1973) who first developed a model to explain presidential approval. To Mueller, 
the variables explaining presidential approval were: 1) foreign affair crises (which increased 
approval ratings through the ‘rally round the flag’ effect); 2) economic crises (negative effect on 
approval); 3) economic recovery or growth (no effect on approval); 4) personal presidential traits, 
and time. In this model, time explains the decline observed in approval rating towards the end of 
the administration; according to Mueller this was due to the fact that at some point the president 
must act on controversial issues, thereby alienating some current or potential supporters 
(“coalition of minorities”). Mueller measured the effect of such coalition with a time trend, 
giving the impression of a natural decline in presidential approval. Figure 1 shows such decline 




[Figure 1. Presidential Approval in the United States HERE] 
 
A second wave of approval research during the 1980s builds on findings from the first 
wave and focused on aggregate as well as individual approval seeking to determine whether 
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group differences or political differences matter (Kernell and Hibbs 1981; Hibbs, Rivers, and 
Vasilitos 1982; Kinder 1981; Tedin 1986).
93
 The overall line of research looks at the duration of 
the effects from political and economic variables (MacKuen 1983; Norpoth and Yantek 1983)
94
 
and the incentives presidents have to increase their approval ratings through speeches, special 
events, public appearances and domestic crises (Ostrom and Simon 1985; Ostrom and Job 1986; 
Ragsdale 1984; Simon and Ostrom 1989).
95
 In terms of group differences, Hibbs, Rivers, and 
Vasilitos (1982) found that unemployment was important to Democrats and inflation to 
Republicans.
96
 According to Gronke and Newman, a major finding during this wave was that 
domestic events could have positive or negative effects on approval. 
Shapiro and Conforto (1980) found a stong association between presidential approval and 
objective economic measures (unemployment and inflation) but also found room for other 
factors, arguing that non-economic variables (political events, manipulation, etc.) may play a 
significant role. They argue:  
“…The public may be basing its assessment of presidential performance on 
misinformation, and the president may be intentionally trying to manipulate public 
opinion. Some of our empirical findings support this argument. Our measure of 
evaluations and perceptions of economic conditions is correlated more strongly with 
disapproval of the president than with the economic indicators. In addition, these 
economic indicators leave roughly 50 percent of the variation in the intervening variable 
unexplained, which suggests that there may be considerable opportunity for manipulating 
either the public's assessment of economic conditions or the economy itself”…(64).  
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 Hibbs, Douglas A., with Douglas Rivers and Nicholas Vasilatos. 1982. “The Dynamics of Political Support for 
American Presidents Among Occupational and Partisan Groups.” AmericanJournal of Political Science 26:312–23 





A third wave of approval research during the 1990s moved the attention from exogenous 
to endogenous variables, focusing on the political manipulation of public attitudes and behavior 
by the media and elites (originally proposed by Brody and Page 1975; suggested by Shapiro and 
Conforto 1980; Nadeau et al. 1999; Goidel, Shields, and Peffley 1997; Mutz 1992, 1994; West 
1991; Brody 1991; Callaghan and Virtanen 1993; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Miller and 
Krosknick 2000).
97




1. Media and elites serve as filters to the flow of information between the president and the 
public. Priming became a major factor in which the media and elite discourse modify the 
saliency of issues as viewed by the public. In this sense, political and economic factors 
may or may not be at all relevant, depending on how much media exposure they received.  
2. Mediated by elite discourse, prospective evaluations of the economy drive approval 
(MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992). 
3. Current and retrospective evaluations drive approval (Norpoth 1996; Clarke and Stewart 
1994). 
4. Individual-level studies show that economic conditions and perceptions have a strong 
influence on approval (Gronke 1999; Gilens 1988; Ostrom and Simon 1988), 
5. Foreign and domestic crises also affect approval ratings (Greene 2001; Edwards and 
Swenson 1997; Peffley, Langley, and Goidel 1995). 
6. For overall instances where issues did or did not produce a “rally effect” see Brody (1991) 
and Zaller (1992). 
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The third wave of approval research revealed two interesting dynamics. One relates to the 
question of whether prospective, current or retrospective perceptions of the economy influence 
approval. The second, explaining presidential approval is not about ‘real world’ data but how 
people perceived ‘real world’ data, and finding that a big part of that perception comes from 
priming by the media and elite discourse (see references cited by Gronke and Newman 2003; 
more recently see Althaus and Kim 2006; Kelleher and Wolak 2006). The implications of these 
findings for both the president and democracy are troublesome. Presidential approval relies on 
how people perceive the political and economic context, but if those perceptions respond more to 
the media and elite discourse rather than to objective measures then, as Kernell suggested (see 
also Jacobs and Shapiro 2000), the president will have incentives to create the appearance of 
meeting expectations which in turn will create a false sense of responsiveness to the public at 
large and therefore undermining a fundamental principle of democracy.
99
  
In their paper "Peasants or Bankers? The American Electorate and the U.S. Economy", 
MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson (1992) show evidence that prospective evaluations of the 
economy drive presidential approval. Using the Index of Consumer Sentiment (ICS), which 
includes a series of subjective questions on retrospective, current and prospective evaluations on 
one’s personal and national economic situation, the authors found first that the ICS’ subjective 
variables trumped the direct effect of unemployment and inflation on approval. In addition, the 
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component of the ICS, with the most significant effect was ‘business expectations’.100 The 
authors conclude: “…Controlling for Business Expectations, no other measure of economic 
sentiment directly affects Approval. Economic conditions affect presidential popularity only to 
the extent that economic conditions alter expectations of the economic future…” (603). But they 
recognize the possible risks of their findings: “…When citizens are retrospective, their politics 
are grounded in reality --personally experienced or observed in others. When citizens act on 
expectations, they rely on an informed imagination. This transformation of the base of politics, 
from reality to imagination, suggests a serious reconsideration of the role that information--and 
information production--plays in the polity” (p. 606).  
If the public’s evaluation of the president’s performance relies on an ideal, what then 
makes this ideal more an illusion than a tangible reality? What prevents politicians and other 
political elites from tampering with this imaginary expectation? The authors suggest not 
worrying, for two reasons: 1) trends in macroeconomic data will corroborate or disprove experts’ 
forecasts and 2) eventually, the public is smart enough to discount misleading forecasts due to 
past failures. Still there are a couple of concerns. One is that the wording of the questions the 
authors used demands a knowledgeable audience and it is indeed a question that a ‘banker’ may 
be able to answer; second, the long-term business expectations question include the words 
‘unemployment’ and ‘depression’. In a way, this part of the ICS may in fact be a proxy indicator 
for unemployment and inflation, and may wipe out the effect of the actual unemployment and 
inflation on approval.  
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 It comes from two questions: a) short-term business expectations Now turning to business conditions in the 
country as a whole do you think that during the next 12 months we'll have good times financially, or bad times or 
what? b) long-term business expectations Looking ahead, which would you say is more likely-that in the country as 
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In sum, what the approval research has found fits the feedback theory presented in the 
spending-opinion paper. On the lower bound, there is a minimum consensus in terms of what the 
people expect from the president: problem solver, keeper of the peace and promoter of the 
general welfare (i.e. prosperity). Beyond these basic expectations, people will evaluate 
presidential performance from their own personal experiences and/or beliefs, their future 
expectations, their own definition of public interest, or from what others say about the president. 
Whether economic or political factors influence those perceptions will depend on the salience of 
the issues at the time those perceptions are measured. For the most part, the literature has made a 
strong case for economic factors (outcomes) influencing those perceptions but there has been the 
case of political factors also playing a role. The central point, however, is whether those 
perceptions directly respond to ‘real world’ measures or are mostly ‘filtered’ by the media/elite 
discourse (the ‘experts’). While aggregate levels of opinion tend to be stable, consistent and 
rational, they are movable, therefore subject to influence by special interests (Page and Shapiro 
1992).  
On the upper bound, approval ratings provide an indicator of performance, leadership and 
accountability, which is particularly valuable to the president and his opposition during electoral 
campaigns. It is precisely during this time that factors explaining variation of approval ratings 
become relevant. The literature has provided evidence of all sorts to support either retrospective 
or prospective perceptions influencing approval. The research has also supported the direct 
impact of leading economic indicators and political factors. The bottom line is that it all depends 
on the type of variables and models used to examine the theorizing. Of all the approaches, the 





artificially inflated or underestimated by the opposition, the media or the elite discourse, the 
president will have a hard time making his case to be re-elected. If the president pays too much 
attention to approval ratings, he might risk alienating his supporters as he may depart from the 
public’s minimum consensus of what is expected of him. In the end, people will hold the 
president responsible for what happen in the economy and, as Neustadt said, if he does not 
justify himself given the public’s frustration he will not get re-elected. 
While the experience from the approval research in the United States looks at a whole set 
of issues, at the end, economic outcomes are the ones that tend to dominate the literature. 
Gomez-Vilchis (2012) provides a comprehensive review of the literature for the case of Mexico 
and divides the approval research in Mexico into two camps: 1) those who argue that presidential 
approval respond to variation in macroeconomic indicators (Buendia 1996, Magaloni 2006); and, 
2) those who argue that approval is influenced by individuals’ evaluation of both the economic 
conditions and economic policies (Domínguez and McCann 1995; Villarreal 1999). Gomez-
Vilchis argues that issues like crime and anti-corruption policies have an even more significant 
impact on public perception of presidential performance.   
This paper will explore presidential approval in Mexico following some of the findings 
from the approval research in the United States. I will focus on evaluating the direct impact of 
leading economic indicators (testing whether ‘real world’ data has a direct effect on approval), 
the effect of policy activity of the president (in terms of spending) as well as retrospective and 
current perceptions about the country’s situation and prospective personal evaluations101. The 
goal is to assess the effect of one variable given the feedback effects of other variables in the 
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system. To account for feedback effects I will be using vector-autorregression models (VAR) in 
which macroeconomic variables (GDP percapita, inflation and unemployment) will be treated as 
exogenous while spending and perceptions will be considered endogenous. Based on the findings 
in the spending-opinion paper that positive opinions generate a more dynamic feedback cycle 
among the variables, I will be focusing on positive subjective measures.  
The expected effects and hypotheses of the variables are the same as those in the 
approval research literature (see diagram 1). I do expect positive prospective and retrospective 
perceptions to have a positive effect on approval. Current conditions will be measured by the 
question asking about the important problem affecting the country today. I do expect that 
increases in identified problems to have a negative effect on approval. I expect presidential 
spending to have a positive effect on approval. Among the macroeconomic variables I expect 
GDP percapita to have a positive effect and inflation and unemployment to have a negative 
effect on approval.  
 
[Diagram 1. Hypotheses HERE] 
 
To assess the effects of socioeconomic status I will explore presidential approval from 
two sources: face-to-face polls (field) and phone polls. In Mexico, in 2000 only 36% of the 
population had landline phone service and 43% by 2010.
102
 Therefore, the sample population 
from phone polls in Mexico reflects the opinions of a population with higher levels of 
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socioeconomic status and better education.
103
 This provides an opportunity to test whether 
individuals are ‘peasants or bankers’ (as defined by MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992, 1996; 
Norpoth 1996; Clarke and Stewart 1994).
104
  I would expect to see ‘bankers’ in the models where 





3) The model 
 
The literature on presidential approval sets approval as a dependent variable. Most 
models treat or assume predictors to be exogenous variables. The third wave of research in 
Gronke and Newman’s review (2003) suggests, however, an endogenous relationship when the 
attention moves from ‘real world’ indicators to perceptions about those ‘real world’ indicators. In 
this case, what people perceived about the current state of the economy may have an immediate 
effect on presidential approval. In turn, presidential approval may have an effect on spending and 
spending may influence approval. Overall, the relationship between approval, perceptions and 
policy activity will be treated as endogenous (see diagram below): 
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 During the Salinas and Zedillo administration, phone polls showed population with higher median incomes and 
better education than face-to-face polls and the political preferences tended to be biased toward the conservative 
party PAN (the party of Presidents Fox and Calderón). 
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 Cited in Gronke and Newman 2003. 
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Endogenous theoretical cycle 
 
 
Recursive vector-autorregresive models (VAR) are useful to account for endogeneity in 
the variables and their feedback effects, controlling for a possible ‘backwards’ process in the 
opinion variables.
106
 This type of VAR models controls for the contemporaneous causality 
according to the order in which the variables enter the model.
107
 Additionally, VAR account for 
reciprocal relationships in the sense that there might be a reverse causation. For example, 
approval may be high because people feel safe and believe the economy is doing well; however, 
it could be the case that individuals may have an unconditional support for the president, which 
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may cloud their sense of security and the perception that the economy is doing well. The relevant 








 Cumulative Orthogonal impulse-response functions (COIFR, shows the net effect of 
unexpected changes –innovations- in one variable on another keeping the rest of the 
variables constant at the forecast horizon t).  
 Forecast-error variance decomposition (FEVD, show the contributions to the forecast 
error in one variable as product of shocks to other variable). 
 Cumulative Dynamic multipliers (CDM, measure the net effect of unexpected changes –
innovations- in exogenous variables on endogenous variables at the forecast horizon t). 
 
The concept of innovation refers to a change in a variable that is not generated by the 
model (i.e. predicted by other variables; they are also referred to as external or exogenous shocks, 
or sudden and unexpected changes; see Sims 1980).
 110
 This could simulate, for example, a 
sudden change in economic conditions, policy or unexpected changes in public opinion. To 
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 “Standard practice in VAR analysis is to report results from Granger-causality tests, impulse responses and 
forecast error variance decompositions… Because of the complicated dynamics in the VAR, these statistics are more 
informative than are the estimated VAR regression coefficients or R
2
 statistics, which typically go unreported.” 
(Stock and Watson 2001:104; see also Freeman, Williams and Lin 1989). 
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Walter C. Labys and Micahel Terraza. 1994. Multivariate Tests for Time Series Models, Sage Publications, 98 pp. 
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estimate the causal effect of innovations it is necessary to estimate a triangular recursive VAR 
model which allows for innovations (εt) to be uncorrelated (i.e. orthogonal)
111
. Orthogonal IRFs 
allows the estimation of the effects of shocks to variable y1 onto y2 keeping the other variables 
constant. Diagram 2 shows the contemporaneous relationships for the recursive VAR models 
estimated for this paper  
 
[Diagram 2. Assumed contemporaneous relationships HERE] 
 
The logic of the model is that presidential approval ‘feeds’ from information coming 
from other variables: the initial cause is assumed to be the policy activity of the president 
(measured here as spending). As the public gets information regarding the changes in spending 
on item A, it evaluates those changes in light of the perceived context of the country (as 
compared to the previous year; retrospective evaluation) which, in turn, may influence or 
determine the current most important issues (MIP). Then, based on that information, the public 
generates or modifies its expectations toward the future (prospective evaluation of personal well 
being). All this information may have an immediate effect on presidential approval. In this sense, 
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yt =  μ + Γyt-1 + εt 
Where: 
yt, yt-1= vector of covariates of spending and opinion variables (growth rates) 
Γ = matrix of 1’s  
εt = “vector of nonautocorrelated error disturbances (innovations) with zero means and 
contemporaneous covariance matrix E[εt ε’t] = Ω” (Green, p. 693). 
The individual equations would be: 
 
Where: 
1. y1 = Presidential spending on A (economy, public safety, other). 
2. y2 = Perception of the current state of the country as compared to the previous year 
(percentage positive –better-). 
3. y3 = Perception of the most important problem (economy, public safety, other). 
4. y4 = Perception about the future regarding personal situation (prospective evaluation, 
percentage positive –better-,). 





4) The data  
 
The VAR models include most of the variables used by the literature on presidential 
approval. The goal is to measure the effects of the dynamics of retrospective perceptions of the 
country, current (measured in the most important problem facing the nation today) and 
prospective evaluations of personal well-being along with policy activity and macroeconomic 
variables (as exogenous factors) on presidential approval, accounting for feedback effects 
(endogeneity). The values used in the models are yearly growth rates for each variable. The lag 
effects refer to the change observed in the previous year. Contemporaneous effects would refer 
to the change observed during the same year. 
Public opinion data in Mexico is collected using two types of polls: face-to-face (or field) 
and phone. The socioeconomic component of each is different. As mentioned before, according 
to the census, in 2000 only 36% of the population had landline phone service; by 2010 it went up 
to 43%. Overall, phone polls tend to represent a population with higher levels of income and 
education, which traditionally supported the conservative party, PAN.
113
 Analyzing approval 
ratings from field and phone polls allow checking for differences between the general population 
(most of which are poor) and the well off. The goal is to see whether in each population 
presidential approval is impacted by retrospective or prospective evaluations (i.e. the ‘peasants 
and bankers’ thesis from the approval research in the United States). 
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There are five endogenous and three exogenous variables in the VAR models.  I will 
estimate six VAR(1) models based on three types of spending (economy, public safety and other), 
three types of “most important problem” (economy, public safety and other) and two types of 
polls (field and phone). 
Spending data comes from the Mexican census office INEGI that published the document, 
El Ingreso y Gasto Público en México (Public Sector’s Income and Expenditures, several 
years)
114
, in particular data related to Gasto Neto Ejercido Por El Gobierno Federal Por 
Clasificación Administrativa (Federal Government’s Net Expenditures per Administrative 
Classification). These expenditures will be aggregated into three types of spending:  
 
1. Economic = Agricultura, Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentación 
(agricultural, livestock, rural development, fishing and food); Comunicaciones y 
Transportes (infrastructure in communication and transportation); Economía 
(economic development); Reforma Agraria (land distribution); Medio Ambiente y 
Recursos Naturales (environment and natural resources); Energía (energy); Turismo 
(tourism); Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología (science and technology). 
2. Public safety = Procuraduría General de la República (federal police), Defensa 
Nacional (military spending: army); Marina (military spending: navy), Seguridad 
Pública (public safety). 
3. Other = Education and miscellaneous spending. 
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The data will be in constant pesos of 2011. All variables are in annual growth rates 
[ECONGR (economic spending), SEGGR (public safety), OTHERGR (other spending)].  
The three exogenous variables come from the World Development Indicators database:
115
 
GDP percapita (constant, 2000, annual growth, GDPPCGR), lagged annual average inflation 
(INFLATION2) and unemployment rate (UNEMP, first difference).
116
  
The perception variables come from presidential polls archived at the Banco de 
Información para la Investigación Aplicada en Ciencias Sociales (BIIACS at CIDE; 
http://www.biiacs.cide.edu/). Currently only polls from presidents Salinas, Zedillo and Fox were 
available. Data for Calderón’s administration (2007-2011, and some additional data since 1994) 
come from polls conducted by Dr. Ulises Beltrán and Leticia Juárez at BGC Ulises Beltrán y 
Asocs (http://www.bgc.com.mx/ )
117
 and by Roy Campos from Consulta-Mitofsky 
(http://consulta.mx/). The presidential polls were coordinated by the Oficina de la Presidencia de 
la República Mexicana (Presidential Polling Unit). The fieldwork was contracted out to a private 
company, Opinión Profesional, S.A. de C.V.  
The question measuring presidential approval is generic: En general, ¿está usted de 
acuerdo o en desacuerdo con la manera como está gobernando el Presidente [nombre]? // In 
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Early versions of this study operated under the assumption that the country, personal and 
prospective perceptions were all generic. Further inspection of the data showed that this was not 
the case. Some of the studies included in the yearly averaged data in which the word ‘economic’, 
was added to the question wording. This caused that the yearly trends to include both generic and 
economic perceptions.  
In an effort to assess the impact of including both generic and economic perceptions I 
separated them for the years they were mixed and ran Spearman and Pearson correlations. 
Results are presented in the table below.  
Spearman (H0: independence) Rho p-value N 
    Country situation, generic vs economic (better) 0.8286 0.0416 6 
Country situation, generic vs economic (worse) 0.8857 0.0188 6 
Future expectations, generic vs economic (better) 0.9747 0.0048 5 
Future expectations, generic vs economic (worse) 0.6669 0.2189 5 
 
   Pearson Correlation p-value N 
 
   Country situation, generic vs economic (better) 0.8816 0.0202 6 
Country situation, generic vs economic (worse) 0.9587 0.0025 6 
Future expectations, generic vs economic (better) 0.8713 0.0543 5 
Future expectations, generic vs economic (worse) 0.7767 0.1223 5 
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In both the Spearman and Pearson correlations, three out of four pair of perceptions show 
no independence. While these results are not conclusive, they suggest that when people are asked 
about their future or country situation the first thing that comes to mind seems to be an economic 
condition (in the case of the generic questions). 119 In this case, generic perceptions seem to 
behave similarly as the economic perceptions in the same types of questions. For the purposes of 
the analysis presented, I will leave the mix of generic and economic perceptions as they 
complement each other especially in cases where there is not enough data from either one. The 
data on perceptions used in this study should be taken as index of perception as they come from 
different question wordings measuring the same latent variable. In this case, the two latent 
variables are perception of the country situation and perception about personal situation the 
following year. 
 
 Perception about the country situation (retrospective evaluation, SITECOMEJ -better) .  
Comparada con la situación que tenía el país 
hace un año, ¿cómo diría usted que es la 
situación actual de México, mejor o peor? 
Compared the country’s situation last year, 
how would say is the current situation of 
Mexico, better or worse? 
¿Cree usted que el país está hoy, en general, 
en mejor o peor situación que hace un año? 
Do you believe that, currently, the country is in 
better or worse shape than last year? 
¿Me gustaría que me dijera si cree que el país 
está hoy, en general, en mejor o peor situación 
que hace un año? 
I would like you to tell me if you believe that 
the country today, in general, is in better or 
worse shape than last year. 
Comparada con el año anterior (mm/yyyy), 
¿cómo cree usted que está la situación 
económica del país actualmente, mejor o peor? 
Compared to last year (mm/yyyy), what do you 
believe is the current country’s economic 
situation, better or worse? 
Comparada con el año anterior (mm/yyyy-
mm/yyyy) ¿cómo cree usted que es la situación 
económica del país actualmente: mejor o peor? 
Compared to last year (mm/yyyy-mm/yyyy) 
what do you believe is the current’s country 
economic situation: better or worse? 
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 Perception about the future (personal prospective evaluation, EXPMEJ -better) . 




And what do you think your [personal] 
situation will be next year? 
Y su situación económica personal ¿cree usted 
que el año que entra será mejor o peor? 
And your personal economic situation, do you 
think it will be better or worse next year? 
¿Y cómo cree que estará su situación personal 
el año que viene, mejor o peor? 
And what do you think it will be your personal 
situation next year, better or worse? 
  
 
 Most important problem - ¿Cuál cree usted que es el problema más importante que 
enfrenta actualmente el país? // Which do you think is the most important problem the 
country faces today? [MIPecon (economy), MIPseg (public safety), MIPother (other 
problems)] 
 
Figure 2 shows the trends for approval from field and phone polls. The decline in 
approval toward the end the administration observed for presidents in the United States only 
happened once in Mexico: President Calderón whose approval rate went down from 62%/67% in 
2007 (field/phone respectively) to 51%/59% in 2011 (field/phone).
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 Still, he managed to stay 
over his 33.4% vote share and over the 30.7% his party (PAN) got during the mid-term election.   
                                                 
120
 This question was always asked as a follow-up to the retrospective personal situation -¿Y su situación personal 
cómo es; mejor o peor que hace un año? // And, your personal situation how is it; better or worse than last year? 
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In the case of president Salinas, during his first year in office, in 1989, he got an approval 
rate of 70%/76% (field/phone),
122
 and by the end of his administration stayed the same: 
70%/75% (field/phone). The approval rates were also above his vote share during the 
presidential election, 48.5% and the mid-term election for his party (PRI), 58.9%. 
The approval ratings for Presidents Zedillo and Fox show not only a different dynamic, 
(both ended with higher rates), but the trends between field and phone polls are different. In 1995, 
the first year of President Zedillo’s term, Mexico had one of the worse economic crises (see 
figures 9 –GDP- and 10 –UNEMP-) giving President Zedillo 40%/48% approval (field/phone), 
the lowest of all four presidents; by the end of his administration his approval went up to 
66%/54% (field/phone). Notice here that approval from phone polls is lower than approval from 
field polls, something not observed during the Salinas administration (during which the two type 
of approval stayed parallel to each other). The shift happened in 1998, the year after the PRI lost 
control of Congress. As mentioned before, phone polls tend to represent a population with higher 
socioeconomic status (usually conservative in terms of electoral preferences, which may have 
been a contributing factor in the electoral victory of President Fox - from PAN). During his first 
two years in office, Zedillo’s approval rates remained under the 48.6% he got during his 
presidential election, and over what his party (PRI) got during the 1997 mid-term election, 38% 
(see table 1).  
During the Fox administration, approval from phone polls once again is higher than those 
from field polls, as during the Salinas administration, but this time the gap is wider (see figure 2). 
During the first year of his tenure, 2001, Fox got 51/62% approval (field/phone); by the end, 
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 The presidential polling unit did not start using phone polls until 1991. The percentages presented for phone polls 
for the years 1989 and 1990 are estimations following the trends observed during the Salinas administration that 





2006, he got 61/69%. Notice that between 2002 and 2004 Fox’s approval rate in the field polls 
remained under 50% while phone polls were between 64% and 72% (this later in 2003). Unlike 
Salinas, Fox got more support from affluent groups rather than from the general population. 
Zedillo lost support from affluent groups, which may have contributed to the PRI’s losing the 
2000 presidential election. Still, Fox’s approval managed to stay over his vote share during the 
presidential election (38.8%) and over what his party (PAN) got during the mid-term election 
(30.7%). 
The general trend shows President Salinas with the highest approval rates while Zedillo 
shows the highest recovery from beginning to end (see table 1).  The trends for the two 
administrations coming from the opposition parties show an initial satisfaction during the Fox 
administration and disenchantment during the Calderón administration.  
 
[Tabel 1. Presidential Approval and Federal Elections HERE] 
 
[Figure 2. Presidential Approval (field/phone) HERE] 
 
Figure 3 shows the annual variation in the approval ratings. One thing to notice here is 
that approval from field and phone polls show the same variation during the Salinas 
administration but not after that. During the Fox administration, phone polls showed a positive 
trend during the first couple of years while approval from field polls decreased. An even more 
revealing trend is the response to ‘real world’ data. Between 1989 and 2011, there were two 





shows the annual variation of GDP percaptia (constant prices), figure 10 shows unemployment 
rates.  
By looking at both the approval rates and their annual growth, the ‘real world’ effect on 
approval only happens in 1995 but not in 2009. Why? If we look at figure 4 with the trends for 
retrospective/prospective evaluations we can see that in 1995 both indicators went down 
significantly (also see figure 5 showing the annual variation; figure 11 shows the rate of inflation, 
which only shows the 1995 crisis). In 2009, only retrospective evaluations went down while 
prospective went up. In the same way, presidential spending dropped altogether in 1995 while in 
2009 only spending on public safety increased (figure 8 shows the annual growth for presidential 
spending). Whether this explains the effects of the ‘real world’ on approval remains unclear but 
it does seem to show that when both type of perceptions (retrospective and prospective) respond 
in the same way to ‘real world’ data there is a clear effect on approval. When both types of 
perceptions respond differently, the effect on approval is either null or smaller.  
Another possible explanation for the decline in approval ratings points to the effect that 
electoral campaigns have on political preferences.  In this case, electoral campaigns inflate 
approval for the winner which later on wears off as the president has to deal with either 
controversial issues or people simply forget about the election, which makes approval rates to go 
back to their ‘natural’ level (Erikson and Tedin 2005:110). However, it is not clear what point of 
reference to use for the ‘natural’ level of approval. In the United States there are two types voting 
returns. The one that defines the winner is the electoral vote, which remains higher than approval 
levels, while the popular vote remains lower most of the time (see figure 1). In the case of 





years, approval typically remained above those percentages (see figure 2).  It is difficult to assert 
that electoral returns are the ‘natural’ threshold for approval ratings for presidents for two 
reasons: 1) not everybody votes, and 2) it all depends on the electoral system. In Mexico, a 
simple majority is needed to win the presidential election. The last two presidents won with 
about a third of the votes but their approval ratings were between 16 to 21 percentage points 
higher at the beginning/end of their administrations (see table 1). This may suggest that when 
evaluating the performance of a president in Mexico, the public may actually be evaluating the 
presidency as institution and therefore the government in general rather than the person in the 
presidential chair. While there is no clear evidence that this is the case, the variation in 
presidential approval seems to have an effect on the electoral process and seems to respond to 
both ‘real world’ data, policy activity of the presidents and subjective perceptions about the 
country and the individual.  
 
[Figure 3. Presidential Approval (field/phone) annual growth HERE] 
 [Figure 4. Retrospective/prospective evaluations HERE] 
 [Figure 5. Retrospective/prospective evaluations annual growth HERE] 
 [Figure 6. MIP HERE] 
 [Figure 7. MIP growth HERE] 
 [Figure 8. Presidential spending annual growth HERE] 
[Figure 9. GDP percapita HERE] 
[Figure 10. Unemployment HERE] 






5) The results 
 
Diagrams 3-8 and tables 2-9 show the post-estimation results from the VAR(1) models
123
. 
Major findings are: 
 
1. Presidential approval responds to changes in leading economic indicators, in 
particular to unemployment. The effect of unemployment remains high and 
significant regardless of the type of spending used in the models and whether 
approval is collected from field or phone polls. Buendia (1996:578) wrote: “….To 
the extent that unemployment affected presidential popularity, this was not 
mainly through the unemployed or those who feared losing their jobs (a 
relatively small number in the population). Instead, it was because many 
Mexicans regarded unemployment as an indicator of how well the economy was 
doing and as predicting the general future course of the economy, and they 
attributed the president responsibility for it.”  
2. Approval-phone responds to positive prospective personal evaluations, measured 
here as future expectations regarding personal well-being. Surges to these 
perceptions have a positive and significant impact on approval-phone.  
3. Approval-field responds to positive national retrospective evaluations but not in 
the expected direction. These evaluations are measured here as the perceptions 
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about the current conditions of the nation as compared to the previous year. The 
observed effect is only contemporaneous but negative. This effect seems to be 
mediated by unemployment. Removing unemployment from the models makes 
the impact of retrospective perceptions positive but insignificant. 
4. The forecast variation of approval-field shows more stability than approval-phone 
(see table 5). Shocks to approval-field tend to account for the same amount of 
variance during the entire forecast horizon. On the contrary, shocks to approval-
phone tend to have an immediate high effect but it decreases over time.  
 
a) Economic spending and the economy as MIP 
 
Diagrams 3 and 4 show the VAR post-estimation results for approval when the president 
spends on economic issues and the economy is perceived as MIP. Diagram 3 shows the model 
where the contemporaneous dependent variable is approval-field. Diagram 4 uses approval-
phone instead.  
The first thing to notice is the arrow going from positive future expectations (positive 
prospective personal evaluations) to approval-phone (diagram 4). The bold arrow suggests that 
prospective evaluations Granger-cause approval-phone (p-value 0.01, see table 2). This is, 
previous values of prospective evaluations have some predictive power over current values of 





The numbers next to the arrow indicate that the maximum cumulative effect on approval-
phone due to innovations in prospective evaluations is 9% within the following three years. This 
is, any sudden increase in positive personal perceptions about the future will increase presidential 
approval between 6% and 9% within the next three years (there are no contemporaneous effects, 
see also table 3).
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 The forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) does not show any 
significant effect with the exception that most of the contemporaneous variance in approval-
phone is explained by its own changes (70%) but decay quickly a year after (51%) and towards 
the end of the forecast horizon (40%, see table 5). Interestingly enough, there is no decay 
observed in the FEVD in approval-field, which shows more stability over the forecast horizon. 
The fast decay in the FEVD of approval-phone may suggest that it may be affected by other 
variables not considered in the models. Given that prospective evaluations tend to impact 
approval-phone, and as Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson pointed out, approval-phone could 
respond to prospective evaluations, which can be easily manipulated. 
In the case of approval-field, retrospective national evaluation Granger-cause it (p-value 
0.06, see table 2). This is, previous values of retrospective perceptions about the country’s 
situation do have some predictive power over approval-field. The COIRF effect, however, is not 
the expected. Surges in positive national retrospective evaluations reduce, contemporaneously, 
approval by 4%. What this means is that surges in the perceptions that the current situation of the 
country is better than the previous year reduce approval-field by 4% within a year. If things are 
better now than before, why approval-field goes down?  
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The retrospective question is generic in the sense that evaluates general conditions of the 
country. A possible explanation for the negative impact of retrospective perceptions could be that 
while the public think that the country is doing better, they may also believe the president is not 
doing enough. Direct evidence of this is not available but a proxy approach suggests that this 
may be the case. Removing unemployment from the model reverses the effect in the expected 
direction but it is not significant.
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Diagram 3 shows that shocks to unemployment reduce the positive retrospective 
evaluations by 42% within a year and 31% a year after (see table 9). This shows that national 
evaluations are highly sensitve to changes in unemployment levels. This also suggests that when 
evaluating the national context, unemployment levels matter in in the public’s evaluations.  
Diagrams 3 and 4 show that the only macroeconomic variable directly influencing 
approval (field and phone) is unemployment. GDP percapita and inflation do not have an effect 
on approval. Surges in unemployment levels reduce approval up to 13% over the entire forecast 
horizon for approval-field and up to 18% over the following three years in approval-phone (see 
table 9). There is a contemporaneous effect in approval-phone and one-year delay in approval-
field. 
It is important to notice that surges in spending on economic issues do not have any 
significan effect on either type of presidential approval. Economic spending is used as a proxy 
for the effect of the policy activity of the presidents.  
Looking at the reverse effect, surges in presidential approval-phone do not have any 
significant impact on any variable other than on itself. Surges to approval-field, however, reduce 
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5% the perception that the economy is MIP. The effect lasts up to two years. It does appear that 
approval may be a temporary indicator of how the economy is doing.  
[Diagram 3. Field/Economy/MIPecon here] 
[Diagram 4. Phone/Economy/MIPecon here] 
[Tables 2-9 here] 
 
b) Public safety spending and public safety as MIP 
 
This section presents the model where presidential approval is still the contemporaneous 
dependent variable, but now MIP-economy is replaced by MIP-public safety (crime, vandalism, 
delinquency, public safety, drug dealing, kidnaping, etc.) and spending refers to spending on 
public safety rather than to economic issues. 
While there are no feedback effects between presidential approval and the president 
allocating spending on the economy, the models in this section show a relationship between 
approval and spending on public safety. Surges in approval-field cause an increase on spending 
by 4% within the following two years; while shocks to spending increase approval-phone, 
contemporaneously, by 3% (see diagrams 5 and 6). In the case of approval-field, there is the 
additional finding that it does Granger-cause spending on public safety. These results, taken 
together, confirm Gómez-Vilchis’ findings that the anti-crime efforts of the president are 
connected to his approval ratings. The president may perceive his popularity in terms of his 
efforts in the war against crime. In turn, these efforts have an immediate effect on his popularity 





Controlling for public safety, in both spending and as MIP, the effect of prospective 
expectation on approval is no longer significant but retrospective evaluations remain and now are 
significant also in the approval-phone model. The effect is the same as in the economic models, 
and the explanation may be the same as unemployment still shows a strong effect on 
retrospective perceptions. An important difference is that retrospective perceptions in the 
approval-field model is the only variable that account for 32%, one year ahead, of the forecast 
variance in approval-field. This finding suggests that retrospective evaluations have a dual 
component, one economic mediated by unemployment levels and another one in terms of level 
of crime and violence. The net effect is observed in the negative impact on approval. While 
people may believe things are getting better, this is not enough for the popularity of the president 
to increase.  
In the same way as in the economic models, the public safety models show a greater rate 
of decay in the effect of approval-phone on its own forecast variance. Unlike the previous 
models, approval-field explain less variance on itself, around 44% comparing to 64% in the 
economic models (see diagrams 3 and 5, and table 5). This drop is not observed for approval-
phone (table 5). This suggests that presidential approval (from field surveys) tend to be more 
sensitive to public safety issues than to economic ones. On the contrary, presidential approval 
(from phone surveys) seems to be equally affected by either economic or public safety issues. 
 
[Diagram 5. Field/Public safety/MIPp.safety here] 






c) Other spending and other issues as MIP 
 
The models presented in the two previous sections consider two major salient issues: the 
economy and public safety. To contrast those models with non-salient issues I modeled what is 
leftover on both spending and MIP (see ‘other’ in figure 6 –MIP) and will refer to it as the non-
salient models (see diagrams 7 and 8). 
As in the salient models, unemployment still is the main macroeconomic variable that not 
only has a direct impact on approval but also on retrospective perceptions. Retrospective 
evaluations have the same negative effect on approval. Similar to the economic models, 
prospective evaluations have a positive effect on approval. 
The decay effect is also observed in the approval-phone model and lower levels of 
variance explanation in the approval-field model. While the decay is observed across all models 
for approval-phone, about two-thirds of the forecast variance is explained by shocks to approval-
field only in the economic models. The public safety and non-salient models surges in approval-
field explained a little less than half of the forecast variance on itself. This may suggest that 
while popularity may be sensitive to unemployment or retrospective evaluations; previous levels 
of popularity mostly explain its variance. It may be the case that economic success may have a 
high and long lasting effect on approval than non-economic factors. In turn, while non-economic 
factors have a significant effect on approval, it is not as high as the economic factors but they are 
long lasting for approval-field as well.  
[Diagram 7 Field/Other/MIPother here] 







The models presented in this paper suggest that presidential approval in Mexico is 
strongly connected to the fate of the economy. To Mexicans, unemployment is the leading 
economic indicator of how the county is doing (Buendia 1996). The VAR models indicate that 
when unemployment rate goes up presidential approval goes down. The other two 
macroeconomic variables included in the models, GDP percaptia and inflation, do not have a 
significant effect on approval. 
Two other factors complement the effect on approval: anti-crime policies and prospective 
evaluations. Since 1996, the opinion that public safety is the most important problem has 
significantly increased from 10% to 40% (see figure 6). The VAR models show a combined 
effect collected in the field and phone surveys in which we can observe a feedback effect 
between approval and the president spending on public safety issues. Approval, from field polls, 
generates incentives for the president to increase the budget allocation to anti-crime/violence 
(this is not the case for economic or other types of spending). In turn, this increase in spending 
has a positive effect on presidential approval among the well off. This finding shows that salient 
issues affect approval. Presidential actions addressing those issues generate a positive effect on 
popularity. 
A third component influencing approval is prospective evaluations. The models show that 
this is particularly important among the well off (measured as proxy using approval from phone 





approval. If those with higher levels of socioeconomic status believe they are going to be better 
off the following year, their approval of the president will increase.  
In sum, there are three different factors influencing approval. One objective and rooted in 
how the economy is doing with a direct connection to the president’s performance. Another one 
is based on a salient issue, in this case crime and violence, also with a direct connection to the 
president’s performance. And a third is prospective perceptions which can be subject to 
manipulation by either the president or other political elites (MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson 
1992). Two of these three variables are under the control of the president and were crucial during 
the last presidential election in Mexico. President Calderón did well in the economic front but 
failed on the salient one, and in turn, affecting the future expectations of those with higher levels 
of education and income. This failure played a relevant role in his party losing the presidential 
seat.  
Whether popularity helps the president to get what he wants remains up in the air. What 
seems likely is that popularity can help the president’s party win or lose elections. This relation 
is becoming and will become the rule in Mexican politics. President Calderón is the first 
president to experience this in a combination effect between his performance regarding the 
economy and salience issues. The tipping point was the expectations about the future. The levels 
of crime and violence and, most importantly, the perception that such levels were high may have 
created a situation in which the public, in particular the well off, did not perceive a better future. 
This ended up costing the election to the PAN. 
The victory of Enrique Peña Nieto, PRI’s candidate in the 2012 presidential election, will 





public safety issues in the form of crime and violence. How he deals with this issue will affect 
the midterm election of 2015. If he does not manage to deal with the salient issue of public safety 
and perceptions about the future do not improve, his party will not control Congress and the 
chance to advance his policy agenda. 
These results shed some light regarding the nature of Mexican public opinion. As 
Buendia (1996) mentioned, the Mexican people seemed to have positioned themselves in a 
pragmatic situation: if the country is doing well they will support the president, but if not they 
will punish the president’s party the next election. Since the Salinas administration, Mexico has 
developed a reliable national electoral system. Since then, there have been three main political 
offers on the table. What is interesting is the fact that, in spite of being a country where two 
thirds of its population lives in poverty, candidates from the left party (PRD) running on 
platforms centered around helping the poor have not won the presidency (they have, however, 
won local, state and congressional elections). Instead, the Mexican voter punished the PRI and 
gave a chance to the conservative party PAN in the hopes that things would change. When the 
PAN did not delivered, instead of giving the chance to the PRD they preferred to put back in the 
presidential seat the PRI. I believe, so far, the Mexican people have giving politicians the chance 
to redeem themselves and get the idea.  
The overall conclusion is that presidential approval in Mexico is rooted in 
macroeconomic, salient and subjective measures that are also connected to the dynamics of 

























Source for Presidential Approval: Roper Center, 
http://webapps.ropercenter.uconn.edu/CFIDE/roper/presidential/webroot/presidential_rating.cfm 
Source for Electoral returns: Dave Leip’s Atlas of US Presidential Elections, http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/ 
 Horizontal solid green lines represent the percentage of popular votes. 









 Horizontal solid-bold lines represent the percentage of votes obtained in the presidential election 
 Horizontal dotted lines represent the percentage of votes obtained by the president’s party in the midterm 
congressional elections 
 
Note: Phone data for the years 1989-1991 is estimated based on the trends observed on individual studies from 

















 Horizontal solid lines represent the percentage of votes in the presidential election 































































































 Granger = Granger-causality 
 COIRF = Cumulative Orthogonal impulse-response function 
 FEVD = Forecast-error variance decomposition 
 CDM = Cumulative Dynamic Multiplier (apply only to macroeconomic variables) 
 Solid lines with a parenthesis indicate Granger-causality and impulse-response effect. 
 Dash lines only indicate impulse-response (including dynamic multipliers) 
 Characters within parenthesis next to arrow refer to the impulse-response effect, FEVD and CDM::  
o If an “*” then Granger-causality significant at 10% (otherwise 5%) 
o Numbers before forward slash indicate the duration of the cumulative effect 
o Number with % sign indicates the maximum cumulative % due to innovations.  
o Numbers in brackets refer to the FEVD effect, if present indicates: 
 Numbers before forward slash show the the duration, in time periods, of the effect 
 Numbers after the forward slash show the explained variance from beginning to end of the duration 
 
NOTE: Showing only the relationship between presidential approval and the rest of the variables at 95% significance 
Example: Presidential approval affecting itself reads as follows: 
 
o 0-6 = The COIRF effect last the entire forecast horizon (six years, plus year 0) 
o 10% = The maximun COIRF during the forecast horizon is 10% 
o [1-6] = The FEVD effect lasts from year 1 to 6 of the forecast horizon 
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Table 1. Presidential approval and federal elections 
Comparative with presidental elections 
       
President  Approval Vote Difference  
(first/last year) field phone share field phone 
    a b d a-d b-d 
Salinas (PRI) 1989 70 76 48.8 21.2 27.2 
Salinas (PRI) 1994 70 75 48.6 21.4 26.4 
Zedillo (PRI) 1995 40 48 48.6 -8.6 -0.6 
Zedillo (PRI) 2000 66 54 36.9 29.1 17.1 
Fox (PAN) 2001 51 62 38.8 12.2 23.2 
Fox (PAN) 2006 61 69 33.4 27.6 35.6 
Calderón (PAN) 2007 62 67 33.4 28.6 33.6 







Average 58.9 63.8   19.6 24.5 
              
Comparative with mid-term elections 
       
President/Party Approval Vote Difference 
 (mid/last year) field phone share field phone 
    a b d a-d b-d 
Salinas (PRI) 1991 77 82 58.9 18.1 23.1 
Salinas (PRI) 1994 70 75 48.6 21.4 26.4 
Zedillo (PRI) 1997 57 61 38 19 23 
Zedillo (PRI) 2000 66 54 36.9 29.1 17.1 
Fox (PAN) 2003 49 72 30.7 18.3 41.3 
Fox (PAN) 2006 61 69 33.4 27.6 35.6 
Calderón (PAN) 2009 56 64 30.7 25.3 33.3 















Difference in approval 
  
 (last year-first year) 
 
  field phone   
  
 
Salinas 0 -1   
  
 
Zedillo 26 6   
  
 
Fox 10 7   
  
 
Calderon -11 -8   
  
 
NOTE: Vote share refers to the results for for the election in that year. Year 2000 and 2001 are different since in the 2000 electon PRI lost with 





Table 2. Granger Causality tests (p-values). 1989-2011 
 
 
Dependent variable in regression 
Regressor Spending Country situation (better) MIP Future expectations (better) Presidential approval 
      Economy (field) 
     Presidential spending 
  
0.06 




     Future expectations (better) 
 
0.02 0.06 
  Presidential approval    0.02   
Economy (phone) 
     Presidential spending 









Presidential approval        
Public safety (field) 
     Presidential spending 
     Country situation (better) 
     MIP 0.07 
    Future expectations (better) 
 
0.01 
   Presidential approval 0.01      
Public safety (phone) 
     Presidential spending 
 
0.08 
   Country situation (better) 
     MIP 0.06 





Presidential approval 0.04       
Other (field) 
     Presidential spending 




    Future expectations (better) 
 
0.01 
   Presidential approval       
Other (phone) 
     Presidential spending 
     Country situation (better) 
   
0.04 
 MIP 0.00 





Presidential approval        
 





Table 3. Cumulative Orthogonal Impulse-Response. Presidential Approval as response (1989-2011) 
 
  
Innovation (a percentage increase) in: 
Presidential Approval response 

















































-1.97 1.49 2.29 5.19 
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-3.33 2.90 5.63 7.05 
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Public safety (field) 

































Public safety (phone) 
















-4.27 -3.77 6.73 9.01 
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0 -3.20 -1.17 
  
4.94 
1 -4.96 -2.54 
 
3.82 6.91 
2 -6.35 -3.98 
 
5.25 7.64 
3 -6.66 -4.51 
 
6.03 7.89 
4 -7.11 -4.86 
 
6.44 8.09 
5 -7.22 -4.98 
 
6.69 8.20 
6 -7.40 -5.09 
 
6.84 8.30 
* Showing values significant at 68% (as suggested by Sims 1980) 
NOTE: 95% significance in bold-italic. 
 
Example: Column ‘Future Expectations (better)’, 5.63 indicates that surges of one percent in expectations increase approval-





Table 4. Cumulative Orthogonal Impulse-response. Presidential Approval as impulse (1989-2011) 
  
Innovation in Presidential Approval (% increase) in model: 















Spending (economy, public safety, 
other) 
























   
Country situation (better) 
0       







   
3 
      
4 
      
5 
      
6 
      
MIP 
(economy, public safety, other) 
0       
1 -4.23 
   
4.51 5.55 
2 -5.49 
   
5.20 7.70 
3 -6.17 
   
6.50 9.84 
4 -6.49 
   
6.38 10.45 
5 -6.69 
   
6.65 11.14 
6 -6.81 
   
6.50 11.35 
Future expectations (better) 
0       
1 
     
1.54 
2 
      
3 
      
4 
      
5 
      
6 
      
Presidential Approval 
0 6.58 5.19 5.29 5.48 5.40 4.94 
1 8.89 7.05 7.62 8.31 7.65 6.91 
2 9.76 7.57 8.00 9.68 8.60 7.64 
3 9.96 7.64 7.52 9.67 8.70 7.89 
4 9.99 7.50 7.15 9.01 8.72 8.09 
5 9.99 7.27 7.02 8.23 8.62 8.20 
6 9.99 7.02 7.05 7.66 8.59 8.30 
* Showing values significant at 68% (as suggested by Sims 1980). NOTE: 95% significance in bold-italic. Example: Column ‘Public Safety 





Table 5. Forecast-Error Variance Decomposition. Presidential Approval as response (1989-2011) 
 
  
Innovation (a percentage increase) in: 
Presidential Approval 
response (% increase 











      
  
Economy (field) 
































0      
1 
   
14% 70% 
2 
   
28% 51% 
3 
   
31% 45% 
4 
   
32% 42% 
5 
   
32% 41% 
6 
   
32% 40% 
Public safety (field) 































Public safety (phone) 
0      
1 17% 


















































0      
1 27% 

















* Showing values significant at 68% (as suggested by Sims 1980) 
NOTE: 95% significance in bold-italic. 
 
Example: Column ‘Country situation (better)’, 32%, indicates that one percent shocks to retrospective perceptions explained 32% of the forecast 







Table 6. Forecast-Error Variance Decomposition. Presidential Approval as impulse (1989-2011) 
  
Innovation in Presidential Approval (% increase) in model: 















Spending (economy, public safety, 
other) 
0       





















Country situation (better) 
0       
1       
2 
      
3 
      
4 
      
5 
      
6 
      
MIP 
(economy, public safety, other) 
0       
1       
2 13% 
     
3 13% 
     
4 13% 
     
5 13% 
     
6 13% 
     
Future expectations (better) 
0       
1       
2 
      
3 
      
4 
      
5 
      
6 
      
Presidential approval 
0       
1 65% 70% 44% 74% 48% 65% 
2 64% 51% 44% 61% 48% 51% 
3 64% 45% 42% 56% 48% 46% 
4 64% 42% 42% 54% 47% 45% 
5 63% 41% 42% 53% 47% 45% 
6 63% 40% 42% 52% 47% 45% 
* Showing values significant at 68% (as suggested by Sims 1980). NOTE: 95% significance in bold-italic.Example: ‘Economy (field)’ column, 





Table 7. Cumulative Dynamic Multipliers. GDP percapita as impulse (1989-2011) 
  
















Spending (economy, public safety, 
other) 
0 1.32 1.44 
  
-1.03 -1.22 
1 1.97 2.45 0.89 
 
-1.16 -1.27 
2 2.17 3.05 1.21 
 
-1.35 -1.22 



















0 0.99 -1.00 0.96 -0.91 1.16 -0.81 
1 1.70 
 



























(economy, public safety, other) 
0 
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2.64 
 
Country situation (better) 
0 2.59 3.46 2.96 3.79 2.71 3.48 
1 










     
5.49 
4 
     
5.85 
5 
     
6.08 
6 
     
6.23 
Future expectations (better) 
0 1.19 1.12 0.82 0.68 
  
1 2.18 1.91 0.81 
   


























Table 8. Cumulative Dynamic Multipliers. Inflation as impulse (1989-2011) 
  
















Spending (economy, public 
safety, other) 
0       






















   
Presidential approval 
0       
1 0.79 0.81 0.68 1.18 0.63 0.77 
2 1.30 1.63 1.08 1.83 1.15 1.40 
3 1.44 1.83 1.07 1.86 1.33 1.58 

















(economy, public safety, other) 
0       





      
3 
      
4 
      
5 
      
6 
      
Country situation (better) 
0       












      
5 
      
6 
      
Future expectations (better) 
0       




   
0.88 1.41 
3 
     
1.82 
4 
      
5 
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Table 9. Cumulative Dynamic Multipliers. Unemployment as impulse (1989-2011) 
  
















Spending (economy, public safety, 
other) 
0 -3.42 -3.11 
  
-8.42 -9.82 

















     
6 -7.16 
     
Presidential approval 
0 -5.22 -9.13 -3.63 -7.89 -4.72 -8.79 
1 -10.62 -13.91 -8.02 -14.61 -10.36 -15.36 
2 -12.14 -15.87 -9.20 -16.85 -10.94 -16.57 
3 -12.68 -17.82 -8.95 -16.63 -11.54 -17.48 
4 -12.58 -19.08 -8.45 -15.12 -11.20 -17.81 
5 -12.39 -19.73 -8.21 
 
-11.22 -18.23 




(economy, public safety, other) 
0 9.03 10.62 -39.11 -49.85 -13.36 -17.83 
1 7.35 11.75 -39.17 -61.13 -12.75 -22.96 
2 7.53 10.95 -41.91 -76.89 -20.16 -35.84 


















Country situation (better) 
0 -41.60 -39.25 -32.99 -28.68 -39.82 -36.54 

































Future expectations (better) 
0 -7.38 -7.70 -5.35 -6.63 -9.03 -10.11 
1 -8.51 -9.88 -5.34 
 
-7.87 -11.21 
2 -12.15 -13.48 -5.34 
 
-10.41 -16.36 
3 -14.04 -15.02 
  
-10.67 -18.44 
4 -15.29 -15.84 
  
-11.41 -20.40 
5 -15.89 -16.12 
  
-11.35 -21.13 
6 -16.19 -16.12 
  
-11.52 -21.82 


































Appendix 1. Economy/field (Stata output) 
.   





   Lagrange-multiplier test 
  +--------------------------------------+ 
  | lag  |      chi2    df   Prob > chi2 | 
  |------+-------------------------------| 
  |   1  |   23.2905    25     0.56060   | 
  |   2  |   27.0728    25     0.35226   | 
  +--------------------------------------+ 




   Eigenvalue stability condition 
  +----------------------------------------+ 
  |        Eigenvalue        |   Modulus   | 
  |--------------------------+-------------| 
  |   .5776098               |    .57761   | 
  |   .4325667 +  .2009121i  |   .476948   | 
  |   .4325667 -  .2009121i  |   .476948   | 
  |  -.2979242               |   .297924   | 
  | -.07164184               |   .071642   | 
  +----------------------------------------+ 
   All the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle. 
   VAR satisfies stability condition. 
 
. ************************************************************** 
Appendix 2. Economy/phone (Stata output) 
.  





   Lagrange-multiplier test 
  +--------------------------------------+ 
  | lag  |      chi2    df   Prob > chi2 | 
  |------+-------------------------------| 
  |   1  |   28.1624    25     0.30043   | 
  |   2  |   25.9500    25     0.41027   | 
  +--------------------------------------+ 




   Eigenvalue stability condition 
  +----------------------------------------+ 
  |        Eigenvalue        |   Modulus   | 
  |--------------------------+-------------| 
  |   .6640418 +  .2308509i  |   .703025   | 
  |   .6640418 -  .2308509i  |   .703025   | 
  |   .1091363 +   .271945i  |   .293027   | 
  |   .1091363 -   .271945i  |   .293027   | 
  |  -.2450678               |   .245068   | 
  +----------------------------------------+ 
   All the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle. 






Appendix 3. Public Safety/field  (Stata output) 
 





   Lagrange-multiplier test 
  +--------------------------------------+ 
  | lag  |      chi2    df   Prob > chi2 | 
  |------+-------------------------------| 
  |   1  |   21.1772    25     0.68269   | 
  |   2  |   16.3985    25     0.90244   | 
  +--------------------------------------+ 




   Eigenvalue stability condition 
  +----------------------------------------+ 
  |        Eigenvalue        |   Modulus   | 
  |--------------------------+-------------| 
  |   .3394369 +  .4207581i  |   .540606   | 
  |   .3394369 -  .4207581i  |   .540606   | 
  |  -.3344836               |   .334484   | 
  |   .1451824 + .07750408i  |   .164575   | 
  |   .1451824 - .07750408i  |   .164575   | 
  +----------------------------------------+ 
   All the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle. 
   VAR satisfies stability condition. 
 
. ************************************************************** 
Appendix 4. Public Safety/phone (Stata output) 
.  





   Lagrange-multiplier test 
  +--------------------------------------+ 
  | lag  |      chi2    df   Prob > chi2 | 
  |------+-------------------------------| 
  |   1  |   23.3949    25     0.55452   | 
  |   2  |   23.8494    25     0.52809   | 
  +--------------------------------------+ 




   Eigenvalue stability condition 
  +----------------------------------------+ 
  |        Eigenvalue        |   Modulus   | 
  |--------------------------+-------------| 
  |   .5850887 +  .4281069i  |   .724986   | 
  |   .5850887 -  .4281069i  |   .724986   | 
  |  -.2826664               |   .282666   | 
  |  .05545718 + .08130646i  |   .098419   | 
  |  .05545718 - .08130646i  |   .098419   | 
  +----------------------------------------+ 
   All the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle. 






Appendix 5. Other/field (Stata output) 
 





   Lagrange-multiplier test 
  +--------------------------------------+ 
  | lag  |      chi2    df   Prob > chi2 | 
  |------+-------------------------------| 
  |   1  |   18.9431    25     0.79984   | 
  |   2  |   22.9794    25     0.57877   | 
  +--------------------------------------+ 




   Eigenvalue stability condition 
  +----------------------------------------+ 
  |        Eigenvalue        |   Modulus   | 
  |--------------------------+-------------| 
  |  -.6176498               |    .61765   | 
  |   .4095691 +  .2051389i  |   .458071   | 
  |   .4095691 -  .2051389i  |   .458071   | 
  |   .2726635               |   .272664   | 
  |  -.1809942               |   .180994   | 
  +----------------------------------------+ 
   All the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle. 
   VAR satisfies stability condition. 
 
. ************************************************************** 
Appendix 6. Other/phone (Stata output) 
.  





   Lagrange-multiplier test 
  +--------------------------------------+ 
  | lag  |      chi2    df   Prob > chi2 | 
  |------+-------------------------------| 
  |   1  |   31.9949    25     0.15816   | 
  |   2  |   23.0493    25     0.57468   | 
  +--------------------------------------+ 




   Eigenvalue stability condition 
  +----------------------------------------+ 
  |        Eigenvalue        |   Modulus   | 
  |--------------------------+-------------| 
  |   .6290508               |   .629051   | 
  |  -.6043075               |   .604307   | 
  |    .266883 +  .2482158i  |   .364469   | 
  |    .266883 -  .2482158i  |   .364469   | 
  |  -.1793836               |   .179384   | 
  +----------------------------------------+ 
   All the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle. 







Appendix 7. Unit root tests (Stata output) 
. dfuller econgr 
 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        21 
 
                               ---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Z(t)             -4.290            -3.750            -3.000            -2.630 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0005 
 
. dfuller educagr 
 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        21 
 
                               ---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Z(t)             -4.037            -3.750            -3.000            -2.630 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0012 
 
. dfuller seggr 
 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        21 
 
                               ---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Z(t)             -4.847            -3.750            -3.000            -2.630 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000 
 
. dfuller actelgr 
 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        21 
 
                               ---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Z(t)             -3.923            -3.750            -3.000            -2.630 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0019 
 
. dfuller sitecomejgr 
 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        21 
 
                               ---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Z(t)             -4.716            -3.750            -3.000            -2.630 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 






. dfuller expmejgr 
 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        21 
 
                               ---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Z(t)             -5.041            -3.750            -3.000            -2.630 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000 
 
. dfuller mipecongr 
 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        21 
 
                               ---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Z(t)             -4.030            -3.750            -3.000            -2.630 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0013 
 
. dfuller mipseggr 
 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        21 
 
                               ---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Z(t)             -4.758            -3.750            -3.000            -2.630 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0001 
 
. dfuller mipothergr 
 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        21 
 
                               ---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Z(t)             -5.104            -3.750            -3.000            -2.630 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Public opinion research in the United States shows a connection between policy and public 
opinion. At the margins, policy activity often responds to changes in public opinion and vice 
versa. Can we find this connection in the Mexican case? Are Presidents responding more to 
positive or negative opinions? Are they listening more to the rich or to the poor? Is there a 
feedback cycle between the President’s policy activity (measured here as spending) and public 
opinion? The quick answer is yes, but a complex one and not necessarily in favor of those with 
higher income and education levels. Here I define policy change as the first difference in the 
proportion of the presidential budget dedicated to both economic and public safety areas. This is, 
the proportion of federal money allocated to different ministries grouped per issue. I will 
consider this as a signal of the President’s policy priorities. Money given to ministries focusing 
on economic activities will be defined as spending on the economy. Money given to ministries 
focusing on anti-crime activities or national defense will be defined as spending on public safety. 
Opinion change is defined as the first difference in opinion variables. Using policy and opinion 
changes, and controlling for the effects of leading economic indicators, I estimated a series of 
vector-autoregressive models to explore the nature of the relationship between spending and 
opinion. A feedback cycle is defined as one in which there is a Granger and/or an impulse-
response effect running both ways between opinions and spending. Results show feedback in the 
economic but not in the public safety models. In the models where economic spending is the 
contemporaneous outcome variable, positive prospective evaluations of personal well-being and 





significant effects on spending. In the case of spending on public safety, negative prospective 
evaluation of personal well-being and the perceptions that public safety is the most important 
problem in the country play a role (but there is no feedback). An important finding is that the 
public attentiveness to economic issues (MIP) does explain a significant portion of the variance 
in spending on the economy. Regarding the impact of opinions by socioeconomic status, there is 
not enough evidence to conclude that the President listens more to a particular segment of the 
population. The results, however, seem to indicate a subtle difference in favor of the public with 
lower income and education levels. These findings are preliminary but they are consistent with 
the traditional practices of Mexican politicians catering to the masses seeking their political 










In a representative democracy, policymaking is subject to the verdict of the people 
(Manin 1997). Early in the 1900s, Tocqueville noticed that it was through elections in the United 
States that the people could keep policymakers in check by electing them, re-electing them or not. 
Elections, then, created powerful incentives for elected public officials to respond to the needs 
and wants of the public. In this case, in an ideal democracy, if a politician wants to stay in office 
he or she must be responsive to his or her constituencies otherwise he or she will not be re-
elected (the same apply to a political party).
126
  
Given the institutional arrangements and the individual’s wishes, responsiveness may not 
be easy to achieve. In the case of the United States, policymaking is a complex process. Jones, 
Larsen-Price and Wilkerson (2009) identified ten channels of policymaking, all part of a set of 
institutions that constraint the actions, wishes and wants of policymakers. Accounting for issue 
salience and the public’s priorities, in this process, the authors conclude that there is a higher 
probability that representation happens at the agenda-setting stages of policymaking than during 
the decision-making process. In this case, it is during the agenda-setting process where 
politicians can signal some responsiveness to the public (see also Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). 
At the decision-making stage, responsiveness is contingent on issue saliency. 
Jones and Baumgartner (2005) also concluded that policymaking is not a clean and flat 
process. It has its peaks and instability characterized by a ‘Normal’ distribution in the 
                                                 
126





information process at the beginning. At this stage, there is a competitive market providing a 
variety of policy inputs. However, towards the end of the process the distribution is skewed 
because of the institutional friction caused by the political conflict between the President and 
Congress and the multiple veto points. 
In the case of Mexico the situation is different and, at some point, simpler, although this 
is changing. For a long time, the conventional wisdom (and the de facto practice) was that the 
President was the originator and executor of policy. The public perceived the president as 
responsible for changes in the economy or political context.  In this sense, the most visible parts 
of the presidential decision making process were (and still are) the budget cycles. The allocation 
of the federal government funds signals the presidential priorities.  
This paper will focus on this particular phase of the policymaking process and compare it 
to trends in public opinion to examine some indication of ‘responsiveness’. The question is 
whether the President’s priorities are aligned in any way to the public sentiment. I will be 
focusing on two issues, economic and public safety. I will look at changes in the proportion of 
the federal budget allocated to those issues and changes in public sentiment. 
Public sentiment will be measured as the retrospective/prospective personal evaluations 
of well-being as well as the attentiveness to issues (using the ‘most important problem’ question). 
It is important to notice that the source of public opinion data comes from the presidential polling 
unit. The main concern here is the extent to which, if any, this flow of private polling 
information influences the policy decisions of the president. Three flows are considered. The 
first one refers to the personal situation of the individual as compared to the previous year (see 





might be plenty of reasons why people may feel either way, the findings in this paper show that 
this variable is highly sensitive to changes in unemployment rates. 
The second flow refers to how individuals feel their personal situation will be the 
following year (see data section). The models show that this variable is also sensitive to changes 
in economic indicators, in particular, to inflation and changes in GDP percapita (economic 
growth). The third flow of information is the most important problem facing the country today 
(MIP, see data section). Jones (1994) used this variable to measure public attentiveness, and 
found to be an important factor in assessing the influence of policy preferences on policy. The 
agenda setting research has also looked into this variable concluding that it does tend to reflect 
reports by the media (Iyengar 1991). These findings suggest that the MIP question does not 
reflect objective measures but rather is the product of media manipulation. In the Mexican case, 
most media studies have focused on electoral campaigns and behavior. The findings in this paper 
suggest that the MIP question (in particular, the one related to economic issues) follow the trend 
of the main economic indicators (mostly unemployment). In the case of Mexico, this makes 
sense since most of the population lives in poverty. Overall, all three flows of public opinion 
information provide an evaluation of the current state of the country. 
The research presented here departs from the mainstream done in the United States in the 
sense that it does not focus on specific policy preferences or priorities. As Jones, Larsen-Price 
and Wilkerson argued (2009:278): "Existing approaches to the study of representation....are 
solely concerned with whether the positions of policymakers on …. issues match the positions of 
the public and do not consider whether the issues that are the focus of government attention are 





termed positional". This positional literature has covered both micro (issue by issue) as well as 
the macro level attitudes (aggregated preferences over time).
127
 
Here I am not concerned with policy preferences or priorities but rather with evaluations 
of well-being (past and future). The question is then, how sensitive is the President to negative or 
positive retrospective and prospective evaluations of personal well-being with respect to the 
economy and public safety. This could be taken as a proxy for the public’s feedback of policy 
outcomes. This is, regardless of the details, the question is whether the president’s decisions are 
making the people feel better in terms of how the economy is doing, and/or how safe they feel 
concerning levels of crime and violence. Here I would expect that negative evaluations to 
incentive increases on spending on economic stimulus or anti-crime policy actions (see Jones 
and Baumgartner, 2005: chapter 1). In a way, this study follows the positional literature in the 
United States, in which if people feel things are getting or will get worse I would expect the 
president to make policy decisions to address those concerns or perceptions.  
As we will see below, I will control for attentiveness measured by the most important 
problem facing the nation. Here Bryan Jones (1994) makes an interesting point in arguing that 
policy preferences do not have any significant impact if people do not pay attention to those 
issues. Attentiveness helps policy preferences influencing policy. In this paper, I am exploring 
two issues: the economy and public safety. I would expect increases in levels of attention to any 
of these issues to have a positive impact on spending.   
Evidence from scholars in the United States suggests a causal and endogenous relation 
between policy and public opinion (for a complete review, see Shapiro 2011). The research 
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literature shows a type of feedback cycle in the relation between policy and public opinion. 
Another goal of this paper is to find whether such feedback cycles exist in the case of Mexico.
128
 
In order to assess the nature of these cycles, and given the endogenous nature of the 
opinion-policy link, I will use recursive vector-autoregressive (VAR) models. VAR models can 
help simulate the decision-making process of the president by taking spending as the 
contemporaneous outcome variable. In the case of Mexico, we have the peculiar situation of a 
president with an in-house polling unit. The president receives a constant flow of information 
about the public’s sentiments. He is the first to know how the public sees his administration, how 
the public feels about the current situation of the country and how optimistic they are.  
VAR models simulate a situation when an individual considers the available information 
and makes decisions in a particular context.  Imagine a scenario where the president responds 
and uses polling information to decide whether to increase or not spending on either economic or 
anti-crime issues. In this scenario, all he knows is whether people approve or not of his job, 
whether people think they are better off than the previous year or whether they will be better off 
the next year and which is the most important problem affecting the country today. Given this 
information, the VAR models will recreate the scenario where, for example, spending on 
economic issues is the contemporaneous outcome variable and then switch to a scenario where 
the contemporaneous target is spending on public safety using the same available information.
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Given these two contexts, I expect to find some connections or feedback cycles between policy 
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 A feedback cycle is defined as A influencing B and B influencing A, where A and B can be policy and opinion or 
both opinion/policy 
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and opinion, but at this point, it is unclear whether those connections are both present in both 
contexts or only in one.
130
  
Opinion research also suggests that policymakers respond more to negative than to 
positive feedback and that there is no difference in the effects due to socioeconomic status 
(Soroka and Welzien 2010); other research suggests that policymakers tend to respond more to 
the wealthy sectors of the population than to the general public (Jacobs and Page 2005; Bartels, 
2008; Gilens 2012).
131
 To model the effect of positive and negative variables I will run models 
using opinions that refer to the individual’s well being as ‘better’ or ‘worse’. For the 
socioeconomic differences, I will use as proxy presidential approval collected from face-to-face 
(field) and phone polls. 
The intensity of the presidential polling activity in Mexico shows that presidents were 
attentive and concerned to what the public had in mind. As Jacobs (1992) observed, politicians 
are ambivalent when it comes to using polling, while they want to find ways to manipulate the 
public, they also want to respond to what it wants.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 will present the theoretical framework for 
the feedback cycle, section 3 will review some of the empirical literature relevant to this paper, 
section 4 will layout the hypotheses, section 5 will present the model, section 6 will discuss the 
data, section 7 will show the results and section 8 will present the conclusions. 
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 A cautionary note is in order. The period of analysis goes from 1989 to 2011, covering four presidents and 23 
time periods (which allows only running the models with one lag). This is the very low minimum to fit VAR 
models, therefore the results presented here should be taken as exploratory. The findings, however, are similar to 
some of those from the opinion-policy research in the United States. 
131
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2) The feedback cycle theory 
 
It is impossible for a society X with a population n to govern itself by the same n number 
of people and/or satisfy the needs, wants and interests of n at the same time. Democracy means 
that while the power is vested on n, the decisions are made with the consent and/or authority of 
the majority of n.
132
 Those decisions, however, are made by a subset z chosen by the majority of 
n. Society X would have to implement mechanisms to choose z to allow them to make the 
decisions for n and, at the same time, mechanisms to prevent those z to depart from the ‘will of 
the people’ or the ‘public interest’.133 This is the basic structure of a representative democracy 
where the people give consent to a group of citizens (z) to make the decisions for them in 
accordance to what the majority of n wants but with safeguards to prevent any abuse of power, as 
Manin (1997) said: “Representative democracy is not a system in which the community govern 
itself, but a system in which public policies and decisions are made subject to the verdict of the 
people” (p. 192).134  
One of the issues raised by Manin is that while elections provide a way to legitimize the 
chosen z, there is no requirement (in the representative system) that binds z to do what n 
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 Each society X sets the standards to conform that majority, age is usually the threshold to decide who participates. 
Some other times, societies have used other criteria as thresholds besides age like gender or race/ethnicity, which 
amounts to what it means to be a ‘citizen’ (See Manin, 1997, chapter 3). 
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 As a contrast, autocracy means that power is vested on a subset (usually very small) of that n without the consent 
and/or authority of the majority of n. In this sense, any society in which decisions are made without the consent 
and/or authority of the majority of the people could be considered an autocracy. For a good overview of selection 
mechanisms see Manin 1997. 
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 This ‘verdict of the people’ was first noticed in the 1900s by one of first outsiders to study the political system of 
the United States: “In America the people name those who make the law and those who execute it; they themselves 
form the jury that punishes infractions of the law. Not only are institutions democratic in their principle, but also in 
all their developments; thus the people name their representatives directly and generally choose them every year in 
order to keep them more completely under their dependence. It is therefore really the people who direct, and 
although the form of government is representative, it is evident that the opinions, the prejudices, the interests, and 
even the passions of the people can find no lasting obstacles that prevent them from taking effect in the daily 







 The literature on public opinion in the United States has focused on finding whether 
this relationship exists, if so whether is stronger or weaker over time and whether the causality 
runs both ways. This section will try to build a theoretical framework as a guide to navigate the 
complex relationship between decision-makers and the public. 
The theoretical guide for this paper will be based on the amended version of Down’s 
economic model of democracy presented in his paper called “The Public Interest: Its Meaning in 
a Democracy”, published in 1962, five years after he first proposed it in his book An Economic 
theory of Democracy (1957); V.O. Key’s Public Opinion and American Democracy, published 
in 1961; Manin’s The Principles of Representative Government, published in 1997; and, Page 
and Shapiro’s The Rational Public: Fifty years of Trends in Americans’ Policy Preferences, 
published in 1992. 
The central argument in Downs’ model, as originally presented in his book, explains 
political behavior in terms of rationality and self-interest behavior: any individual will make 
decisions that satisfy his or her own self-interest regardless others’ interests. For the same reason, 
the government will pick policies that maximize its chances of staying in power regardless of 
whether such policies respond to the welfare of the people. This was the central attack to his 
original model: how can policymakers work for the ‘common good’ by acting in their own self-
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 “…Promises or programs might be put forward, but representatives have, without exception, retained the freedom 
to decide whether to fulfill them. Representatives undoubtedly have an incentive to keep their promises. Keeping 
promises is a deep-rooted social norm, and breaking them carries a stigma that can lead to difficulties in being 
reelected. Representatives remain, however, free to sacrifice the prospect of their reelection if, in exceptional 
circumstances, other considerations appear to them more important than their own careers. More importantly, they 
can hope that, when they stand for reelection, they will be able to convince voters that they had good reasons for 
their actions, even though that meant betraying heir promises. Since the link between the will of the electorate and 
the behavior of elected representatives is not rigorously guaranteed, the latter always retain a certain amount of 
discretion. Those who insist that in representative democracy the people govern through their representatives must at 
least acknowledge that this does not mean that representatives have to implement the wishes of the electorate.” 





interest. Downs responded to his critics by adding the concept of the ‘public interest’ into his 
model without removing the central argument of rationality and self-interest behavior. 
Downs (1962:2) provides a basic definition of public interest in terms of “government 
actions that most benefited the whole society” and assumes that all citizens agree that this is what 
the government ought to do even though they may disagree on specific issues.
136
 The importance 
of public interest comes from its three main functions: 
1. It is a compass that helps citizens to navigate and to judge government actions and share 
those judgments with other citizens 
2. It is a reason for those negatively affected by specific government actions to accept them.  
3. It is a guide and a check for public officials to make policy decisions when no clear 
mandate comes from either the electorate or their superiors (if any). At any moment a 
policymaker should be able to defend his decisions based on his own perception of what 
is good for society and, eventually, this may help him develop a guide for policy action 
when no other rules are present.  
There is however another problem. Citizens may have different conceptions about the 
‘common good’ and use this and their own set of values to evaluate what the government ought 
to do. In this sense, there may be as many views of ‘common good’ as the number of citizens in a 
society. Here Downs introduces the concept of ‘minimal consensus’, which refers to:  
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1. Cultural traits (values and beliefs) which set the basic rules of behavior that regulate the 
interactions among individuals in the society (examples could be the honor system, 
respect for others, tolerance, ‘do not steal’, etc.)  
2. Political conduct expressed in the Constitution that set basic political rules like protection 
of individual rights and terms limits among others. 
3. Political principles that are universally accepted by the society. For example in the case 
of the United States the protection of freedom, liberty and individual rights at all costs; in 
the case, for example, of Mexico the principle of no intervention in other countries’ 
affairs has dictated the direction of foreign policy since the 1900s as it is considered 
relevant for peace. 
4. Agreements on basic principles of social policy to keep peace and stability (for example 
extreme polarizing political views could paralyze or take a society to civil war).  
While, from the citizen’s point of view, there could be many definitions of public interest, 
they all must, at least have some common ‘ground rules’ on how to interact with each other in 
order to minimize uncertainty (sort of like Rousseau’s Social Contract). Those ground rules 
could be written (like the Constitution) or not (like the ‘honor system’ or the recognition of 
electoral defeat) or based on a common understanding of what the government ought to do at the 
very minimum. The minimal consensus sets the basic common understanding of what is, at its 
minimum, the public interest. 
To Downs, policymaking in a democracy should not violate the minimal consensus. This, 





right to self-defense is part of that minimal consensus. This is similar what Jones, Larsen-Price 
and Wilkerson (2009) refer to as ‘institutional friction’, in this case the right to bear arms is 
written in the second amendment to the Constitution.  
The minimal consensus has an important property, it allows for policies to be enacted 
whenever such consensus is threatened regardless of what a majority of citizens want: “… the 
rules specified in the minimal consensus implies that each citizen is willing to sacrifice his own 
short-run interests to at least some extent if those interests require behavior or policies 
detrimental to the survival of the democracy; in other words, he has a positive desire for the 
survival of the system…” (Downs 1962: 9). However, the minimal consensus alone cannot be 
used to guide policymaking because is too vague when it comes to details. 
To complement the minimum consensus, Downs combines elements from different 
theories of public interest as presented by Glendon Schubert.
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 Downs summarize the theories 
of public interest as follows: 
 Rationalist school – The government must do what the people want it to do. 
 Idealist school – The government will do what is best for society as a whole based on 
its own judgment and a specific or ‘absolute’ set of values, in this case public opinion 
does not need to be consulted 
 Realist school – Policies will be the product of specific methods. 
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o Bentleyan realists – Policies are the result of interest groups’ conflict and the 
public interest is just a facade to advance their own interests 
o Psychological realists – Policies emphasizing the good of society rather than 
interest groups 
o Due-process realists – Policies must include the affected parties into the 
decision-making process 
Downs disagreed with the rationalist school on the basis that most people are not 
informed and even if they were, they would never agree with one another creating ‘circular 
majorities’ in which there is no clear winner of the ‘will of the people’. However, he agrees with 
this line of thought when he argues that: 
“…Experience has taught people living in democracies that they cannot allow the 
officials to be the sole judges of whether their actions are beneficial to the citizenry; 
democracies were established precisely to avoid this situation. The citizens have 
empowered themselves to pass such judgment periodically by means of popular elections. 
In order to stay in office, government officials must periodically persuade a majority of 
voters to approve of their actions, either by shaping their actions to conform to a 
majority's preconceived notions of what should be done, or by altering the preconceived 
notions of enough voters that the policies chosen appear satisfactory. In either case the 
result must be a degree of conformity between "the popular will" and the decision of 
government officials, or a new government will replace the existing one.” (p. 14). 
 
Downs also disagreed with the idealist theory because it is not clear which set of 
‘absolute’ set of values should the government uses to make policies, but he argues that: 
“…when officials must use some type of decision rule not closely tied to public opinion, they 





concept of the common good, since such rationalization may someday be required by the 
pressure of public opinion (in such forms as a congressional investigation, for example)…” (p15). 
He further argues “…the set of values are those conceived by each government decision-maker 
to be the most effective in attaining his goals of keeping his conduct within the limits indicated 
by the minimal consensus and keeping the system going, and in following whatever additional 
decision rule he uses, such as getting reelected, avoiding public censure, or advancing the 
interests of a particular group…Only the ultimate survival of the system and popular approval in 
the next election (assuming he seeks reelection) can determine whether  the values employed 
were “correct enough” to have accomplished these goals” (p.17). 
On the realist theories, Downs agreed with all but combined. While certain groups may 
try to advance their own interests, there may be instances in which policy decisions may require 
the guidance of the individual values of the decision-maker or instances in which to secure the 
survival of the system, groups affected by specific policies may be included in the decision-
making process to guarantee agreement on its possible consequences. 
Downs’ amended theory provides a direct link between policymaking and public opinion 
through the electoral process but also allows some flexibility in policymaking based on 
leadership when it comes to assess the possible threats to the minimal consensus or to the 
survival of the system. This latter opens the possibility for public officials to enact policies that 
go against the majority that may, in the long-run, be beneficial of the society as a whole and/or 
guarantee the stability and continuity of the system. In this sense, the behavior of the decision-
makers is not only constrained by the upcoming elections but also by other factors like judicial 





on public opinion, elected officials must come up with a justifiable version of their definition of 
‘public interest’ that should resemble those of their constituencies (in terms of either the minimal 
consensus or the survival of the system). This is precisely the departure from his original model. 
Government decisions are not only based on maximizing their chance of winning the next 
elections regardless of the common good of society but rather they are guided by an overall 
concept of public interest (which may minimize future political costs or public censure); in other 
words, elected officials should be responsive, in one way or another, to the public. 
Overall, Key also agreed with Downs in that decision makers should pay attention to the 
public: “…governors shall seek out popular opinion, that they shall give it weight if not the 
determinative voice in decision, and that persons outside the government have a right to be 
heard…the essence of government by public opinion may rest, not in any precise mirroring of 
opinion by government, but in concern in good faith by governments for public preferences and 
in dedication to mass interests.” (p. 412). To him, the electoral process is also the main link 
between policies and public opinion but raised the issue of what happens in between elections: 
“In any case, in popular government the day-to-day work of government is conducted with an 
eye to the mechanisms of linkage between government and opinion peculiar to popular 
governments, the chief of which is the electoral process. At elections public opinion is clearly 
controlling; that is, it determines who shall govern. The vexing analytical problem comes in the 
comprehension of the extent to which, and the process whereby, public opinion is linked to the 
actions of government in the periods between elections.” (p. 412-13). 
In spite of his amendment, Downs kept the ‘rational ignorance’ assumption: “…The 





government policy to the majority’s real needs) would actually occur if everyone were well 
informed; in fact, it affirms it. But it also contends that the individual’s moral commitment to the 
preservation of the system, though effective in getting large numbers of people to vote, is not 
likely to extend to the point where he spends a great deal of his resources becoming and 
remaining politically informed…” (p. 34).  
Here Downs’s logic can be applied in the same fashion as he defined public interest. It 
may be the case that some individuals may be more interested in politics than others. It could 
also be the case that some individuals may find their levels of interest in terms of the salience of 
particular issues. V.O. Key provided an interesting insight: “…We have pictured public opinion 
as the product of an interaction between political influential and the mass of the people, an 
interaction that may produce alterations in mass opinion…Mass opinion is not self-generating; in 
the main, it is a response to the cues, the proposal, and the visions propagated by the political 
activists” (p. 557). In this case, it could be the possibility that some of those ‘cues’, ‘proposals’ 
and/or ‘visions’ alter the value of getting informed, in other words, they could reduce the cost of 
participating and/or getting informed therefore making it worthwhile their time and efforts. In 
this sense, the solution to the ‘rational ignorance’ is the modification of the transactions costs of 
getting informed. In Key’s words, the higher the salience of the issue the higher the stability of 
public opinion: “…On the American scene mass opinion about most matter of political 
importance possesses a high viscosity [stability]…. Stability of opinion both in idea and in fact 
can be understood only in relation to the stimuli that affect opinion. Public opinion must be in a 





issues, the problems, the cues from leadership, and the objective circumstances that affect 
individual well-being…” (p. 235). 
Another part of Downs’ conclusion is that policy = people’s needs only if “…everyone 
were well informed…” (See quote above). This need not to be the case as Page and Shapiro 
(1992), in a thorough study spanning over fifty years of national surveys, provided quantitative 
evidence showing that “…while we grant the rational ignorance of most individuals, and the 
possibility that their policy preferences are shallow and unstable, we maintain that public opinion 
as a collective phenomenon is nonetheless stable (though not immovable), meaningful, and 
indeed rational in a higher, if somewhat looser, sense: it is able to make distinctions; it is 
organized in coherent patterns; it is reasonable, based on the best available information; and it is 
adaptive to new information or changed circumstances, responding in similar ways to similar 
stimuli…” (p. 14, see also chapter 10). The statistical properties of random samples make this 
possible: “…The simple process of adding together or averaging many individuals’ survey 
responses, for example, tends to cancel out the distorting effects of random errors in the 
measurement of individuals’ opinions. Similarly, statistical aggregation tends to eliminate the 
effects of real but effectively random (i.e. offsetting) opinion changes by individuals. And social 
processes involving division of labor and collective deliberation mean that collective opinion 
responds –more fully and attentively than most individuals can hope to do—to new events and 
new information and arguments” (p.15). If we extend this to the population as a whole we could 
see that one interesting property of public opinion is that it is asymmetrical: extreme views 





assume that at the ‘minimum consensus’ public opinion is symmetrical in the sense that a big 
majority if not all of the public agrees on what that consensus should be. 
While the asymmetric property of public opinion makes it stable and predictable, as Page 
and Shapiro argued, it is also what makes it movable. If politicians can move some of those 
extremes to one or the other side then the average opinion may move as well. This might be one 
of the reasons the authors offer a cautionary note regarding the flow of information in the sense 
that public opinion will be good as long as the information the public receives is good. The case 
for the war in Iraq makes a good example, where President Bush and his team convinced the 
public by offering “strong evidence” that the Iraqi government was manufacturing biological 
weapons. This example offers a case of how ‘passions’ of the few can be more dangerous that 
the ‘passions’ of the whole and how misleading information can move opinion to support policy 
actions that may not be in the best interest of the public. 
For the link between policy and public opinion to work, an additional factor is required: 
freedom of public opinion. According to Manin (1997) such freedom has two components: 1) 
“…In order that the governed may form their own opinions on political matter, it is necessary 
that they have access to political information, and this requires that governmental decisions are 
made public. If those in government make decisions in secret, the governed have only inadequate 
means of forming opinion on political matters…” (p. 167); and 2) “…The second requisite for 
freedom of public opinion is freedom to express political opinions at any time, not just when 
voting in elections…” (p. 168). In the case of the United States this is guarantee by the 
Constitution in the First Amendment, which combines both individual freedom (religion) and a 





concerned with protecting, not only the collective expressions of opinion in general, but also 
those specifically addressed to the authorities with the intent of obtaining something from 
them…. (p. 169). According to Manin, the first amendment guarantees the connection between 
the public and government officials. 
In sum, the theoretical framework suggests that: 
 In a democracy, we must expect a ‘feedback cycle’ between elected officials and public 
opinion.  
 The electoral process is the main engine of the ‘feedback cycle’. 
 The ‘feedback cycle’ has a lower bound set by a ‘minimal consensus’ – policies must not 
disturb the minimal consensus unless the stability and continuity of the system is 
threatened. 
 The ‘feedback cycle’ has an upper bound: in the absence of a clear signal from public 
opinion or the electorate, policymakers should rely on their own values and beliefs but, 
most importantly, on their own perception of ‘public interest’ in the face of a possible 
future “judgment day’ (judicial reviews, congressional hearings, impeachment process, 
public censure by relatively relevant affected groups, and/or electoral defeat). This may 
also be related to accountability. 
 In between the lower and upper bounds policymakers may collect information about their 
constituencies in order to directly respond to their concerns or to evaluate those concerns 
in terms of their policy agenda, the public interest and their political risks.  
 Because of its asymmetric properties, collective public opinion is stable, knowable, 





 The public must be free to express and share their views and have access to accurate 
information about the government policy activities (transparency). 
The theory suggests that a democratic system that meets the above requirements should 
have responsive policymakers given that their policy activity is constrained by a lower/upper 
bounds set by society’s values and beliefs and political costs if they ‘get it wrong’. Such 
responsiveness, however, has more than one dimension. Decision-makers could be responsive to 
direct public opinion (as in the form of public opinion polls, massive demonstrations, petitions, 
media pressure, etc.); they could also be responsive to an anticipated public opinion (either in the 
form of elections or public censure); they could be responsive to unexpected events that affect 
the public (ability to respond to emergency situations); or they could be responsive to the public 
by focusing on the ‘common good’ or ‘public interest’. These, I believe, are the main 
components of what is known as leadership that requires a decision-maker to be responsive to all 
of the above. The point here is that responsiveness is not one thing but many and the feedback 
cycle will work as long as its components remain strong and present at all times. On the side of 
the public, the theory does not require to mandate or to provide instructions to policymakers nor 
requires full knowledge on all issues. It does require freedom to share and express opinions and 
transparency in the policy activity of the representatives. However, what makes the feedback 
cycle work is also what could make it fail. 
This feedback cycle can be rather dysfunctional for the same reasons that make it work. 
First, the rational anticipation created by the upcoming elections generates incentives for the 
politicians to attempt to manipulate the public in order to lower the electoral risks “…politicians 





public support for what they desire. We refer to this strategy as one of crafted talk. If public 
opinion does not change in the desired direction, politicians change their behavior with the 
imminent approach of presidential elections by temporarily increasing their responsiveness to 
centrist opinion even if it requires compromising their policy objectives” (Jacobs and Shapiro, 
2000, p. 27). A major consequence is that representation would not be one “…in which public 
opinion was not an independent driving force…” (Shapiro, 2011:986) therefore undermines the 
concept of “democratic” representation.  
Second, the public is not attentive to all issues and representation occurs only to those 
issues that are salient to the public “…we find a close connection between salience, public 
responsiveness, and representation. Where the public cares more and pays attention, there is a 
good deal of representation. In less salient domains, where public responsiveness is weak, the 
opinion-policy connection is itself quite weak. In low-salience domains where the public does 
not notice what policymakers do, there is no discernible representation connection…” (Soroka 
and Wlezien 2010; p. 171). This could open the door for politicians to pander to specific interest 
groups without causing unnecessary noise among the public. 
Third, the feedback cycle depends from other dynamics, which could be causing some of 
the dysfunctionality in the cycle like “…ideological polarization, interest group proliferation, 
institutional individualization, incumbency, and acrimonious interbranch relations…” (Jacobs 
and Shapiro 2000; p. 64).  This, according to the authors, has caused a decrease in 
responsiveness over the last forty years in the United States. 
A fourth possible problem in the feedback cycle is the asymmetry of information. At any 





strategically, but the public cannot do the same about the policymaker’s positions. It has to rely 
on the media, interest groups, social media, their personal social networks, political parties or 
their personal experiences to figure out where politicians stand.  
In general, the theoretical framework calls for representatives’ responsiveness and place 
direct public opinion (as measure in polls) as part of the process but not at the center. In this case, 
representatives do have a steady flow of information to help them make policy or policy changes 
(Jones and Baumgartner, 2005). It is certainly important for them to know where the public 
stands on certain issues but they need to see the big picture as well. This is particularly relevant 
in the case of the president who has the biggest constituency.  
 
3) The empirical literature 
 
The literature in the United States on the relationship between public opinion and policy 
is numerous. Most of it has focused on the relationship between Congress and its constituencies. 
Robert Shapiro (2011) provides a thorough overview of the current state of the field with the 
convincing argument that indeed public opinion matters for policymaking but one gets the 
feeling that more research is needed to uncover the causality and strength of the relationship. 
Still the literature, as a whole, has managed to provide some idea of responsiveness over time. 
Here Shapiro delivers some bad news: “…There is, however, no clear evidence for a stronger 
relationship than in the past. Rather, one current debate is that policy responsiveness to the 
public at large has decreased: Partisan conflict has become more polarized, and presidents and 





public opinion, not respond to it. The opinions to which they may be most likely to respond are 
those of their partisan bases whose support they must keep to avoid intraparty challenges…” (p. 
999).  
Shapiro’s review also reveals that most of the research has focused on the level of issue-
congruence between government policies and public opinion. For example, in analyzing more 
than 200 cases of opinion change, Page and Shapiro (1983) found congruence in 66% of the 
cases (policy changing a year after a change in opinion). Monroe found 60% congruence on the 
majority of opinion supporting policy changes, other studies have also found high (as well as low) 
levels of congruence across different issues; and congruence seems to be directly related to issue 
saliency. Still the strength and causality of the relationship is not quite clear.  
Bryan Jones (1994) conclude that while policy preferences show high levels of stability, 
people’s attentiveness to issues varies significantly overtime, he argued: “….preferences become 
relevant only when a policy area becomes salient. For preferences to become important, citizens 
must attend to them; so preferences are not likely to influence policies on their own. This 
preference activation model implies an interactive approach; attentiveness and preferences 
interact to influence policy outcomes….” (p.127) 
From Shapiro’s review, two studies seem relevant for this paper: the book by Erikson, 
MacKuen and Stimson (2002) The Macro Polity and the book by Soroka and Wlezien (2010) 
Degrees of Democracy. 
Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson (2002) offer an impressive time series analysis on the 
relationship between public opinion and policy activity by focusing on a latent concept of 





demand for more liberal or more conservative government action. As a relative demand, Mood is 
a function both of current policies and of the electorate’s ideal policy preference…” (p. 355). 
The way responsiveness works in this setting is that policy and public opinion gravitate towards 
an equilibrium where policy = public’s collective preference: “ At equilibrium, Policy reflects 
the public’s collective Preference. However, at any point, Policy will deviate somewhat from 
equilibrium. This deviation is represented by Mood. When Policy is more liberal than Preference, 
Mood becomes relatively conservative. When Policy is more conservative than Preference, 
Mood becomes relatively liberal. Representation occurs with the Policy response to Mood. The 
faster the response, the greater the match between Preference and Policy.” (p. 355). In this sense 
responsiveness is an error correction process in which policy and opinion dance around until 
policy matches preferences.  
In Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson’s analysis public opinion and the electoral connection 
make sure that policy never deviates too much from preferences. In their model presented in 
page 315 they show that public opinion matters because when it moves one point (in the previous 
year) it moves current policy activity 0.36 points (controlling by electoral composition, previous’ 
year policies and the Vietnam effect). In this case, public opinion matters because of the 
statistical property of the coefficient, it is significant. Their model shows one more result. The 
electoral connection is even more relevant when the government composition favors the 
Democratic Party, which causes policy activity to increase by 0.88 points. In this case, policy 
responds to both direct public opinion and to the electoral context, which take the authors to 
conclude that: “…It is through elections and the anticipation of elections that public opinion 





The authors went even further and estimated the valence and time of policymakers’ 
response to public opinion. In the case of the president, the effect of public opinion is towards 
moderation.  Democrats (and their liberal policies) move public opinion towards Republicans 
(and conservative positions) and vice versa and they adjust their policy activity accordingly in 
anticipation of the upcoming election. Based on their models, such response happens within a 
year “…about 87 percent of any gap between the public’s demand and the president’s Activity is 
‘corrected’ within a year…” (p. 319). The total processing of the public’s demands happen in 3.4 
years for the presidency, 3.5 for the House, 3.9 for the Senate and 6.9 for the Supreme Court (see 
page 319). The reverse is, however, faster, public opinion responds almost immediately to policy 
change (p. 371). 
Interestingly enough, according to the authors, this shows the workings of the United 
States political system of checks and balances in the sense that the action of politicians tends to 
cycle around and/or be directed towards the public’s dominant ideology of the moment. This is 
interpreted by the authors as gravitating towards public opinion by a series of ‘actions, responses 
and counter-responses’: “the public opinion-policy linkage serves to keep the political system 
along the course set by public preferences, much as an earlier generation of ‘systems theorists’ 
postulated. In normative terms, this behavior accord with Madison’s vision. The governing 
system does respond to sustained changes in national judgment, but it responds slowly and in a 
stable manner.” (p. 374). 
In a study comparing the United States, Canada and United Kingdom, Soroka and 
Wlezien (2010) presented a model called Thermostatic: when the public feels too much ‘heat’ 





to ‘cool it down’ (i.e. reduce spending) and vice versa. To the authors this relationship is relevant 
in the sense that it marks the level of efficiency of the system: “The ongoing interaction between 
public preferences and policy is in this way fundamental to the functioning of a democratic 
political system. Indeed, the more the public responds to policy, and policymakers represent 
public preferences, the more “efficient” the system, that is, the more effectively –quickly and 
fully- changes in preferences translate into changes in policy” (p. 15). The authors conclude that 
policy and public opinion indeed move together overtime, that issue saliency is important, that 
policymakers tend to respond more to negative feedback than to positive (although this is not 
entirely rejected), and that once an opinion is established, new feedback coming from highly 
informed individuals would not alter collective opinion, this is, public opinion if fairly 
homogenous and observe a “…high degree of parallelism in preferences across a number of 
population subdivisions, including education levels…” (p. 169). This property, according to the 
authors, creates incentives for policymakers to equally listen to public opinion. The institutional 
context is another factor that constrains responsiveness.  
Using time series techniques, in this paper I will explore not only the causal relation 
between policy and public opinion but also its impact of positive or negative opinions, its impact 
across socioeconomic groups and the time-lag response to each other’s change over time for the 
case of Mexico. In the case of policy, I will focus on changes on government spending on the 
economy and anti-crime spending (public safety). Regarding public opinion measures there is, 
however, one major difference with the literature on this issue. Because of the lack of long-term 
trend data on policy preferences, I cannot replicate analysis similar to those in the case of the 





personal situation, future expectations, most important problem and presidential approval. While 
these questions do not offer specific ‘policy instructions’ they do reveal the state of mind of the 
public about the current state of affairs and could provide ‘policy heuristics or clues’ to 
policymakers that could indicate that something is going either good or bad (similar to the Mood 
index or the Thermostatic approach). In the same way that the statistical properties of random 
samples reveal a stable and knowable public opinion regarding policy preferences, opinions 
regarding the state of the economy provide good indicators on how the public perceive policy 
outcomes by either looking at their immediate surroundings or responding to changes in 
macroeconomic conditions. The question here is whether these overall public perceptions have 
some impact on presidential spending and which perceptions are more or less affected by the 
president’s policy signals as view through his budget.  
Opinion variables regarding the well-being of the individual do have policy value and are, 
therefore, meaningful for policy analysis as long as they respond to some policy or 
macroeconomic indicator. As Dolan and Peasgood (2008) suggests: “…if subjective evaluations 
are well informed and well considered, there is less reason to suspect that life satisfaction 
assessments are not authentic or are myopic. This suggests that judgments are more valid when 
individuals have good access to information about factors that affect how well their life is going 
overall, such as knowledge about health, risk of crime, and the risks of poverty in old age…” (p. 
25). If such connection exists then public opinion may be able to convey “policy instructions” as 
individuals react to the policy consequences of the decision made by policymakers. If the 





directions imply? Are the ups or downs on these types of questions having an effect on the policy 
activity of president in the form of spending allocation?
138
 
In the United States, politicians pay attention to general opinions of well-being to, either 
rally people to vote for them as Ronald Reagan did during his debate with Jimmy Carter in 
1980
139
, or when Franklin Roosevelt in his fireside chat on June 28, 1934 told the public (during 
the Great Depression): “… the simplest way for each of you to judge recovery lies in the plain 
facts of your own individual situation. Are you better off than you were last year? Are your debts 
less burdensome? Is your bank account more secure? Are your working conditions better? Is 
your faith in your own individual future more firmly grounded?... “140 
The message that Roosevelt (and Reagan) sent was very simple: regardless of what the 
government does, at the end what matters is whether people feel better off than before and have 
some hope for the future. This is consistent with the feedback cycle theory presented in a 
previous section. It allows policymakers to make decisions based on their own beliefs of what 
has to be done with the understanding that they will be judged or held accountable by the public. 
The above is consistent with the theory in the sense that the public is sending signals to 
the policymakers, and the job of policymakers is to decipher and interpret what those signals 
mean and act accordingly under the understanding that if they get it wrong ‘judgment day’ will 
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come upon them holding them accountable for their decisions (their party may not get reelected, 
they could face an impeachment process, face public censure, etc.) An example of this is the case 
of President Felipe Calderón whose administration ended November 2012. He got the message 
that people were concerned about public safety and acted accordingly. The problem was that he 
seemed to have erred in the strategy by declaring open war to the drug cartels, which caused 
about 60,000 deaths during his administration. His party paid the price by not only losing the last 
presidential election (and seats in Congress) but also sending his party to a third place in the 
electoral preferences.  
 
4) The hypotheses 
 
Based on the feedback theory presented in this paper and on the Mood and Thermostatic 
models (M&T) discussed above I do expect some feedback cycles to exist between public 
opinion and presidential spending which would suggest some democratic process going on in the 
Mexican political system. In these cycles, I do expect opinion variables to have an effect on 
spending and spending to have an effect on opinion; we should see arrows going in all directions. 
The M&T models suggest that policy cycles around opinion when it reaches certain point: 
when there is too much spending on item A or moving to extreme ideological positions the public 
reverses support and send signals to slow down spending and/or move to more moderate 
positions. Since I am using retrospective and prospective evaluation of personal situation, 
following the same logic as the M&T models, I would expect that an increase in positive 
opinions to slow down economic spending because it may signal the president that current 





increase in negative opinions should trigger more spending to stimulate the economy or to 
address crime and violence). In the same way as the literature on presidential approval suggests, 
higher levels of popularity allows the president room for political maneuver and focus on his 
policy agenda, therefore, higher levels of popularity may also tend to slow down economic 
spending, allowing the president to focus on other items in his policy agenda. 
In terms of the effects of economic spending on opinion, I do expect positive opinions to 
go up whenever the president signals more spending. The reason for this is that, in the particular 
case of Mexico, until 1997 the president was at the center of the policymaking process and his 
actions were perceived as having a strong effect on the economy. After 1997, for the first time in 
the political history of Mexico, opposition parties got control of Congress and started playing a 
major role in the policymaking process. In spite of this, the president still is, in the public’s eye, 
responsible for what happens in the economy.
141
 
In exploring the relation between public opinion and macroeconomic variables, I will 
control for three exogenous variables: economic growth (GDP per capita), unemployment and 
inflation. In order for perceptions of well-being to have policy value, they must react to at least 
one of those macroeconomic variables. I would expect that increases in economic growth to 
increase positive opinions. I would expect unemployment and inflation to have a reverse effect 
on positive opinions. This is, for example, increase in unemployment rate or inflation should 
lower positive opinions. A direct impact of macroeconomic variables on opinions would provide 
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them with policy meaning and, therefore, a sense of policy direction for the president to react. 
Diagram 1, shows the hypothesized relations. 
 
 [Diagram 1. Hypotheses  HERE] 
 
5) The model 
 
The literature suggests an endogenous relationship between public opinion and policy (or 
policy activity). Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson’ Mood and Soroka and Wlezien’s Thermostatic 
model provide the most compelling quantitative evidence of this relation in which policy seems 
to respond to opinion and opinion to policy. The feedback cycle theory presented early in this 
paper also suggests an endogenous relation: all variables depend and/or explain each other: 
 






The technique that better deals with the dynamics of an all-endogenous variable model is 
the vector autoregressive models (VAR), their feedback effect and ‘backwards’ process in the 
opinion variables.
142
 There are three types of VAR models: reduced, recursive and structural.
143
 
The reduced form of VAR is the starting point of estimations but is not useful to establish causal 
relationship among variables. The main reason is that while the errors or residuals are not serially 
correlated they are correlated across equations or variables. Therefore, changes in one variable 
may be connected to changes in other variables making it difficult to identify the source. The 
goal is to identify the effect of one positive standard deviation shock in the error (innovations) of 
one variable on another. The reason why the shocks are called innovations is that they refer to the 
part that is new to each variable and not predicted by previous values of the variables in the 
model (Sims 1980).
 144
 To identify the changes Sims suggested to ortogonalize the variance-
covariance matrix of the residuals by triangularizing the system of equations as they entered the 
model, this is called a recursive model (1980, p. 21; see also Stock and Watson 2001). In 
recursive VAR the contemporaneous effects are based on the order of the variables in the model 




yt =  μ + Γyt-1 + εt 
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Where yt is vector of first differences of the spending and opinion variables, Γ is a matrix 
of 1’s and the εt is the “vector of nonautocorrelated error disturbances (innovations) with zero 
means and contemporaneous covariance matrix E[εt ε’t] = Ω” (p. 693). 
The individual equations would be: 
 
Where: 
1. y1 = First differences in the perception of current personal situation as compared to the 
previous year (positve/negative) 
 
2. y2 = First differences in the perception of the economy and/or public safety as the most 
important problem 
 
3. y3 = First differences in the perception of prospective situation the following year (future 
expectations, positive/negative) 
 
4. y4 = First differences in presidential approval/disapproval 
 
5. y5 = Firs differences in presidential spending on the economy and/or on public safety. 
 
The post-estimation results will be ortogonalized based on the order in which the 




sitpermej -> mip -> expmej -> approval -> spending  
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Here spending does not have any contemporaneous effect on the other variables and will 
considered the contemporaneous dependent variable. 
Where: 
 sitpermej = positive personal evaluations  (as compared to the previous year) 
 mip = economy or public safety as the most important problem 
 expmej = positive future expectations (the following year) 
 approval = presidential approval 
 spending = economic or public safety 
Negative models: 
sitperpeor -> mip -> exppeor -> disapproval -> spending  
Where: 
 sitperpeor = negative personal evaluations (as compared to the previous year)  
 exppeor = positive future expectations (the following year) 
 mip = economy or public safety as the most important problem 
 disapproval = presidential disapproval 
 spending = economic or public safety 
 
The positive and negative models will be testing the findings by Soroka and Wlezien 
(2010) which suggest that policy responsiveness happens more with negative rather than with 
positive feedback: “…When policy increases (decreases), preferences for more policy decrease 
(increase), other things being equal. And while allowing for the possibility of positive feedback, 
our analyses clearly indicate that negative feedback overwhelms positive feedback over the long 






[Diagram 2. Assumed contemporaneous relationships HERE] 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, VAR models allow simulating the thinking process 
given the available information. These models allow us to identify the nature of the relationship 
among endogenous variables and look into the impact of each other accounting for the feedback 
effects in the entire system. 
In the models presented here, the individual evaluates his/her current personal situation, 
evaluates the current most important problem (MIP) and, based on these two, assess his/her 
expectations about his/her personal situation one year from today. Current evaluations about 
personal situation, MIP and expectations may influence the current presidential approval (or 
disapproval) and all combined may have an effect on current economic spending (which the 
president learns through public opinion polls). At any moment, for example, current evaluations 
of personal situation can have an effect on any other variables. However, for example, current 
evaluations of MIP do not have a contemporaneous effect on personal situation; only past values 
of MIP do have an effect.  
The scenario above reproduces a situation in which the president learns first about 
people’s perceptions of well-being through his presidential polls and may or may not react. The 
public learns after the fact. The causal ordering defined in diagram 2 is necessary to estimate the 
orthogonal version of the impulse-response functions and the forecast-error variance 
decomposition in order to make causal inferences about the relationship among variables (i.e. a 





variables constant). The Granger causality test provides an indication of predictability of past 
values of one variable in relation to another, this is whether y1,t-1 has some predicted power over 
y2,t,if so then we can say that y1,t-1 Granger-causes y2t.  
 
6) The data  
 
 
Testing the relationship between public opinion and policy in Mexico is complex. Each 
president had his own policy agenda and priorities, which in turn defined the workflow of the 
presidential polling unit. In this sense, policy preference questions depended on each of the 
president’s agenda, which made it difficult to keep the consistency in the wording in all three 
administrations. Common questions, across all presidencies were presidential approval, most 
important problem, perceptions of the economy and measures of current and future personal 
well-being. Following Page and Shapiro’s rationality approach (1992), I believe these questions 
reflect, on average, a clear, stable and consistent measure of the current state of affairs in the 
country as viewed from the public in response to macroeconomic trends, and they represent an 
overall evaluation of policy performance.
147
 As we will see, these measures do respond to 
changes in current macroeconomic variables and therefore are of policy value. 
In Mexico, government spending generates incentives to stimulate the economy. Through 
spending the president distributes government resources according to his policy agenda. In the 
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same way as Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson (2002) argued for policy, spending is an 
autoregressive process in which most of what is spent at time t follows what was spent at time t-1. 
The focus for this paper is on the relation between change in the proportion of spending 
dedicated to economic or public safety issues (first differences, which I interpret as the policy 
signals from the President) and the percentage point change in opinions (first differences). The 
post estimation results from the VAR models will be interpreted as changes in percentage points 
in the variables. For example, it would measure the impact of an unexpected increase of one 
percentage point on spending on an opinion variable and vice versa.  






Agricultura, Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentación (agricultural, 
livestock, rural development, fishing and food) 
Comunicaciones y Transportes (infrastructure in communication and transportation) 
Economía (economic development) 
Reforma Agraria (land distribution) 
Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (environment and natural resources) 
Energía (energy) 
Turismo (tourism) 
Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología (science and technology council) 
    
Public 
safety 
Procuraduría General de la República (federal police) 
Defensa Nacional (military spending: army) 
Marina (military spending: navy) 
Seguridad Pública (public safety). 
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Opinion data comes from the following questions:
149
  
 Presidential approval 
Spanish English Category 
En general, ¿está usted de acuerdo o en 
desacuerdo con la manera como está 
gobernando el Presidente [nombre] ? 
In general, do you agree or disagree with 
the way President [name] is governing ? 
Approval -1 
Disapproval - 2 
 
 Index of personal situation (retrospective) 
Spanish English Category 
¿Y su situación personal como es: 
mejor o peor que hace un año?  
In general, do you agree or disagree 
with the way President [name] is 
governing ? 
SITPERMEJ (better) -1 
 
SITPERPEOR (worse) - 2 
Y comparada con el año pasado 
(mm/yyyy) ¿cómo cree usted que está 
su situación económica personal, 
mejor o peor? 
 
And compared to last year (mm/yyyy) 
do you believe your economic 
personal situation is better or 
worse ? 
Hablando concretamente de Usted 
y su familia ¿cómo diría que es su 
situación económica, mejor o 
peor que la de hace un año? 
 
Speaking of you and your family, do 
you think your economic situation is 
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 Index of future expectations (prospective) 
Spanish English Category 
¿Y cómo cree usted que será su 
situación el año que entra?
 150
 
And what do you think your 
[personal] situation will be next 
year? 
EXPMEJ (better) -1 
 
EXPPEOR (worse) - 2 
Y su situación económica 
personal ¿cree usted que el año 
que entra será mejor o peor? 
And your personal economic 
situation, do you think it will be 
better or worse next year? 
¿Y cómo cree que estará su 
situación personal el año que 
viene, mejor o peor? 
And what do you think it will be 
your personal situation next year, 
better or worse? 
 
 
 Most important problem – economy (MIPECON) 
Spanish English Category 
¿Cuál cree usted que es el principal problema 
que enfrenta el país?  
- Crisis, inflacion, deuda, perdida poder 
adquisitivo, falta de desarrollo, desempleo, 
pobreza, y salarios bajos 
What do you think is the main problem facing 
the country?  
- Crisis, inflation, debt (national), loss of 
purchasing power, lack of development, 
unemployment, poverty and low salaries 
- 
 
 Most important problem – public safety (MIPSEG) 
 
Spanish English Category 
¿Cuál cree usted que es el principal problema 
que enfrenta el país? - Seguridad publica, 
delincuencia, vandalismo, crimen, narcotrafico, 
robo de infantes 
What do you think is the main problem facing 
the country?  
- Public safety, delinquency, vandalism, crimes, 
drug trafficking, kidnapping of babies 
- 
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The three exogenous (macroeconomic) variables are annual growth of GDP percapita 




Figure 1 shows the trends for the three types of spending from 1963 to 2011 (VAR 
models will consider only data from 1989 to 2011). The series starting in 1989 continue the 
upward trend in economic spending that started in 1980, spending on public safety shows a flat 
line since 1965 and spending on education shows high levels in 1964 (25%), 1978 (18%) and 
1994 (24%) and average levels of 10% between 1965-1975 and after 1998. Figure 2a shows the 
first differences for economic spending, showing a significant amount of variation between 1977 
and 1997, slowing down after that for economic spending. A possible reason could be that 
economic spending already reached a peak in in the overall presidential budget (close to 60%). 
Figure 2b shows the first differences for spending on anti-crime policies in which we can see 
variations between minus five and two percentage points, being the administrations of President 
Salinas and Calderón the most active. 
 
[Figure 1. Presidential Spending (1963-2011). Percentage of total spending HERE] 
[Figure 2a. Economic Spending (1963-2011). First differences HERE] 
[Figure 2b. Public safety Spending (1963-2011). First differences HERE] 
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Figure 3 shows the trend of presidential approval along with the percent of votes from 
each presidential and midterm elections, figure 4 shows the first differences. President Salinas 
won the presidential election with 50.7%, his party won the midterm election of 1991 with 
58.9% and his popularity remained around 75%. President Zedillo won with a similar percentage, 
48.6% but in the midterm election of 1997, his party lost votes (38%) and control of Congress; 
this in spite that his popularity started below the level of his presidential votes but later recovered 
and stay close to 60% in approval. President Fox, the first president from an opposition party 
(conservative) won his election with 38.2% of the votes and during his first year got 56.5% of 
approval increasing to 65% by the end of his administration, but in the midterm elections of 2003 
his party got only 30.7% of the votes. President Calderón, from the same party as President 
Fox’s, won the presidential election of 2006 with 33.4% and started with an approval of 64.5% 
but, unlike his predecessors, in 2011 went down to 55% (and up a little during the first half of 
2012, 57%). President Calderón is the first Mexican president to show similar trends in approval 
as those seen for the United States presidents (high at the beginning of the administration then 
low towards the end). During the midterm elections of 2009, his party got the same percentages 
as before, 30.7% keeping Congress politically divided. 
 
[Figure 3. Presidential approval/disapproval (1989-2011). HERE] 
[Figure 4. Presidential approval/disapproval (1989-2011). First differences HERE] 
 
Figure 5 shows the trends for the evaluation of current personal situation and its 





shown before, these trends mix generic and economic evaluations of both personal situation as 
compared to the previous year and future perceptions about their personal situation. An 
interesting finding was that generic and economic perceptions are closely related. This suggests 
that when asked about those perceptions without any reference to the economy, the public tend to 
respond thinking about economic issues.
152
 The table below shows an exercise to test the 
relationship between generic and economic perceptions. While results are not conclusive, the 
relationship between the two types of measurements is not entirely rejected. For consistency, I 
will include in the models a mean value of these trends. 
 
Spearman (H0: independence) Rho p-value N 
    Personal situation, generic vs economic (better) 0.4857 0.3287 6 
Personal situation, generic vs economic (worse) 0.8286 0.0416 6 
Future expectations, generic vs economic (better) 0.9747 0.0048 5 
Future expectations, generic vs economic (worse) 0.6669 0.2189 5 
 
   Pearson Correlation p-value N 
 
   Personal situation, generic vs economic (better) 0.8517 0.0313 6 
Personal situation, generic vs economic (worse) 0.9871 0.0002 6 
Future expectations, generic vs economic (better) 0.8713 0.0543 5 
Future expectations, generic vs economic (worse) 0.7767 0.1223 5 
 
 
During the first year of the Salinas administration, the majority of retrospective opinions 
(better/worse today than a year ago) were positive but the majority of prospective opinions 
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(better/worse next year) were negative.  After his first year, opinions on both types of variables 
moved to positive.  
In a contrast to the Salinas administration, the Zedillo administration experienced about 
four years of negative perceptions on both prospective and retrospective variables due to the 
economic crisis of 1995. In that year, around 80% said that their current personal situation was 
worse than the previous year and a little over 55% said that they expect to be worse-off the 
following year. These negative trends changed to positive during the last year of President 
Zedillo’s term. After Zedillo’s, the people’s perceptions were sweet-and-sour. During the Fox 
administration positive prospective evaluation remained high (around 60%) and even improved 
during the last year of Fox’s term (almost 70%); but, at the same time, negative personal 
retrospective evaluation also remained high (around 50%) during half of his administration and 
lowered around 40% during the last two years. During Calderón’s administration positive 
prospective evaluation stayed high even though it dropped to around 60%; but the negative 
retrospective evaluation came back up at around 60%-65%. This could be the combination of 
both, the worldwide economic crisis in 2008 and the effect of the administration’s war on drugs 
and increase in violence (see figure 8). Figures 9 and 10 show the fluctuations in terms of first 
differences in which we can see the strong effect of the 1995 economic crisis. 
 
[Figure 5. Personal situation (1989-2011). HERE] 
[Figure 6. Personal situation - current (1989-2011). First differences HERE] 






Figure 8 show the trends for the perception of the most important problem (MIP). 
Economic issues always have priorities in people’s mind but the series show some interesting 
trends. During the Salinas administration, the economy was a concern for an average of 65% of 
the people interviewed. It went up to 80% in 1995 but Zedillo’s efforts to solve the crisis 
managed to bring some peace of mind to “half” of the public. During the last two years of 
President Zedillo’s term only a little over 40% of the public thought that economic issues were 
MIP.  The following two administrations (Fox and Calderón) managed to raise the economic 
worries again and the economy as MIP went back up to an average of 60%.  
President Zedillo managed to reduce the worries about the economy but the economic 
crisis of 1995 generated another concern: public safety. In 1995 only 2% mentioned public safety 
as MIP, by 2000 (the last year of the Zedillo’s administration), 30% of the public believed public 
safety to be MIP. During the Fox administration, it oscillated between 20% and 30% and by 
2011 went up to about 40%. This trend may be the result of a combination of a series of events 
that started in 1994
153
: 
 On January 1994 an uprising by the guerrilla group Ejército Zapatista de Liberación 
Nacional (EZLN). 
 Two mayor political assassinations in 1994: on March 23, Luis Donaldo Colosio, the 
PRI’s presidential candidate; and on September 28, José Francisco Ruiz Massieu general 
secretary of the PRI (the president’s party). 
 In 1995 there is a major economic crisis.  
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 On June 1996 an uprising by the guerrilla group Ejército Popular Revolucionario (EPR). 
From the EPR, two more were created the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo Insurgente 
(ERPI) and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias del Pueblo (FARP). 
 The increased presence of the drug cartels, the perceive weakness of the federal 
government to control them and war on drugs initiated by President Fox and a policy 
priority during the administration of President Calderón. 
 
[Figure 8. Most important problem (1989-2011). HERE] 
[Figure 9. Most important problem - economy (1989-2011). First differences HERE] 
 
Figures 13-15 show the trends for the macroeconomic variables: GDP percapita growth 
and inflation from 1963 to 2011 and unemployment rates from 1989 to 2011.  
Based on the dynamics in the data, the models presented here will look for feedback 




This section will discuss the results of the VAR post-estimation. This, following Stock 
and Watson (2001:104): “…Standard practice in VAR analysis is to report results from Granger-
causality tests, impulse responses and forecast error variance decompositions… Because of the 





VAR regression coefficients or R
2
 statistics, which typically go unreported.” (see also Freeman, 
Williams and Lin 1989).  
The VAR post-estimation include the Granger causality tests, the orthogonal impulse-
response functions (OIRF, which show the impulse-response effects among endogenous 
variables, a cumulative version will be discussed -COIRF), the forecast-error variance 
decomposition (FEVD, which shows the contributions in the forecast error variance of one 
variable given unexpected shocks in other variables) and dynamic multipliers (DM, showing the 
impulse-response effects of the exogenous variables on the endogenous, a cumulative version 
will be presented -CDM).
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A feedback cycle is defined as the back-and-forth or reciprocal relationship between 
variable A and B: A↔B, where A can be policy and B opinion or both can be opinion. Cromwell, 
Hannan, Labys and Terraza (1994:32) define a feedback cycle as the back-and-forth Granger 
causality between two variables: “Feedback occurs in the case where x(t) causes y(t) and y(t) 
causes x(t)…”. For the purposes of this paper I will extent that definition to include other aspects 
of the VAR post-estimation. I will define a feedback cycle as composed by either both the 
Granger-causality and the cumulative orthogonal impulse-response functions (COIRF) or by at 
least one of them going in both directions. A full feedback cycle would have both Granger and 
COIRF effects. As we saw before, Granger-causality shows the predictive power of previous 
values of variable A on current values of B and the COIRF shows the cumulative response in 
variable B to shocks from variable A. To complement the effects, the forecast-error variance 
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decomposition provides a measure of relevance; this is, how much of the percentage of the 
forecast error variance in B is explained by shocks to variable A. In this sense, we can see the 
contributions from each variable in the feedback cycle. 
I will present only the results of the effects between opinion variables and spending on 
economic/public safety. There are eight VAR models, all summarized in the following tables: 
Table 1 shows the p-values of the F-test in the Granger causality test. Tables 2 and 3 show the 
marginal effects of the cumulative orthogonal impulse-response functions (COIRF). Tables 4 and 
5 show the percentages of the forecast-error variance decomposition (FEVD). Tables 6-8 show 
the marginal effects from the cumulative dynamic multipliers (or the cumulative effects of the 
macroeconomic variables; CDM). The forecast horizon for the COIRF, CDM and FEVD will be 
six periods ahead, which correspond to a presidential term in Mexico. Appendix 9 shows the unit 
root tests for stationarity; all variables are stationary. 
 
[Tables 1-8 HERE] 
 
a) Granger-causality: all models 
 
Table 1 presents the results of the Granger causality tests. Out of all eight models, only in 
two, economy/positive and economy/positive/field, all opinion variables (it previous values) 
have some predictive power over current spending. In one more, economy/positive/phone, all but 
presidential approval show predictive power over spending. Conversely, with the exception of 
MIP, in these three models previous values of spending also have some predictive power over 





The above is not observed in the models where spending on public safety is the 
contemporaneous outcome variable. With the exception of MIP-public safety in the negative 
model, no other opinion variables Granger-cause spending on this area. The reverse is also true, 
spending on public safety does not Granger-cause any of the opinion varialbes. In fact, in the 
negative models, only MIP-economy and MIP-public safety Granger-cause spending on their 
respective spending issues.  
Following the definition of Cromwell, Hannan, Labys and Terraza (1994), feedback 
cycles are present in the models where economic spending is used as contemporaneous output 
variables, attentiveness to economic issues is included and with positive retrospective and 
prospective evaluations and presidential approval are considered.  
The findings that the cycles are not present in all models suggest that the influence of 
public opinion on the policy activity of the president is limited to only the economic sphere. 
There are no cycles in the public safety models. A possible explanation could be what Jones 
(1994:106) refer to as valence issue: ”…These are issues on which the overwhelming number of 
voters have a single position. Prevailing opinion is so strong that no opposing position seems 
possible….” Crime and violence have affected the great majority of the population regardless of 
their socioeconomic status. The economy on the other hand, may have a differentiated influence 
across different income brackets.  
The President may be more willing to ‘listen’ to the public on economic matters to select 
the best strategy in order to maximize the chances of this policies being accepted by the majority 






b) Positive models: economy and public safety 
 
Diagrams 3 and 7 show the results from the models with positive retrospective / 
prospective evaluations.
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 In both models, the contemporaneous outcome variable is spending 
on the economy and public safety respectively. We can clearly see that spending on economic 
issues generates more feedback than spending on public safety issues. In the economic model, 
the public’s attentiveness to economic problems (measured in the MIP question) has a 
contemporaneous effect of one percentage point on economic spending and accounts for 40% of 
the forecast variance in spending. This contrasts with the high rate of decay in the explained 
variance of economic spending on itself. After one year, shocks to spending account for 58% of 
itself, but by year six, it accounts only for 23% (see diagram 3). MIP-economy explains 42% to 
40% from period two to six. The effect of MIP-economy is significantly high and constant for 
the entire forecast horizon. While I did not included policy preferences in the models, this seems 
to go along with Jones’ findings that attention to issues can matter in explaining spending. 
The impact of MIP-economy on economic spending seems to suggest that when the 
president works on his budget allocation, the public’s attention on economic issues may be taken 
into account. It is important to show that out of the three macroeconomic variables, only 
unemployment has a positive effect on MIP-economy. One percentage point increase in the 
unemployment rate, generates an immediate eight percentage point increase in the perception the 
economy is the most important problem.  
In terms of other variables, spending on the economy shows a feedback cycle with 
personal retrospective and prospective perceptions. With retrospective, the relation is only at the 
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Granger causality level. Prospective evaluations do not only Granger-cause spending but also 
shock it. Surges in the expectation that the future personal situation will be better tend to reduce 
spending on the economy by two percentage points. Conversely, surges in spending improve 
positive retrospective and prospective opinions by one percentage point. Interestingly enough, 
neither of these variables explains any portion of the forecast error in economic spending. In 
terms of the influence of the macroeconomic variables, prospective evaluations are impacted 
only by shocks to inflation while retrospective perceptions are influenced by inflation and 
economic growth (changes in GDP percapita). 
The above findings contrast with the model for spending on public safety. Diagram 7 
shows that variations on this type spending depend mostly on itself. Surges on it explain 78% to 
75% of the variance during the entire forecast period. The only opinion variable that matter for 
this type of spending is positive retrospective personal evaluations. Surges in the perception that 
the individual feels better today than last year reduces spending on public safety by a marginal 
0.3 percentage points. This effect is not only contemporaneous but also is significant five periods 
ahead. Interestingly enough, MIP-public safety does not have an impact in this model (which 
controls for only positive opinions). In this case, attentiveness does not seem to matter but rather 
personal experiences and the increase probability of being the victim of a crime (see figure 11). 
Unlike economic spending, shocks to spending on public safety issues do not have any impact on 
opinion variables. 
 








c) Negative models: economy and public safety 
 
Diagrams 4 and 8 show the models with negative opinions (‘worse’) and presidential 
disapproval. In this scenario, the number of feedback effects goes down to one for economic 
spending and still non-existent in the public safety model.  
The only opinion variable that shows feedback with spending on the economy is 
prospective evaluations. Shocks to spending reduce the negative perception that the future 
personal situation will be worse by 2 percentage points. Conversely, shocks to negative 
prospective evaluations tend to increase spending by one percentage point (see diagram 4).  
In the economic model, spending tends to depend more on itself while the effect of MIP-
economy is limited to a Granger effect. Comparing these results with those observed in the 
positive model, it does seem to suggest that the president pays more attention to positive 
opinions than to negative ones.  
The same conclusion does not seem to apply to the public safety models. While there is 
still not much activity going on, MIP-public safety is not significant in the Granger effect on 
spending and prospective negative evaluations have a small but significant impact on spending 
(see diagram 8). This seems to suggest that on issues related to crime and violence the president 
is paying more attention to negative opinions.  
 








d) The impact of macroeconomic variables 
 
Approval/disapproval, MIP, personal situation (better/worse) and future expectations 
(better/worse) do respond to changes in the economy. Shocks to any of the macroeconomic 
variables included in the models have an immediate effect (positive or negative) on the opinion 
variables. In this sense, these variables tend to react to the dynamics of the economic activity and 
therefore are of public policy interest (see Dolan and Peasgood 2008:25).
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While all three macroeconomic variables affect the opinion variables, unemployment 
show the highest contemporaneous effects (see tables 6 to 8). In the economic models, a shock to 
unemployment rate causes a contemporaneous drop of about 4 percentage points (pp) in 
presidential approval and/or an increase of about the same amount in presidential disapproval. 
Having public safety spending as contemporaneous dependent variables the influence is similar 
but one year ahead, approval goes down by about 3 percentage points while disapproval goes up 
by a little over 4 percentage points.  
In terms of MIP, shocks to unemployment have a positive effect on the perception that 
economic issues are the most important problem with the obvious reduction in the perception 
that public safety issues are MIP. In the economic context, surges in unemployment cause an 
immediate increase of 6 percentage points in the perception that the economy is the most 
important problem in the positive model. MIP economy is showing that the public is attentive to 
what is going on in the country and that unemployment may be one of the most pressing 
problems in the mind of the public. 
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In terms of the perception about personal situation, the cumulative dynamic multipliers in 
table 8 show a more compelling story. Shocks to unemployment have a higher effect on negative 
retrospective evaluations than on positive evaluations on both contexts (economic and public 
safety). The contemporaneous effect is an increase of 7.9 pp (economic) and 7.79 pp (public 
safety) on the perception that the personal situation of the individual is worse than the previous 
year. Three years later this goes down to 5.52 pp/5.9 pp respectively; and six years later 5.6/6.3 
pp. Retrospective evaluations are strongly connected to the dynamics of unemployment but it 
seems to be stronger on the negative side. Interestingly enough, unemployment does not seem to 
have any cumulative impact on prospective evaluations (see table 8). 
Surges in GDP percapita (or economic growth) do have an expected effect on 
retrospective and prospective evaluations on both, economic and public safety contexts: if 
increase then positive perceptions go up and negative go down (see table 6). The same with 
shocks to inflation, which influences all opinion variables in the expected direction and the 
effects last for the entire forecast horizon (see table 7). However, the impact of GDP percapita 
and inflation on opinion variables and spending is small. 
In sum, economic spending seems to respond contemporaneously to public opinion but 
only two variables have a lasting effect: the economy as MIP and positive prospective 
evaluations. In turn, the opinion variables respond to changes in unemployment with some 
consistent responses to economic growth and inflation. In the models with spending on public 
safety, on the positive side retrospective evaluations seem to matter while on the negative side 







e) Face-to-face/phone models with positive feedback 
 
 
Research in the United States suggests that policymakers response to the public demands 
has been unequal among different socioeconomic groups (Jacobs and Page 2005; Bartels, 2008; 
Gilens 2012) but others have argued that because of the different levels of attention and the 
parallel changes in opinion across groups, socioeconomic status does not make a difference in 
terms of the overall government responsiveness to public opinion (Soroka and Welzien 2010). 
Gilens argued that while the most affluent are in a better position to set or influence policy, 
responsiveness relies on a set of circumstances related to party control of government and how 
far/close is the next election. In this sense, responsiveness is a product of a combination of 
institutional arrangements.  
The data available in this paper does not directly measure the impact of socioeconomic 
status in government responsiveness but it may provide some glimpse on the degree of 
responsiveness. The VAR models can create two scenarios using presidential approval from 
face-to-face and phone polls: one for the general public, which tends to be mostly low income 
and low levels of education (represented in the face-to-face polls) and another one for a sector of 
the population with higher levels of socioeconomic status represented in phone polls.  
Diagrams 5, 6, 9 and 10 summarize the VAR post-estimation results. Tables 1 to 8 show 
the Granger-tests, COIRF, FEVD AND CDM for models were presidential spending is the 
impulse and opinion variables are the responses and vice-versa. These models focus only on the 





A visual comparison of diagrams 5/6 (economic context) and 9/10 (public safety model) 
show some subtle differences between field and phone models. These differences in the feedback 
cycles are more noticeable in the economic context (see diagrams 5/6) that in the public safety 
models (diagrams 9/10). This indicates that public safety is an issue that is everybody’s concern 
regardless of his or her socioeconomic status.  
It is in the economic context where we can see more differences between field and phone 
polls. Similar to the positive/negative models, the economic model with approval from face-to-
face (field) shows one more feedback cycles than the model with approval from phone polls
157
. 
In the field model, we have three cycles: spending with approval, retrospective and prospective 
evaluations. In the phone model, there are only two: spending with retrospective and prospective 
evaluations. The main difference, while subtle, lies in the influence of retrospective and 
prospective evaluations. In the field model prospective perceptions account for some variance in 
spending (see diagram 5) and retrospective not only Grange-causes spending but also shocks to it. 
In the phone models, the influence of these variables is more limited (see diagram 6).  
The Granger causality tests show that all opinion variables in the economic face-to-face 
model are predictors of presidential economic spending (previous values of opinion predict 
current values of spending, see table 1). In the economic phone model, the only variable not 
predicting economic spending is presidential approval. In the public safety model, none of the 
opinion variables predicts spending on public safety and spending on this issue does not seem to 
predict any of the opinion variables. 
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What does all this mean?  It means that socioeconomic status does not play a role on 
spending on public safety issues. Crime and violence has affected the whole population 
regardless its socioeconomic status. In terms of economic spending, it seems that the influence 
from the general population is slightly higher than from the well off.  Context here may help to 
understand these results. The sample of four presidents is divided into two from the PRI (the 
ruling party until 2000) and two from the PAN (conservative party governing during 2000-2012). 
The main political support of PRI is among low-income people (which are represented within the 
party through several interest groups and popular organizations); for the PAN, its political 
support comes mostly from the well off. What the models may be capturing is the dynamic in 
which the PRI heavily caters to the poor during and in between elections (for example, President 
Salinas’ Solidarity program aimed to helping the poor) while the PAN focused more on making 
the government more efficient and fiscal responsible which are mostly demands from the upper 
income levels of the population. As more data becomes available, this may be re-tested to 




The results presented here suggest that feedback cycles exist between the presidents’ 
spending activity and public opinion. These cycles are, however, not homogenous and policy 
response vary across issues.  
This paper explores the nature of the relationship between spending on economic and 
public safety issues and public opinion (controlling by the effect of macroeconomic variables). I 





seem to be influencing spending on the economy: most important problem (MIP) and 
prospective personal evaluations of personal well-being. When positive prospective evaluations 
go up the proportion of spending dedicated to the economy goes down by a maximum of two 
percentage points; when negative prospective evaluations go up spending goes up by a maximum 
of one percentage point.  
In the case of the perception that the economy is the most important problem (MIP-
economy), shocks to it have an immediate effect on spending by one percentage point. The 
relevance of this variable, however, is that it explains up to 42% of the forecast variance in 
economic spending. This seems to suggest that when the president allocates federal funds, public 
attentiveness to economic problems may have some influence.  
In the case of public safety, negative opinions seem to be more relevant. In this case, 
perceptions that public safety is the most important problem (MIP-public safety) Granger cause 
spending, while prospective evaluations of personal well-being have a negative impact. The 
overall conclusion is that economic spending tends to be more sensitive to changes in positive 
opinions while spending on public safety tends to respond more broadly to negative perceptions.  
Socioeconomic status does not seem to have an influence on spending on public safety 
but it does seem to have it on economic spending. In the latter, the response seems to be slightly 
more towards the general population than to the rich. 
Why there are more feedback cycles in the economic than in the public safety context? A 
possible answer could be related to the asymmetry in opinions based on differences in 
socioeconomic status (similar to Enns, Kellstedt and McAvoy 2012). Individuals from different 





case of public safety, there is less feedback because there may be less disagreement among social 
groups. Crime and violence has affected all at the same level and the signal from the public is 
one and only: they want to feel safe regardless of their socioeconomic status, and this is 
something that cannot be debated, it needs to be resolved. Jones’ valence approach may also 
explain why there are no cycles between opinion and spending on public safety. In this case, 
everybody agrees that crime and violence is a major issue. 
A major departure from the opinion-policy research in the United States is the use of 
opinion regarding the personal well-being instead of policy preference variables to assess the 
relationship between policy and opinion. These perceptions assess the current and future 
conditions of the public and their evaluation of presidential performance (retrospective, 
prospective, MIP and presidential approval). Here I argued that these variables are of policy 
value, at least in Mexico, as long as they respond to changes in macroeconomic conditions. This 
is that shocks to macro variables have some significant effect on the opinion variables. The 
models show that these variables indeed respond to changes in macroeconomic conditions (in 
particular, to unemployment), which suggest that their variations are not entirely random or 
myopic. The fact that these variables respond to shocks to leading economic indicators make 
them of certain policy value in which their variations represent reactions to positive or negative 
macroeconomic conditions. In this sense, retrospective or prospective evaluations may evaluate 
the effect of policy outcomes and tend to be more consistent since they do not require expert 
knowledge (although prospective evaluation may be influenced by experts’ forecasts).158 The 
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results showing that spending on economic or public safety issues responding to changes in 
opinion, do suggest that presidents pay some consideration to the policy consequences of their 
decisions and in, defining economic or public safety spending, public opinion play a role.  
In this paper, I also tested the scenario between positive and negative opinions. Results 
are different to what Soroka and Wlezien (2010) found, because presidential spending seems to 
respond to both positive and negative feedback; the effects, however, are slightly higher in the 
positive context. In the positive models, there are more feedback cycles and opinions tend to 
have more substantive effect on spending. In fact, the Granger-causality tests suggest that all 
opinion variables in the positive model have some predictive power over current levels of 
economic spending, while only the perception that the economy or public safety are MIP predict 
current spending in the negative models (table 1). 
Overall, the findings presented here show a connection between policymaking and public 
opinion. This suggests some responsiveness towards public opinion. Regardless of their own 
personal agendas, presidents have worked to improve the conditions of the citizens and 
responded to their perceptions of the general situation of the country. The fact that most of the 
population is still poor, and combined with the fact that polling is here to stay (along with the 
new impact of social media) it has forced politicians to be responsive to the needs and wants of 
the public. As long as the public remains connected to their economic reality and pay attention to 
their immediate environment, any attempt of manipulation will not last long. The Mexican public 
                                                                                                                                                             
other than their own individual experiences. This is the same problem for studies looking at policy preferences. It is 
clear that in the aggregate the public show stable, rational and consistent opinion overtime, but the question remains 
as to whether that rational preference is the product of a collective and independent ‘calculation’ of how much has to 
be spend on items A or B, or is the product of the flow information coming from sources that may or may not bypass 






is wise and, repeatedly in electoral processes, it has demonstrated strong and reasonable political 
culture. Mexican politicians are catching up with the public and this is a good thing. However, as 
democracy consolidates in Mexico, it may be possible to see the nature of responsiveness 
changing as the influence of the traditional political elites disappear and other forms of influence 






































Diagram 3.  
 
 Granger = Granger-causality 
 COIRF = Cumulative Orthogonal impulse-response function 
 FEVD = Forecast-error variance decomposition 
 CDM = Cumulative Dynamic Multiplier (apply only to macroeconomic variables) 
 Solid lines with a parenthesis indicate Granger-causality and impulse-response effect. 
 Dash lines only indicate impulse-response (including dynamic multipliers) 
 Characters within parenthesis next to arrow refer to the impulse-response effect, FEVD and DM::  
o If an “*” then Granger-causality significant at 10% (otherwise 5%) 
o Numbers before forward slash indicate the duration of the cumulative effect 
o Number with letter “p” indicates the maximum cumulative percentage point change due to innovations.  
o Numbers in brackets refer to the FEVD effect, if present indicates: 
 Numbers before forward slash show the duration, in time periods, of the effect 
 Numbers after the forward slash show the explained variance from beginning to end of the duration 
 
NOTE: Showing only the relationship between spending and the rest of the variables at 95% significance 
 
Example: MIP economy influencing spending,  reads as follows: 
o Bold arrow indicates that previous values of MIP economy  Granger-cause current values of spending 
o 0 = Shocks to MIP have a contemporaneus effect on spending (COIRF at time 0) 
o 1p = The maximun COIRF, in this case only at time 0, is an increase of 1 percentage point 
o [2-6] = The FEVD effect lasts from year 2 to 6 of the forecast horizon. 





Diagram 4.  
 
 Granger = Granger-causality 
 COIRF = Cumulative Orthogonal impulse-response function 
 FEVD = Forecast-error variance decomposition 
 CDM = Cumulative Dynamic Multiplier (apply only to macroeconomic variables) 
 Solid lines with a parenthesis indicate Granger-causality and impulse-response effect. 
 Dash lines only indicate impulse-response (including dynamic multipliers) 
 Characters within parenthesis next to arrow refer to the impulse-response effect, FEVD and DM::  
o If an “*” then Granger-causality significant at 10% (otherwise 5%) 
o Numbers before forward slash indicate the duration of the cumulative effect 
o Number with letter “p” indicates the maximum cumulative percentage point change due to innovations.  
o Numbers in brackets refer to the FEVD effect, if present indicates: 
 Numbers before forward slash show the duration, in time periods, of the effect 
 Numbers after the forward slash show the explained variance from beginning to end of the duration 
 
NOTE: Showing only the relationship between spending and the rest of the variables at 95% significance 





Diagram 5.  
 
 Granger = Granger-causality 
 COIRF = Cumulative Orthogonal impulse-response function 
 FEVD = Forecast-error variance decomposition 
 CDM = Cumulative Dynamic Multiplier (apply only to macroeconomic variables) 
 Solid lines with a parenthesis indicate Granger-causality and impulse-response effect. 
 Dash lines only indicate impulse-response (including dynamic multipliers) 
 Characters within parenthesis next to arrow refer to the impulse-response effect, FEVD and DM::  
o If an “*” then Granger-causality significant at 10% (otherwise 5%) 
o Numbers before forward slash indicate the duration of the cumulative effect 
o Number with letter “p” indicates the maximum cumulative percentage point change due to innovations.  
o Numbers in brackets refer to the FEVD effect, if present indicates: 
 Numbers before forward slash show the duration, in time periods, of the effect 
 Numbers after the forward slash show the explained variance from beginning to end of the duration 
 
NOTE: Showing only the relationship between spending and the rest of the variables at 95% significance 





Diagram 6.  
 
 Granger = Granger-causality 
 COIRF = Cumulative Orthogonal impulse-response function 
 FEVD = Forecast-error variance decomposition 
 CDM = Cumulative Dynamic Multiplier (apply only to macroeconomic variables) 
 Solid lines with a parenthesis indicate Granger-causality and impulse-response effect. 
 Dash lines only indicate impulse-response (including dynamic multipliers) 
 Characters within parenthesis next to arrow refer to the impulse-response effect, FEVD and DM::  
o If an “*” then Granger-causality significant at 10% (otherwise 5%) 
o Numbers before forward slash indicate the duration of the cumulative effect 
o Number with letter “p” indicates the maximum cumulative percentage point change due to innovations.  
o Numbers in brackets refer to the FEVD effect, if present indicates: 
 Numbers before forward slash show the duration, in time periods, of the effect 
 Numbers after the forward slash show the explained variance from beginning to end of the duration 
 
NOTE: Showing only the relationship between spending and the rest of the variables at 95% significance 





Diagram 7.  
 
 Granger = Granger-causality 
 COIRF = Cumulative Orthogonal impulse-response function 
 FEVD = Forecast-error variance decomposition 
 CDM = Cumulative Dynamic Multiplier (apply only to macroeconomic variables) 
 Solid lines with a parenthesis indicate Granger-causality and impulse-response effect. 
 Dash lines only indicate impulse-response (including dynamic multipliers) 
 Characters within parenthesis next to arrow refer to the impulse-response effect, FEVD and DM::  
o If an “*” then Granger-causality significant at 10% (otherwise 5%) 
o Numbers before forward slash indicate the duration of the cumulative effect 
o Number with letter “p” indicates the maximum cumulative percentage point change due to innovations.  
o Numbers in brackets refer to the FEVD effect, if present indicates: 
 Numbers before forward slash show the duration, in time periods, of the effect 
 Numbers after the forward slash show the explained variance from beginning to end of the duration 
 
NOTE: Showing only the relationship between spending and the rest of the variables at 95% significance 
 






Diagram 8.  
 
 Granger = Granger-causality 
 COIRF = Cumulative Orthogonal impulse-response function 
 FEVD = Forecast-error variance decomposition 
 CDM = Cumulative Dynamic Multiplier (apply only to macroeconomic variables) 
 Solid lines with a parenthesis indicate Granger-causality and impulse-response effect. 
 Dash lines only indicate impulse-response (including dynamic multipliers) 
 Characters within parenthesis next to arrow refer to the impulse-response effect, FEVD and DM::  
o If an “*” then Granger-causality significant at 10% (otherwise 5%) 
o Numbers before forward slash indicate the duration of the cumulative effect 
o Number with letter “p” indicates the maximum cumulative percentage point change due to innovations.  
o Numbers in brackets refer to the FEVD effect, if present indicates: 
 Numbers before forward slash show the duration, in time periods, of the effect 
 Numbers after the forward slash show the explained variance from beginning to end of the duration 
 
NOTE: Showing only the relationship between spending and the rest of the variables at 95% significance 
 






Diagram 9.  
 
 Granger = Granger-causality 
 COIRF = Cumulative Orthogonal impulse-response function 
 FEVD = Forecast-error variance decomposition 
 CDM = Cumulative Dynamic Multiplier (apply only to macroeconomic variables) 
 Solid lines with a parenthesis indicate Granger-causality and impulse-response effect. 
 Dash lines only indicate impulse-response (including dynamic multipliers) 
 Characters within parenthesis next to arrow refer to the impulse-response effect, FEVD and DM::  
o If an “*” then Granger-causality significant at 10% (otherwise 5%) 
o Numbers before forward slash indicate the duration of the cumulative effect 
o Number with letter “p” indicates the maximum cumulative percentage point change due to innovations.  
o Numbers in brackets refer to the FEVD effect, if present indicates: 
 Numbers before forward slash show the duration, in time periods, of the effect 
 Numbers after the forward slash show the explained variance from beginning to end of the duration 
 
NOTE: Showing only the relationship between spending and the rest of the variables at 95% significance 
 






Diagram 10.  
 
 Granger = Granger-causality 
 COIRF = Cumulative Orthogonal impulse-response function 
 FEVD = Forecast-error variance decomposition 
 CDM = Cumulative Dynamic Multiplier (apply only to macroeconomic variables) 
 Solid lines with a parenthesis indicate Granger-causality and impulse-response effect. 
 Dash lines only indicate impulse-response (including dynamic multipliers) 
 Characters within parenthesis next to arrow refer to the impulse-response effect, FEVD and DM::  
o If an “*” then Granger-causality significant at 10% (otherwise 5%) 
o Numbers before forward slash indicate the duration of the cumulative effect 
o Number with letter “p” indicates the maximum cumulative percentage point change due to innovations.  
o Numbers in brackets refer to the FEVD effect, if present indicates: 
 Numbers before forward slash show the duration, in time periods, of the effect 
 Numbers after the forward slash show the explained variance from beginning to end of the duration 
 
NOTE: Showing only the relationship between spending and the rest of the variables at 95% significance 
 





















Table 1. Granger Causality tests (p-values). 1989-2011 
  
 
Dependent variable in regression 





      Economy (positive) 
     Personal situation (better) 
    
0.00 
MIP Economy 0.03 
   
0.00 
Future expectations (better) 
    
0.00 
Presidential approval 0.02 0.03 
  
0.09 
Economic spending 0.00   0.02 0.07   
Economy (negative) 
     Personal situation (worse) 





Future expectations (worse) 0.01 
    Presidential disapproval 
 
0.10 0.10 
  Economic spending     0.02     
Economy (positive/field) 
     Personal situation (better) 
    
0.00 
MIP Economy 0.03 
   
0.00 
Future expectations (better) 
    
0.00 
Presidential approval 0.06 0.01 
  
0.00 
Economic spending 0.01   0.04 0.07   
Economy (positive/phone) 
     Personal situation (better) 
    
0.00 
MIP Economy 0.08 
  
0.00 0.00 
Future expectations (better) 
   
0.03 0.00 
Presidential approval 0.04 
    Economic spending 0.01   0.02 0.09   
Public Safety (positive) 
     Personal situation (better) 
     MIP Public Safety 0.00 
    Future expectations (better) 
     Presidential approval 0.04 
    Public safety spending           
Public Safety (negative) 
     Personal situation (worse) 





Future expectations (worse) 0.01 0.10 
   Presidential disapproval 
     Public safety spending           
Public Safety (positive/field) 
     Personal situation (better) 
     MIP Public Safety 0.00 
    Future expectations (better) 
     Presidential approval 0.02 
    Public safety spending           
Public Safety (positive/phone) 
     Personal situation (better) 
     MIP Public Safety 0.00 
    Future expectations (better) 
   
0.04 
 Presidential approval 
     Public safety spending 
      





Table 2. Cumulative Orthogonal Impulse-response. Spending as response (1989-2011) 
  
Innovation (a percentage point increase) in: 
Spending response (% point 













































































0 -0.95 0.53 -0.46 0.47 1.13 
1 
 







































-1.51 0.36 1.28 
3 0.67 
 
-1.57 0.33 1.18 
4 0.58 
 
-1.46 0.32 1.22 
5 0.60 
 
-1.52 0.32 1.22 
6 0.61 
 
-1.51 0.32 1.22 
Positive (public safety) 
0 -0.26 
   
0.54 
1 -0.26 0.21 
  
0.25 
2 -0.25 0.16 
  
0.44 
3 -0.26 0.21 
  
0.32 
4 -0.26 0.18 
  
0.39 
5 -0.26 0.20 
  
0.35 
6 -0.26 0.18 
  
0.38 





























6 -0.13 0.18 0.27 
 
0.35 
Positive/field (public safety) 
0 -0.26 
   
0.54 
1 -0.26 0.20 
  
0.24 
2 -0.25 0.16 
  
0.43 
3 -0.27 0.21 
  
0.32 
4 -0.26 0.18 
  
0.39 
5 -0.26 0.20 
  
0.34 
6 -0.26 0.18 
  
0.37 
Positive/phone (public safety) 
0 -0.26 
   
0.54 
1 -0.25 0.21 
  
0.25 
2 -0.25 0.17 
  
0.44 
3 -0.26 0.21 
  
0.32 
4 -0.25 0.18 
  
0.39 
5 -0.26 0.20 
  
0.35 
6 -0.25 0.19 
  
0.38 
NOTE: 95% significance in bold-italic. * Also, showing values significant at 68% (as suggested by Sims 1980). 
Example: Column ‘Future Expectations’, -1.95 indicates that surges of one percent in positive expectations decrease spending on economic 





Table 3. Cumulative Orthogonal Impulse-response. Spending as impulse (1989-2011) 
 
  

































        
1 1.11 
 
0.76 1.03 0.78 
 
0.86 0.60 
2 1.09 -0.97 0.80 0.87 0.75 
 
0.87 0.58 
3 0.96 -0.72 0.83 0.76 0.85 
 
0.88 0.71 
4 0.90 -0.74 0.78 0.79 0.83 
 
0.92 0.65 
5 0.90 -0.70 0.76 0.79 0.85 
 
0.90 0.70 







        
1 




     
3 
















        
1 1.15 -1.96 0.75 1.15 
    
2 1.07 -1.91 0.74 0.88 
    
3 1.13 -1.75 0.90 0.89 
    
4 0.97 -1.65 0.81 0.84 
    
5 1.00 -1.71 0.83 0.87 
    
6 1.00 -1.72 0.80 0.87 




        
1 -0.69 
 







































0 1.60 2.44 1.13 1.69 0.54 0.52 0.54 0.54 
1 1.21 2.21 0.98 1.10 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.25 
2 1.42 2.50 1.22 1.28 0.44 0.40 0.43 0.44 
3 1.18 2.24 1.05 1.18 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 
4 1.25 2.31 1.08 1.22 0.39 0.36 0.39 0.39 
5 1.24 2.30 1.05 1.22 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.35 
6 1.26 2.32 1.06 1.22 0.38 0.35 0.37 0.38 
NOTE: 95% significance in bold-italic. * Also, showing values significant at 68% (as suggested by Sims 1980). 
Example: Column ‘Positive (economy), 1.11 indicates that surges of one percent in economic spending increase 1.11 percentage points the 





Table 4. Forecast-Error Variance Decomposition. Spending as response (1989-2011) 
  
Innovation (a percentage point increase) in: 
% variance explained in 




























4 13% 40% 20% 
 
23% 
5 13% 40% 20% 4% 23% 





     
1 





























     
1 31% 
   
44% 
2 10% 42% 24% 13% 11% 
3 10% 41% 24% 14% 11% 
4 11% 39% 25% 14% 11% 
5 11% 39% 25% 14% 10% 
6 11% 39% 25% 14% 10% 
Positive/phone (economy) 
0 































Positive (public safety) 
0 
     
1 18% 
   
78% 
2 13% 
   
75% 
3 12% 
   
75% 
4 12% 
   
75% 
5 12% 
   
75% 
6 12% 
   
75% 
Negative (public safety) 
0 































Positive/field (public safety) 
0 
     
1 17% 
   
77% 
2 13% 
   
74% 
3 12% 
   
74% 
4 11% 
   
74% 
5 11% 
   
74% 
6 11% 
   
74% 
Positive/phone (public safety) 
0 
     
1 17% 
   
78% 
2 13% 
   
75% 
3 12% 
   
75% 
4 11% 
   
75% 
5 11% 
   
75% 
6 11% 
   
75% 
NOTE: 95% significance in bold-italic. * Significant at 68% (as suggested by Sims 1980). Example: Column ‘MIP’, 42% indicates that surges of one percent in the 
perceptions that the economy is MIP explains 42% of the forecasted variance of economic spending at time 2. The mode l ‘Positive (economy)’ refers to the model 





Table 5. Forecast-Error Variance Decomposition. Spending as impulse (1989-2011) 
 
  





























     
  




        
1 


























        
1 
        
2 
        
3 
        
4 
        
5 
        
6 




        
1 
        
2 6% 10% 2% 6% 
    
3 5% 9% 2% 5% 
    
4 5% 9% 2% 5% 
    
5 5% 9% 2% 5% 
    
6 5% 9% 2% 5% 




        
1 
        
2 






















        
1 58% 80% 44% 56% 78% 77% 77% 78% 
2 23% 52% 11% 26% 75% 71% 74% 75% 
3 23% 51% 11% 26% 75% 67% 74% 75% 
4 23% 51% 11% 26% 75% 64% 74% 75% 
5 23% 50% 10% 26% 75% 63% 74% 75% 
6 23% 50% 10% 26% 75% 63% 74% 75% 
 
* Showing values significant at 68% (as suggested by Sims 1980) 
NOTE: 95% significance in bold-italic. 
Example: Column ‘Positive (public safety), 78% indicates that surges of one percent on spending on public safety issues explains 78%% of the 
forecasted variance of spending on public safety at time 1. The model ‘Positive (public safety)’ refers to the model where spending is on public 





Table 6. Cumulative Dynamic Multipliers. GDP percapita as impulse (1989-2011) 
 
  
Innovation (a percentage point increase) in GDP percapita in: 
Response 
(percentage point 



























    







0 0.38 0.17 0.34 0.43 
    1 0.72 0.27 0.62 0.62 
    2 0.68 
 
0.65 0.53 
    3 0.67 
 
0.71 0.52 
    4 0.63 
 
0.68 0.52 
    5 0.65 0.20 0.68 0.53 









































    1 
  
-0.88   
    2 
  
-0.85   
    3 
  
-0.72   
    4 
  
-0.72   
    5 
  
-0.69   
    6     -0.70           
Personal situation 
(better / worse) 
0 0.85 
 
0.86 0.88 0.60 
 
0.55 0.70 
1 1.19 -0.43 0.97 1.31 0.69 -0.39 0.50 0.80 
2 1.43 -0.35 1.17 1.47 0.68 
 
0.49 0.82 
3 1.41 -0.34 1.21 1.38 0.70 
 
0.50 0.82 
4 1.36 -0.32 1.23 1.36 0.69 
 
0.50 0.82 
5 1.35 -0.34 1.22 1.37 0.70 
 
0.50 0.82 
6 1.35 -0.33 1.21 1.37 0.70   0.50 0.82 
Future expectations 




















  3 0.65 -0.95 0.40 0.67 
 
-0.66 
  4 0.63 -0.96 0.44 0.65 
 
-0.67 
  5 0.60 -0.98 0.43 0.65 
 
-0.67 
  6 0.61 -0.98 0.43 0.66 
 
-0.67 
   
* Showing values significant at 68% (as suggested by Sims 1980) 
NOTE: 95% significance in bold-italic. 
Example: Column ‘Positive/field (economy), 0.86 indicates that surges of one percentage point in GDP percapita increases 0.86 percentage 





Table 7. Cumulative Dynamic Multipliers. Inflation as impulse (1989-2011) 
 
  
Innovation (a percentage point increase) in Inflation in: 
Response 
(percentage point 



























    







0 -0.13 -0.15 -0.17 
 




      
2 -0.12 -0.18 -0.18 -0.11 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
3 -0.14 -0.21 -0.19 -0.11 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
4 -0.14 -0.20 -0.19 -0.10 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
5 -0.13 -0.20 -0.19 -0.10 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 




0 -0.62 0.57 -0.43 -0.79 -0.70 0.57 -0.55 -0.82 
1 -0.66 0.62 -0.44 -0.80 -0.58 0.45 -0.49 -0.66 
2 -0.62 0.57 -0.45 -0.65 -0.67 0.57 -0.61 -0.72 
3 -0.60 0.58 -0.44 -0.64 -0.60 0.47 -0.52 -0.67 
4 -0.60 0.58 -0.43 -0.67 -0.65 0.53 -0.58 -0.70 
5 -0.60 0.59 -0.43 -0.67 -0.61 0.50 -0.54 -0.68 







      
1 0.35 0.50 
 
0.45 
    
2 0.35 0.58 
 
0.48 
    
3 0.34 0.55 
 
0.44 
    
4 0.31 0.54 
 
0.43 
    
5 0.32 0.54 
 
0.44 
    
6 0.32 0.54 
 
0.44 
    
Personal situation 
(better / worse) 
0 -0.76 0.99 -0.67 -0.74 -0.75 0.95 -0.73 -0.70 
1 -0.60 0.90 -0.66 -0.51 -0.50 0.78 -0.52 -0.48 
2 -0.62 0.89 -0.67 -0.59 -0.56 0.74 -0.57 -0.53 
3 -0.66 0.92 -0.69 -0.65 -0.54 0.79 -0.55 -0.53 
4 -0.68 0.93 -0.69 -0.65 -0.55 0.75 -0.56 -0.52 
5 -0.68 0.92 -0.69 -0.64 -0.55 0.78 -0.55 -0.53 
6 -0.67 0.92 -0.69 -0.64 -0.55 0.76 -0.56 -0.53 
Future expectations 
(better / worse) 
0 -0.63 0.78 -0.53 -0.65 -0.44 0.70 -0.38 -0.49 
1 -0.52 0.62 -0.53 -0.41 -0.29 0.34 -0.27 -0.30 
2 -0.47 0.67 -0.52 -0.44 -0.35 0.42 -0.33 -0.36 
3 -0.52 0.72 -0.54 -0.50 -0.32 0.39 -0.29 -0.33 
4 -0.53 0.72 -0.54 -0.50 -0.34 0.43 -0.32 -0.35 
5 -0.53 0.71 -0.54 -0.49 -0.33 0.41 -0.30 -0.34 
6 -0.53 0.71 -0.54 -0.49 -0.34 0.41 -0.31 -0.35 
 
* Showing values significant at 68% (as suggested by Sims 1980) 
NOTE: 95% significance in bold-italic. 
Example: Column ‘Negative (economy), 0.57 indicates that surges of one percentage point in inflation increases 0.57 percentage points 





Table 8. Cumulative Dynamic Multipliers. Unemployment as impulse (1989-2011) 
 
  
Innovation (a percentage point increase) in Unemployment in: 
Response 
(percentage point 



























    








   
  0.80 0.90 0.80 0.82 
1 
   
-1.58 0.27 0.36 0.27 0.28 
2 -1.24 
  
-1.77 0.59 0.51 0.60 0.59 
3 -1.33 
  
-1.67 0.38 0.49 0.37 0.39 
4 -1.19 
  
-1.59 0.52 0.48 0.52 0.52 
5 -1.14 
  
-1.61 0.42 0.50 0.42 0.43 




0 -3.88 3.69 -3.80 -3.80 -2.17 1.94 
 
-2.51 
1 -3.29 3.45 -4.67   -3.23 4.30 -4.18 -2.13 
2 -2.49 2.76 -4.60   -2.37 3.01 -3.30 
 3 -2.43 3.08 -4.45   -2.88 3.71 -3.97 
 4 -2.55 3.08 -4.35   -2.56 3.51 -3.55 
 5 -2.62 3.12 -4.32   -2.77 3.54 -3.84 




0 6.14 4.22 4.90 5.74 -3.66 -2.98 -3.66 -3.64 
1 8.18 5.74 6.54 7.30 -3.02 -3.82 -3.07 -3.00 
2 7.88 6.37 6.98 6.97 -3.68 -4.11 -3.73 -3.74 
3 7.22 5.64 6.74 6.54 -3.40 -4.07 -3.39 -3.46 
4 7.13 5.81 6.62 6.63 -3.61 -4.03 -3.63 -3.67 
5 7.21 5.75 6.53 6.69 -3.49 -4.06 -3.49 -3.56 
6 7.27 5.84 6.53 6.69 -3.57 -4.05 -3.58 -3.63 
Personal situation 
(better / worse) 
0 
 










5.67 -1.65 -1.79 -1.52 6.88 -1.83 -1.64 
3 -1.91 5.52 -1.94 -2.09 -1.72 5.90 -2.16 -1.87 
4 -1.87 5.75 -2.05 -1.85 -1.68 6.48 -2.01 -1.84 
5 -1.73 5.56 -2.07 -1.78 -1.71 6.14 -2.10 -1.85 
6 -1.69 5.60 -2.06 -1.81 -1.71 6.30 -2.05 -1.86 
Future expectations 
(better / worse) 
0 
   
  
    1 
   
  
    2 
   
  
    3 
   
  
    4 
   
  
    5 
   
  
    6 
   
  
     
* Showing values significant at 68% (as suggested by Sims 1980) 
NOTE: 95% significance in bold-italic. 
Example: Column ‘Negative (economy), 7.94 indicates that surges of one percentage point in unemployment increases 7.94 percentage points 







































 Horizontal solid-bold lines represent the percentage of votes obtained in the presidential 
election 
 Horizontal dotted lines represent the percentage of votes obtained by the president’s party 












































































Appendix 1. Economy/Positive model 





   Lagrange-multiplier test 
  +--------------------------------------+ 
  | lag  |      chi2    df   Prob > chi2 | 
  |------+-------------------------------| 
  |   1  |   29.2231    25     0.25470   | 
  |   2  |   22.7395    25     0.59277   | 
  +--------------------------------------+ 




   Eigenvalue stability condition 
  +----------------------------------------+ 
  |        Eigenvalue        |   Modulus   | 
  |--------------------------+-------------| 
  |   .1738346 +  .4341955i  |   .467701   | 
  |   .1738346 -  .4341955i  |   .467701   | 
  |   -.433186 +  .1434671i  |   .456325   | 
  |   -.433186 -  .1434671i  |   .456325   | 
  |  .06183046               |    .06183   | 
  +----------------------------------------+ 
   All the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle. VAR satisfies stability condition. 
 
Appendix 2. Economy/Negative model 
 





   Lagrange-multiplier test 
  +--------------------------------------+ 
  | lag  |      chi2    df   Prob > chi2 | 
  |------+-------------------------------| 
  |   1  |   25.1697    25     0.45290   | 
  |   2  |   22.2114    25     0.62351   | 
  +--------------------------------------+ 




   Eigenvalue stability condition 
  +----------------------------------------+ 
  |        Eigenvalue        |   Modulus   | 
  |--------------------------+-------------| 
  |  -.4974018 + .08210557i  |   .504133   | 
  |  -.4974018 - .08210557i  |   .504133   | 
  |  .05048313 +    .44289i  |   .445758   | 
  |  .05048313 -    .44289i  |   .445758   | 
  |   .1019771               |   .101977   | 
  +----------------------------------------+ 





Appendix 3. Economy/Positive/field  
 





   Lagrange-multiplier test 
  +--------------------------------------+ 
  | lag  |      chi2    df   Prob > chi2 | 
  |------+-------------------------------| 
  |   1  |   29.2338    25     0.25426   | 
  |   2  |   19.0486    25     0.79478   | 
  +--------------------------------------+ 




   Eigenvalue stability condition 
  +----------------------------------------+ 
  |        Eigenvalue        |   Modulus   | 
  |--------------------------+-------------| 
  |  -.4468319 +  .1485008i  |   .470862   | 
  |  -.4468319 -  .1485008i  |   .470862   | 
  |   .3195453 +  .2976716i  |   .436712   | 
  |   .3195453 -  .2976716i  |   .436712   | 
  | -.01999205               |   .019992   | 
  +----------------------------------------+ 
   All the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle. VAR satisfies stability condition. 
 
Appendix 4. Economy/Positive/phone  
 





   Lagrange-multiplier test 
  +--------------------------------------+ 
  | lag  |      chi2    df   Prob > chi2 | 
  |------+-------------------------------| 
  |   1  |   29.1292    25     0.25855   | 
  |   2  |   16.9249    25     0.88450   | 
  +--------------------------------------+ 




   Eigenvalue stability condition 
  +----------------------------------------+ 
  |        Eigenvalue        |   Modulus   | 
  |--------------------------+-------------| 
  |  .05017088 +  .4295612i  |   .432481   | 
  |  .05017088 -  .4295612i  |   .432481   | 
  |  -.3838087 +  .1514042i  |   .412592   | 
  |  -.3838087 -  .1514042i  |   .412592   | 
  |  .09998438               |   .099984   | 
  +----------------------------------------+ 






Appendix 5. Public safety/Positive 
 





   Lagrange-multiplier test 
  +--------------------------------------+ 
  | lag  |      chi2    df   Prob > chi2 | 
  |------+-------------------------------| 
  |   1  |   20.1306    25     0.73994   | 
  |   2  |   13.6913    25     0.96685   | 
  +--------------------------------------+ 




   Eigenvalue stability condition 
  +----------------------------------------+ 
  |        Eigenvalue        |   Modulus   | 
  |--------------------------+-------------| 
  |  -.6367567               |   .636757   | 
  |  -.4463887               |   .446389   | 
  |   .3277818               |   .327782   | 
  | -.08589444 +  .1406297i  |   .164786   | 
  | -.08589444 -  .1406297i  |   .164786   | 
  +----------------------------------------+ 
   All the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle. VAR satisfies stability condition. 
 
Appendix 6. Public safety/Negative 
 





   Lagrange-multiplier test 
  +--------------------------------------+ 
  | lag  |      chi2    df   Prob > chi2 | 
  |------+-------------------------------| 
  |   1  |   24.5846    25     0.48584   | 
  |   2  |   20.6870    25     0.70993   | 
  +--------------------------------------+ 




   Eigenvalue stability condition 
  +----------------------------------------+ 
  |        Eigenvalue        |   Modulus   | 
  |--------------------------+-------------| 
  |  -.5466986 +  .1503669i  |   .567001   | 
  |  -.5466986 -  .1503669i  |   .567001   | 
  | -.03568584 +  .3644699i  |   .366213   | 
  | -.03568584 -  .3644699i  |   .366213   | 
  |   .1374749               |   .137475   | 
  +----------------------------------------+ 





Appendix 7. Public safety/Positive/Field 
 





   Lagrange-multiplier test 
  +--------------------------------------+ 
  | lag  |      chi2    df   Prob > chi2 | 
  |------+-------------------------------| 
  |   1  |   22.6481    25     0.59810   | 
  |   2  |   15.0887    25     0.93928   | 
  +--------------------------------------+ 




   Eigenvalue stability condition 
  +----------------------------------------+ 
  |        Eigenvalue        |   Modulus   | 
  |--------------------------+-------------| 
  |   -.647797               |   .647797   | 
  |   -.336427               |   .336427   | 
  |   .3019992               |   .301999   | 
  |  -.1051566               |   .105157   | 
  | -.00884263               |   .008843   | 
  +----------------------------------------+ 
   All the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle.   VAR satisfies stability condition. 
 
Appendix 8. Public safety/Positive/Phone 
 





   Lagrange-multiplier test 
  +--------------------------------------+ 
  | lag  |      chi2    df   Prob > chi2 | 
  |------+-------------------------------| 
  |   1  |   22.3041    25     0.61813   | 
  |   2  |   11.8618    25     0.98765   | 
  +--------------------------------------+ 




   Eigenvalue stability condition 
  +----------------------------------------+ 
  |        Eigenvalue        |   Modulus   | 
  |--------------------------+-------------| 
  |  -.6150435               |   .615044   | 
  |  -.4904636               |   .490464   | 
  |   .2956847               |   .295685   | 
  | -.08995816 +   .114731i  |   .145793   | 
  | -.08995816 -   .114731i  |   .145793   | 
  +----------------------------------------+ 





Appendix 9. Unit root tests 
 
. dfuller d.es 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        21 
 
                               ---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Z(t)             -5.628            -3.750            -3.000            -2.630 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000 
 
. dfuller d.approval 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        21 
 
                               ---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Z(t)             -3.717            -3.750            -3.000            -2.630 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0039 
 
. dfuller d.disapproval 
 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        21 
 
                               ---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Z(t)             -3.693            -3.750            -3.000            -2.630 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0042 
 
 
. dfuller d.sitecomej 
 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        21 
 
                               ---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Z(t)             -5.210            -3.750            -3.000            -2.630 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000 
 
. dfuller d.sitecopeor 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        21 
 
                               ---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Z(t)             -4.858            -3.750            -3.000            -2.630 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 






. dfuller d.sitpermej 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        21 
 
                               ---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Z(t)             -5.871            -3.750            -3.000            -2.630 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000 
 
. dfuller d.sitperpeor 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        21 
 
                               ---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Z(t)             -5.364            -3.750            -3.000            -2.630 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000 
 
. dfuller d.expmej 
 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        21 
 
                               ---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Z(t)             -4.592            -3.750            -3.000            -2.630 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0001 
 
. dfuller d.exppeor 
 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        21 
 
                               ---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Z(t)             -5.671            -3.750            -3.000            -2.630 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000 
 
. dfuller d.mipecon 
 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        21 
 
                               ---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Z(t)             -4.306            -3.750            -3.000            -2.630 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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